


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DPS Economic Expert on SDS-DPS Ties, Reform
93BA0088A Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 13 Oct 92 p 9

[Interview with Evgeniy Matinchev, National Assembly deputy, by Milena Dimitrova; place and date not given: "SDS and DPS Talked Without Negotiating"]

[Text] *Evgeniy Matinchev, who participated in the dinner at the Krim Restaurant as a DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] expert in economic and social affairs, states that most cards, but by no means all of them, were revealed at the meeting.*

[168 CHASA] First of all, on Wednesday the DPS asked for a half-hour break. Of course, at that time the group was discussing the purchase prices of tobacco.

[Matinchev] Yes, we had invited Minister Pramatariski and representatives of Bulgartabak. We discussed the level of purchase prices and the problems associated with this level. First of all, some businesses have used bank credit that has not been fully repaid. These businesses now hope to export products worth millions of leva and use this money to repay the bank credit. But for the forthcoming tobacco purchase they will have to acquire new credit at high interest rates—not on favorable terms. In addition, according to the information available to me, there are around 100,000 metric tons of unprocessed tobacco in warehouses, while annual production does not exceed 80 million tons. You can easily imagine just how difficult the position is of our voters at this time. They are told that the harvest will be paid off in installments, approximately by March.

[168 CHASA] And what money will be used to buy bread, for example?

[Matinchev] The question immediately arises. What they will eat until March, and what will be used to grow seedlings for next year? I would like to put forward another problem that I expect to be solved by the government without fail. I personally asked Pragmatarski for help. On the labor cooperative farms now undergoing reorganization, the tobacco businesses have transferred money in their accounts for the 1991 harvest in order to settle with the tenants and cooperative members. But because the cooperative farmers have acquired bank credit, this money was immediately confiscated by the bank in some villages even though it had been allocated for a specific purpose. In my possession is correspondence revealing the paradox that people have not received their money for 1991, piled up expenses and took out loans in 1992, and have literally been reduced to a condition of hunger.

[168 CHASA] Two weeks ago the DPS announced that it was withdrawing its confidence in Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. Will the inflexibility of the movement be broken after the dinner given by Filip Dimitrov in his capacity of chairman of the SDS NKS [Union of Democratic Forces-National Coordinating Council]?

[Matinchev] There are no indications of this at all. In these talks most of the cards we held as partners were shown, but not all of them. If you were to ask me what the most important thing is, I would reply that it is several purely economic and social matters. First of all, there is what I have already told you about the tobacco harvest. Second, there are many regions in the country with mixed populations, with semialpine inhabitants, mountaineers, and so forth, regions in which the people live in poverty because of a wide variety of factors. Unemployment in individual places has reached 80 to 85 percent. We have read that, considering this unemployment, the freezing of any financing for next year, the failure to solve the tobacco problems, and the stagnation in construction, these inhabitants are abandoned to the vagaries of fate and have no chance of surviving even this winter. For this reason we are immediately making a number of economic demands. We want steps to be taken promptly, for the situation to be analyzed, and for solutions to be found for the difficulties in areas with a mixed population. You know that we have not begun to carry out individual regional programs, for example, in communities such as Madan.

[168 CHASA] Is this known to the government and to Filip Dimitrov personally?

[Matinchev] Yes it is now that we have asked for a vote of no confidence in the prime minister. But we are not concerned in general with the problems of ore mining and uranium mining, for example, as these activities are organized in the town of Madan. We are looking for a total solution, and not a solution for a specific region or mining complex. Quite a few things can be done. There are a number of international programs, such as under the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, whose resources could be oriented toward the destitute regions instead of having the government freeze the capital involved because of the finance minister's ambition to control and distribute these resources.

[168 CHASA] What has the reaction to this been?

[Matinchev] When we posed the global tobacco question, the reaction was, "yes, these are serious problems. We believe that the proper attention should be paid to them." Credit is due Ventseslav Dimitrov. He was the first to admit that such problems objectively exist and should be raised and discussed.

[168 CHASA] On the day after the secret dinner Filip Dimitrov made a statement interpreted by the media as saving Ivan Kostov's job.

[Matinchev] I think that it is wrong to believe that any particular person's job has been saved, because no personnel changes at all were discussed at that dinner.

[168 CHASA] You did not talk about demands for a statement of no confidence?

[Matinchev] There was absolutely nothing about that. The SDS NKS representative talked to us, not the prime minister.

[168 CHASA] And what did you talk about for three hours at the Krim?

[Matinchev] One of the topics we took up was the fact that now we have discovered how unsuccessfully a number of important and fundamental matters have been resolved by legislative means. We voted on them in support of the SDS. Our voters have not had any chance at all of obtaining land. In some places up to 300 decars are being returned; this deprives the landless of even the slightest hope of actually receiving land. Possibly in the regions that are currently destitute we will demand some indication that the amount of land to be returned to the owners will be reduced. We believe it to be our fault that the law is not being applied or cannot be applied by the government. This means that, in order to speed up the restoration process, we did not carefully think out the wording of the law in advance. Take another example that I brought up during the dinner. At the dinner we expressed our alarm that the majority of the landless farmers represent 50 percent of their contribution in the form of labor, as adopted in the law. Now we are faced with the paradox that, in order for wages and the large bonuses to be paid, a number of liquidation boards have proceeded with total sale of livestock and implements. This is not to say that this is being done also to ease the burden on the banks prior to liquidation. This policy is being pursued by both the right-wing and the left-wing heads of liquidation boards. And what will happen if there is no land to give to the landless? We do not believe that we support the interests of those who voted for us by supporting such a policy.

[168 CHASA] What do you expect to happen after the land law has been enacted and goes into effect?

[Matinchev] First of all, we expect that attention will be paid to the problems that we have brought up. Second, we expect a reversal of the policy of this government, speeding up of the economic reform, and resolution of sensitive economic and financial matters. It worries me that many Bulgarian businesses are on the verge of bankruptcy. The government should pursue a differentiated policy and restructure the reform, if there is such a thing as reform at all.

[168 CHASA] Do you insist that the policy be neoliberal?

[Matinchev] Call it right wing or neoconservative or whatever you like. But at the moment we insist on socialization in application of the reform. The burdens borne by any Bulgarian family become more complex if this family lives in one of the difficult areas. We insist that attention be paid to these people. At the same time, we admit that this situation is temporary, possibly because many businesses have closed in these regions, and this is the main reason why unemployment is so very high. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that these

businesses will begin operation in the near future. Consequently, the government must carry out a number of measures during the forthcoming period as part of the process of going through the stages toward a market economy. And so I say that it is a question of human survival.

[168 CHASA] Does the DPS have anything to fear from the opening up of the files?

[Matinchev] Allow me to reply in the words of Akhmed Dogan, stating that we are not worried about this matter. Yes, the files will show who the intelligence agents are; there actually are such people. And afterward? I personally have to ask who will profit from this affair. There is no question that the reform will suffer. Time is passing. I keep on saying that the most democratic institution in the country is the parliament, and I ask myself who has an interest in destabilizing it.

[168 CHASA] Will this battle between the high echelons of power come to an end?

[Matinchev] I hope so. Thus far in our interview I have stressed economic matters, but we did discuss other questions with the SDS leadership. One of them, as an example, is how to restore the mechanisms of cooperation and what technology of cooperation between the SDS and the DPS is to be adopted. In parliament we have come to walk more or less in step, but such is not the case with the executive power. And you well know that the government can issue decrees temporarily suspending enforcement even of an entire law. And we want to promote, to the extent that we are able to do so, lawful solutions to the problems of our voters. A certain amount of tension has built up here in the parliamentary group, because, when we have asked the government for discussion and information on the problems, very seldom have we secured them.

[168 CHASA] What is the next step that you will take?

[Matinchev] Our meetings and talks will continue. I repeat, they are open and honest.

[168 CHASA] But you said a while ago that you have not revealed all the secrets.

[Matinchev] Yes, but everything is clear about the cards we have played.

[168 CHASA] Mr. Matinchev, you have talked about economic problems so difficult that they cannot be solved all at once, even with right-wing magic. When and how do you expect the government to respond?

[Matinchev] We are not yet familiar with all of the government's intentions. We have been told that thought is being given to these matters. But it is not clear to me as an expert what this thinking is. I would like to know, of course, but the talks in question have been merely preliminary ones.

[168 CHASA] But matters are urgent, and this includes the problem of tobacco.

[Matinchev] Yes, but I am firmly convinced that some statement will be issued; this will happen. Moreover, a declaration of intentions will be made. And what with our searching questions, these intentions can be more broadly disseminated and examined. If more goodwill is displayed, we can solve them together even this month. But I must emphasize the "together."

[168 CHASA] What other topics were dealt with in the discussion?

[Matinchev] In addition to the economic ones there were topics relating to the situation in Bulgaria and to domestic political life, as well as to the danger of intervention by other interests and other countries. But again I say that the main topics were economic problems, questions of cooperation and restoration of mutual trust, as well as problems between institutions and the subject of certain international changes.

[168 CHASA] According to eyewitnesses and waiters at the Krim Restaurant, you came away from the dinner with your face pale and drawn.

[Matinchev] I was overcome with fatigue. We had accepted the invitation of Filip Dimitrov because he was unable to come to see us in parliament during the day. And after a full five-hour work schedule, we talked another four hours in the evening, and in the morning we had gathered for a meeting of the movement. My work day began at 0730 and continued without interruption until after midnight. I admit that I was very tired. We are also working Saturday and Sunday; we will prevail.

[168 CHASA] Are you surprised by the reaction of the SDS parliamentary group to the memorandum introduced by Ludzhev?

[Matinchev] Ludzhev did something for which he is to be congratulated. Just how innovative are the thoughts expressed in the memorandum is another matter. I have always said that a government cannot operate without a program. Bikov and Pramatarski wrote about what they will deal with, but more than this is needed. A program for development of the economy and a social policy are also needed. I simply cannot understand the stubborn resistance to someone sitting down and coordinating what the government is doing. If Ludzhev is expelled, although I do not believe that this will happen, we will take him in.

Opponent Considers Completion of Dam Unavoidable*93CH0043A Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian 10 Oct 92 p 30*

[Article by S. Laszlo Gyurovsky: "Water Hijack: C-Variant of Project Bos Will Be Completed"]

[Text] *Bulldozers under Bratislava are working continuously, and the diversion of the Danube can be started in a matter of weeks. Meciar seems undeterred by the tactics of the Hungarian Government; he is adamant about finishing the job. The Slovak prime minister and his entourage believe that the status quo will be legalized by launching the power plant following the "C-variant." The opening of the Danube-Rhone-Main canal, as they see it, also justifies their strive. In Slovakia nobody takes seriously Hungary's possible counter move.*

Bratislava—From the Slovak side the situation isn't very promising either. The Federal Government recently discussed the issue of federal budget support to the gigantic construction and came up with a rather unfavorable decision for Bratislava. Accordingly, the Federal Government will pull out from financing the incomplete hydroelectric power plant. The decision came as a cold shower for Meciar; in Bratislava they didn't even try to conceal their disappointment. Peter Baco, a Slovak government delegate who was just recently appointed to lead the Czechoslovak negotiating group, demanded the immediate freeze of federal construction also in the Czech Republic. Though it turned out the Bos power plant was the last federally funded project, the outrage seemed to be unquenchable. In Bratislava everybody is convinced that the Prague cabinet has no right to decide the fate of the construction; their only duty is to provide enough money to complete the project. The Slovak leaders seem not to lose their faith even in this desperate situation. They hope to continue the construction by issuing government bonds, seeking bank credits, and attracting foreign investments. Perhaps it is not accidental that only the Slovak budget shows a multibillion koruna deficit, while both the Czech Republic and the Federal Government are expected to achieve a budget surplus by the end of the year.

Ivan Carnogursky, general manager of the Hydrostav, mused recently on the different fund-raising possibilities. (Hydrostav is one of the major contractors of the Gabčíkovo project and the biggest construction company in Slovakia.) Carnogursky said in an interview with the economic magazine TREND that his company was providing credits to the investors and also was mobilizing its Canadian and Austrian business partners to import foreign capital as soon as possible. Completion of the project became a national issue for the soon-to-be independent Slovakia—a matter of prestige for the Slovak Government, just like the termination of the construction is a matter of prestige for the Antall cabinet.

Bratislava probably acquiesced that it was impossible to reach agreement with the Hungarians, and considers the

negotiations on the hydro-electric power plant as irrelevant. As an indication of their skepticism, the Czechoslovak negotiating team isn't led by the Slovak Prime Minister anymore. Appointing the politically unimportant Peter Baco, minister for agriculture, the Slovaks gave a very clear message of how they feel about the negotiations.

In order to understand Slovakia's attitude, one has to realize that in the Republic none of the important interest groups are motivated to speak up against the completion of the dam: Almost everybody is interested in finishing it as soon as possible. The investment provides thousands of jobs for the construction industry right now in deep crisis, it boosts the leverage of the "energy lobby," and could turn Bratislava into a key port city on the Danube. But the most important of all is that it could be an opportunity for the Slovak Government to celebrate a victory over Hungarian politics. Because Meciar needs real—or for that matter invented—successes in his foreign policy to balance the deepening economic problems of the soon-to-be independent Slovakia, and a victory in the Hungarian-Slovak conflict could be a real chance. The special police units deployed against the Fradi fans served the same purpose.

It is also clear that for the time being there is no political interest group in Slovakia that would carry the burden of any international consequences of completing the C-variant. None of the professional lobbies or important parties would be effected. In my opinion Slovakia is lacking foreign policy experiences and therefore cannot perceive the real ramifications of its decision, and I believe—not without any ground—that the international opinion is not fully united in assessing Bos.

We should not harbor illusions that they will not finish the hydroelectric power plant. It became such an important national issue that there is no political or professional group ready to face the international consequences of this action. Unfortunately this means that the C-version will be completed and the diversion of the Danube will develop into a source of long-term conflict between Hungary and Slovakia.

Klaus Characterizes Aspects of Current Crisis*93CH0057B Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 9 Oct 92 pp 1-2*

[Commentary by Vaclav Klaus, Czech prime minister: "About Something Else"]

[Text] The generation that used to go to watch the new wave of Czech movies in the 1960's will surely remember an early movie of the same name by Vera Chytilova. The present crisis in Czechoslovakia is also about something other than what the opposition keeps trying to make us believe, and we need to voice it openly again and again. Perhaps sometime in the future Vera Chytilova will make another film about this—with her famous analytical directness, even ruthlessness—and thus will join the recent merciless indictment of Juraj Jakubisek.

At first glance, it seems that the controversy is about the integrity of the Czechoslovak State, about preserving Masaryk's and Stefanik's (as well as Hacha's, Gottwald's, and Husak's) common state, about the integrated nature of the territory from the Sumava to the Tatra Mountains, about the excessive nationalist Slovak ambitions for emancipation that were made possible by the post-November democratization of our society, and, possibly, about the alleged ease with which the Czech Government coalition is accepting the disintegration of the state imposed by Slovakia. As a result, for the third year running, our media are regaling us with the so-called constitution problem, when, in fact, it is a matter of something else, something much deeper in our country.

It is a matter of emancipating this country and its citizens from communist, collective, irresponsible, and thoughtless ideology, from the consequences it had and still has on the thoughts and actions of all of us, from the consequences it imprinted on our land, towns, fields, schools, and factories. There are people among us who lost a lot as a result of November 1989. They are people who have gathered together in the present leftist parties and who are making use of the post-November freedom and taking every opportunity to return us to "democratic" socialism, to system hybrids "with a human face," because that is the only way they can return themselves to the privileged status of the elite in various central committees, kraj national committees, general management, academies of sciences, councils, and commissions, and in the entire endless underbrush of the scientific research base. Democracy and the market, in comparison, are extremely nonauthoritarian; they eliminate favoritism and rights of privilege. And it is these privileges that today's soldiers for "democratic and prosperous Czechoslovakia" got so used to during the past regime that they are willing to turn against everything and everyone, even the most intrinsic rights of the citizens of the Czech country, and are capable of forming an alliance with anyone—even against the interests of the Czech nation. Thus, the present crisis is not primarily a constitutional crisis. It is a civil crisis, an individual crisis, a crisis of our lack of faith. It is a crisis of ambitious leftist politicians. It is a crisis of socialist intellectuals. It is a crisis of the media. It is a crisis of freedom, which fell into our laps and which does not yet have an indispensable element—personal responsibility. It is a crisis that puts forth (and unfairly finds) its arguments in the exceedingly difficult moments of our social transformation, even though we are dealing with them better than other postcommunist countries.

Once these former, and often present, privileged people start to work on a daily basis, once they start to create some new values, once they come back into the Czech society from their external observation point, once they stop making spectacular gestures (and, parallel to this, once they stop pulling invisible strings), once they accept the elementary, if you will, Christian, humility and rid themselves of the arrogant audacity of doing and, above all, of saying whatever they will, the crisis will end and we will solve our constitutional problems very easily.

But we do not want to deceive ourselves. The leftist constitutional card, naturally played differently depending on the situation, merely conceals the true conflict—that really is about something else.

Slovak Activist Related to Former Tiso Regime

93CH0057A Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech
10 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by (kw): "Gabo Zelenay Awarded Medal by Tiso"]

[Text] Bratislava (kw)—Yesterday, the weekly paper TYDENIK PLUS 7 DNI published an extract from the magazine SLOVAK of 26 January 1945, which had published a list of members of the Slovak National Guard who had been awarded medals by President Tiso for their success in the fight against the SNP [Party of National Prosperity]. Among other things, the text states: "The following members of the Emergency Regiment of the National Guard were decorated with a small bronze medal.... Lance Corporal Gabriel Zelenay, who, as a courier, routed an enemy combat group and, together with a comrade, took two partisans prisoner."

The former well-known sports commentator on Slovak television Gabo Zelenay (father of the chairman of the SN FS [Chamber of Nations of the Federal Assembly], Roman Zelenay) acted as press spokesman for the HZDS [Movement for Democratic Slovakia] during its founding. He was one of the first to endorse the creation of the Slovak journalists association, "Klub za pravdivy obraz Slovenska [Club for a True Picture of Slovakia]," and still acts as moderator of almost all HZDS meetings.

Interpellations by Hungarian Minority Deputies

93CH0042A Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian 8 Oct 92
p 4

[Text of interpellations in the Slovak Parliament by Deputies Edit Bauer of the Coexistence Political Movement and Bela Bugar of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement; date not given: "Interpellations"]

[Text] Two deputies, one belonging to the Coexistence Political Movement (EPM) and the other to the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM), put questions to the Slovak Government on issues that are of fundamental importance to us all. The interpellation by Deputy Edit Bauer (EPM) concerned the entering of given names in the register of births. The one by Deputy Bela Bugar was about the prime minister's remarks that were fomenting hysteria against ethnic Hungarians.

Deliberately False Interpretation of the Law

Edit Bauer: My question to the interior minister of the Slovak Republic concerns the deliberately restrictive and misleading interpretation and misquoting of Section 40, Paragraph 2, of the Federal Interior Ministry's Decree No. 22/1977 Sb. [Collection of Laws], by the Slovak

Interior Ministry's Department of General Public Administration. In the 19 August 1992 issue of PRAVDA (in an article entitled "Citizenship Is the Decisive Factor"), a female staff member of the said department gave the following answer to a question:

"Law No. 268/1948 Sb. on the Registration of Births (presumably 1948 is a mistake, because the law in question was enacted in 1949), and Decree No. 22/1977 Sb. implementing it explain how to proceed when entering a person's given name in the register. It is clearly stated that the person's citizenship is the decisive factor. Thus, if ethnic Hungarian parents who are Czechoslovak citizens were to choose Istvan as their son's given name, their request to have that given name entered in the register would have to be denied, because a Slovak equivalent of that name does exist, namely Stefan. A jumbled, pet, or familiar form of a proper name likewise cannot be entered as a given name. Furthermore, when at least one of the parents is a foreign citizen, by mutual agreement the parents may choose for their child a given name that is customary in the foreign parent's homeland. In other words, I wish to repeat, Czechoslovak citizens who are ethnic Hungarians or members of other ethnic minorities may not choose Hungarian or other foreign given names for their children, nor the pet or familiar forms of foreign given names. Because to enter such given names in the register would be a violation of a law that regards citizenship, rather than nationality in the sense of ethnic affiliation, as the decisive factor."

Section 10 of Law No. 260/1949 Sb. on the Registration of Births states: "(a) The child's given name, surname and sex must be entered in the register."

That law does not contain any other relevant or meaningful provision. Decree No. 22/1977 Sb., which was quoted in the PRAVDA article, states: "Only one given name may be entered per child. But more than one given name may be entered for a child that is a foreign citizen, if the child's parents so request and they too are foreign citizens." This decree does not contain any other provisions regarding the child's given name in its native language. In other words, a person's citizenship is decisive only in that one case of entering more than one given name. Therefore the interpretation that only a foreign citizen—a Hungarian citizen, for instance—may choose Istvan for his child's given name is wrong. The quoted decree contains a general ban on entering jumbled, pet, or familiar forms of proper names as given names for anyone, including foreign citizens. But Istvan, Arpad, Siegfried, Stepan, Fedor, and Zbygniew are not jumbled, pet, or familiar forms of proper names. They are given names commonly used by Central European nations. Only Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the Slovak Republic's Constitution can apply to entering such given names in the register of births—i.e., that everyone may do whatever statutory regulations do not explicitly prohibit. For his child, then, anyone may choose a given name in the child's native language, without violating any of the restrictions specified in statutory regulations.

Who Is Fomenting Unrest?

Bela Bugár: Pursuant to Section 89 of Law No. 44/1989 Sb. on the Slovak National Council's Rules of Procedure, I am putting a question to Vladimir Meciar, the Slovak Government's prime minister, regarding some of the remarks he made on 29 September 1992.

As reported in the 30 September 1992 issue of PRAVDA, the prime minister has labeled as extreme the expectations of certain Hungarian politicians that also minority languages may be used to transact official business, orally or in writing. He justified his remark with the argument that otherwise it would be necessary to introduce seven official languages in Slovakia.

During the election campaign the prime minister could see for himself that, in addition to the Slovak language, also Hungarian can be used to transact official business in some districts, and German, etc., in other districts. There is not a single district or town in which all seven ethnic minorities can be found living together, and therefore it is not necessary to speak of seven official languages. Such false information serves only one purpose: to influence Slovakia's population, and to spread mistrust of minorities and their politicians. For that very reason I ask the prime minister: Does he recognize the minority rights entrenched in the Slovak Republic's Constitution? If he does, it will suffice to read Article 34, Paragraph 2, about the right of minorities to use their language also for transacting official business.

The prime minister also claimed that, as a result of the Hungarian parties' dirty and underhanded politics, Slovak entrepreneurs are unwilling to invest in areas inhabited by the Hungarian minority, because they fear that those areas will break away from Slovakia. I reject these accusations and their hostile tone. We are not and will not be the guilty party. It is the prime minister and some of his cabinet colleagues who are spreading rumors that minority demands for autonomy will mean breaking away from Slovakia. They are spreading such rumors despite the fact that they themselves are unwilling to listen to our ideas and, therefore, cannot even know what our ideas are.

The prime minister and his followers are claiming that demands for autonomy presuppose a duplication of public administration, and therefore it is not possible to grant the ethnic minorities autonomy, because that would jeopardize Slovakia's sovereignty, pursuant to Article 34, Paragraph 3, of the Slovak Republic's Constitution. We reject those accusations because our autonomy aspirations (with which the prime minister and his followers are not even familiar) are in harmony with international documents and Slovakia's interests.

In areas inhabited by ethnically mixed populations, we are being accused of fomenting unrest with our allegedly extreme demands. On the other hand, our rights are being questioned, even though the prime minister himself had voted for them. He admonishes us for not being legitimate deputies, yet the results of the parliamentary elections

show that more than 90 percent of the ethnic Hungarian voters had cast their ballots for the Hungarian parties.

If the minority is afraid, then its fear is being fed by remarks such as the following: not every Hungarian who got his land back is innocent; it is enough to examine the

bank accounts of ethnic Hungarians; if some people think they will be doing something differently here, they will be regarded as subversives, etc. On behalf of the Hungarian coalition's deputies, I call on the prime minister to finally stop this search for enemies within Slovakia proper.

Ethnic Hungarian Leader in Ukraine Interviewed
 93BA0070A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO
 in Hungarian 13 Oct 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Mihaly Toth, Ukrainian regional prefect and head of the Beregovo State Administrative District, by Jozsef Birtok; place and date not given: "Participation—At All Levels"]

[Text] [Birtok] Please tell me about your authority and jurisdiction first.

[Toth] The regional prefect system began functioning last spring. It includes the exercise of both supervisory authority and executive power in the region. The scope of executive power exercised by this office is not complete only so far as some of it had been delegated to local councils as their own power, and I, too, can delegate certain powers pursuant to law either to all of the local bodies or to any given local body.

[Birtok] Is your system a hierarchical structure? Are you subordinate to the county prefect?

[Toth] Yes, it is an absolutely vertical system consisting of the president of the state, the county prefect, and myself. This system functions under the head of the state and not under the council of ministers, but from a practical standpoint the prime minister's official decrees and other actions are also implemented by the regional prefect's staff.

[Birtok] Is it within your authority to review the legality of local action?

[Toth] My authority is that of a prefect. Accordingly, I call upon those who create illegal measures to change those measures; subsequent steps include suspension and challenge in courts.

[Birtok] You are an official serving in a hierarchical structure, but you are also an advocate of decentralization based on autonomous principles—you developed the proposal for autonomous governance there....

[Toth] When I was asked and recommended to fill this post last spring, I recognized a chance for enforcing the right to national self-determination, at least in a partial form. This is why I agreed to serve in this capacity.

[Birtok] How did the community react to your appointment?

[Toth] I discussed this appointment with the executive body of the organization. They tacitly took note of the appointment. In essence, every adverse aspect of this matter—both the moral and the financial aspects—has been considered. But it is this duality that's bad in this situation.

[Birtok] In analyzing the autonomy issue the first reference you made related to the definitive role played by the liberal economy during the Czech era....

[Toth] ... and the progressing economic system—interlaced with an essentially almost full cultural autonomy—was virtually capable of managing conflicts between nationalities in some form....

[Birtok] Do you envision a chance in the coming years for a similar solution in Ukraine?

[Toth] Realistically, one can only approach this matter at the level of principles, politics, and legislation. Economic uplift is the key issue, this is what could really help, but this is also the most difficult issue. Economic uplift often does not depend on the good intentions of specific bureaucrats, governments, or parliaments; the laws of the economy function within their own system....

[Birtok] At the same time nationalist tendencies are also gaining strength in Ukraine. Do you see a chance for instituting processes identical to those we see in most of the socialist successor states?

[Toth] There is a chance. There is a chance for that.

[Birtok] How is the relationship between minorities in Ukraine?

[Toth] A relationship exists; in principle there also exists a federation of minority organizations. In addition, there also exists by now an office at the ministerial level that deals with nationality issues. But it is very difficult to deal with these issues on the basis of uniform principles because the historical background, the mentality, and the geographic location of minorities in Ukraine is so varied. Without trying to aggrandize ourselves, I believe that the situation of Hungarians is very different from that of the rest of the minorities. According to my understanding, the KMKSZ [Cultural Association of Hungarians in the Lower Carpathian Region] is seeking, and in most instances is finding, opportunities for establishing relationships with the rest of the organizations, and for joint action.

[Birtok] As you have indicated, the economic aspects play a primary role in autonomous governance, and the rest of the things evolve from that. At the same time you also said that one has to try to set aside the political implications of this matter. Is it possible to set aside the political implications of autonomy? You also said that nationalist tendencies have gained strength since the debate over autonomy began....

[Toth] Clearly, all these things are included. In areas where a minority is in the majority, the minority must be able to defend, and must be able to live its own economic and ethnic life—this is a basic necessity. When I said that we should set aside political implications, I meant to say that we should not try to maximize the acquisition of the state's authority and jurisdiction. It is impossible to fully implement this, of course. But the framework for the exercise of the right to limited self-determination must be established in some form, as a halfway solution. One has to be careful with the political aspects of this matter, and with things that have the character of state functions

because such things have the potential of really encroaching on the interests of the existing state. We must find solutions which do not offend the state. This presents a difficult problem, but we must seek a solution.

[Birtok] Would you summarize the essence of this proposed autonomy?

[Toth] It has three main parts: cultural autonomy, autonomous government administration, and economic autonomy.

Within cultural autonomy the existence of a national institutional system and language use are underscored. In the framework of government administration the issue pertains to the choice and selection of cadres and the exercise of special authorities, which provide for free communications and for the free administration of affairs through the administration, without infringing upon the rights of the majority. Two alternatives are possible in this regard: the existing executive system provided for by law, and, at the same time, representation in higher level organs that exercise power. Economic autonomy means using these avenues for the acquisition of stronger and broader authority than provided for by law, to take advantage of opportunities and to acquire property to operate the institutions. I believe that this could be disregarded if the state provided central guarantees to provide for such things.

[Birtok] A recurring question: How does the majority relate to this? To what extent will those in dispersion suffer as a result?

[Toth] This contrast appears differently as soon as we remove from this issue the characteristics of statehood. We have historical precedents for this even in the Lower Carpathian: There has indeed been an October 1938 and a March 1939. On those occasions Hungarians constituting a bloc had indeed been separated from those living in dispersion, and this had indeed produced reprisals. This experience has produced huge disputes even within the KMKSZ. In the end the solution was akin to "having your cake and eating it, too." At the same time and place they agreed to the principles of both personal (cultural) and regional autonomy.

I believe that those who claim that the solution can only be found in full democratization are also correct. If we have the survival of the Hungarian people as our goal, those living in a bloc have a better chance for survival. Here, too, the disintegration of the dispersion takes place at such rapid pace that the process is going to be complete within a few decades if it continues....

And we once again run into concerns if we consider democratic ways in which the majority could view this problem.... We must seek a solution. We have no prescription—neither I nor the organization has a prescription.

[Birtok] You said that it would be inconceivable to you not to permit participation in the exercise of leadership functions by those in a relative minority....

[Toth] To be sure, we do not have a situation like in Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca], a city that has a large Hungarian minority population, where not a single Hungarian holds office. In the Ungvár [Uzhgorod] district, where Hungarians constitute a relative minority, most leaders appoint Hungarians as their deputies. Just what kinds of Hungarians they appoint is a different matter. I have stressed before that this system continues to function essentially as a remnant of the communist institutional system. I am not concerned with the continued life of this system; instead, we must resolve the issue of participation in the exercise of power by those in a relative minority. We must find a way not only to be represented, but also for direct participation in the exercise of power, in administration, and in the exercise of executive authority.

MDF National Board on Media Battle, Congress

*93CH0054A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 5 Oct 92 pp 1, 5*

[Article by Adrienn Demeter: "MDF Weekend; The Press Has Confused Its Role"]

[Text] In a statement issued Saturday [3 October], the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] National Board regards as dangerous and unsettling certain anti-democratic opposition endeavors to take full control of the various editorial offices of the Hungarian Television by targeting independent journalists, after having managed to push editor in chief Bela Gyori out of the Hungarian Radio. Gyori sympathized with the government and enjoyed the citizens' confidence.

The removal of Istvan G. Palfy as head of the television programs A HET and HIRADO, and the intent to remove Alajos Chrudinak from his post as editor in chief of PANORAMA, are antidemocratic steps according to the statement, actions that not only counter the interests of Hungarians residing within our borders, but also have damaging effects on the fate of all Hungarians. The National Board regards as unacceptable a situation in which political forces that remained in the minority in the first free elections enjoy full freedom to exercise exclusive power and to disseminate propaganda at the taxpayer-funded public service media.

At the Saturday afternoon press conference Agoston Szekelyhidi said that not only the radio and the television but also the entire system of Hungarian public information had suffered a loss as a result of the removal of Istvan G. Palfy. The relationship between HIRADO and A HET on the one hand, and the MDF, on the other, was not based on the two programs' prouling party outlook, but on the fact that these programs satisfied the MDF's expectations, i.e., they presented political personalities and events in an authentic manner, and in proportions consistent with reality. "The Hungarian

press has confused its role," the chairman of the National Board's executive committee said, "it wants to influence politics, instead of informing readers by publishing reports that present the everyday lives of Hungarians and which reflect reality. Among other factors, this may be attributed to the fact that after the system change foreigners became the owners of 74 percent of the newspapers, and thus, having walked a constrained path before, newspapers had no chance or time to freely choose and walk their own paths, but were forced to enter another constrained path."

The press conference was also told that the board has taken note of the Presidium's decision to hold the national congress on 22, 23, and 24 January. The reason for the postponement is that the bylaws also have to be amended, but the proposal to amend has not been completed, and more time is needed to prepare because the national congress is also going to elect officers. A national nominating committee has been established. (No one raised questions about Jozsef Antall's position as chairman of the MDF.) The national congress is intended to perform substantive work; thus, for example, it is supposed to provide answers to problems like how to develop a national citizenry and how to realize in practice the basic, national elements of democracy. Improving the flow of information presents an important issue. A chairman's session has been convened for 17 October; members of the National Board and of the MDF Presidium will take part in that meeting.

Ethnic Hungarians Score Budapest TV Chief

93CH0049A Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in Hungarian
15 Oct 92 pp 1-2

[Interviews with Miklos Duray, president of the Coexistence Political Movement in Slovakia, and Jozsef Tempfli, Roman Catholic Bishop in Oradea, Romania, by I.K.; place and date not given: "Elemer Hankiss Should Be Replaced"]

[Text] *Elemer Hankiss, the president of the Hungarian Television, has relieved of his duties Istvan G. Palfy, the editor in chief of the TV programs A HET and HIRADO, and has given an ultimatum to PANORAMA editor in chief Alajos Chrudinak. He demands that Chrudinak publicly apologize to him, and thereafter Hankiss would see what else would happen. The obviously politically motivated decisions evoked broadly based reactions both in Hungary and beyond our borders, especially within the Carpathian basin.*

Miklos Duray, the president of the Coexistence Political Movement in Slovakia and a member of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, was shocked to learn about the steps taken by the Hungarian TV president.

[I.K.] How does the Hungarian public in the highlands feel about the vendetta against Istvan G. Palfy and Alajos Chrudinak?

[Duray] Hungarian viewers here are very well aware of the fact that Alajos Chrudinak and Istvan G. Palfy demonstrated their fitness and human conduct under communism—they stood fast amid the trials and tribulations of a terrible era. We are fully satisfied with their reports and professional conduct. We regard both as outstanding journalists. And this is exactly why we are shocked by the continually renewed attacks against them.

[I.K.] To what extent are Hungarians in the highlands able to see through the complicated intrigue that goes on at the Hungarian Television?

[Duray] It does not seem to be overly complicated. Palfy and Chrudinak are being persecuted and attacked by the same people as before, during the communist era. It appears that the communists have not forgiven the things they have done.

Nagyvarad [Oradea] Catholic County Bishop Jozsef Tempfli said farewell to Kiralyhago area Reformed Church Bishop Laszlo Tokes just minutes before my telephone call.

[Tempfli] Just now, Laszlo Tokes and I discussed his announcement that he no longer desires to appear on Hungarian Television because of the dismissal of Istvan G. Palfy.

The bishop has justified his decision: "By doing so I want to call attention to damaging actions taken by Hankiss and his associates." He and I hold the same view in this respect: We have extremely high regard for PANORAMA, and for the aforementioned editors and their programs. We have the highest respect for Istvan G. Palfy and Alajos Chrudinak. They and the Hungarian Television maintained our spirits both before and after the revolution. Not having their intellectual contribution, their high standards, and their sense of morality reflected on the television screen would be very regrettable.

[I.K.] How do Hungarians in Transylvania react to Istvan G. Palfy's dismissal and to the ultimatum Hankiss gave to Chrudinak?

[Tempfli] All of us Hungarian bishops of Transylvania raise our voices against and protest this kind of action. We also intend to give voice to these feelings openly, in public, in an open letter. We ask and demand that if anyone, it is Elemer Hankiss who should be dismissed. At the time we discussed the fate of the PANORAMA show at the Ramada Hotel in Budapest, we became convinced that the TV president was not talking on his own behalf, but some people were dictating his actions. We have no alternative but to register an unmistakable, public protest.

TV on 1944 Deaths of Vojvodina Hungarians

93CH0049B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 3 Oct 92 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Banned PANORAMA Film To Be Broadcast Today; Hungarian Tragedy—Vojvodina, 1944"]

[Text] In a special edition of PANORAMA, TV1 is going to broadcast today at 1750 hours the Foreign Policy Editorial Office's documentary on the 1944 tragedy of Hungarians in the Vojvodina, which was banned a year and a half ago.

During the fall and winter of 1944 Yugoslav partisans butchered tens of thousands of innocent Hungarians in the Vojvodina as revenge for the "cold days" of 1942, when the Hungarian Gendarmerie and military shot Serbs and Jews into the Danube in the process of occupying the region, according to "official" justifications at the time.

The film footage includes thus far not publicized Yugoslav documents that prove that Tito and the then Yugoslav leadership attempted genocide by decapitating the Hungarians, the most significant, ancestral resident nationality in the Vojvodina. The first and only documentary that deals with the holocaust experienced by Hungarians in the Vojvodina was produced 18 months ago, but at that time it was banned and could not be broadcast. Indirectly, it called attention to the presently ongoing brutal genocide in Yugoslavia.

Ferenc Szaniszló is the editor and narrator.

Activities of Democratic Charter Discussed

MSZP Links Questioned

93CH0062A Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 22 Sep 92
p 14

[Interview with Maria Nemenyi, spokesperson of the Democratic Charter, by Gabriella Lantos; place and date not given: "Everyone Who Signed It Is a Spokesperson; Is the Charter Demonstrating? Loud Minority, Silent Majority"]

[Text] *The Democratic Charter, which originated as a civilian movement, did not react to the essay by the vice president of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]. Moreover, as many people saw it, the Charter was slowly dying because of infighting. Thus, the recent call by the movement for a peaceful demonstration with the purpose of putting an end to the spread of extremism came as a surprise. Gabriella Lantos interviewed Maria Nemenyi, spokesperson of the Democratic Charter.*

[Lantos] The summer was not completely uneventful in the life of the Democratic Charter. It seemed that there were infightings. This was apparent from the crossing of swords by Miklos Tamas Gaspar and Gyorgy Horanyi in the June issues of HETI VILAGGAZDASAG.

[Nemenyi] It was not only the two of them who crossed swords, because Tivadar Farkashazy, Mihaly Kornis, and Gyula Hegyi also spoke up. This is actually connected with a phenomenon that has accompanied the Democratic Charter since its conception: In the final analysis, it is unclear whether the Charter is a movement, a civilian social motion, or an organization. That is to say, the spokespersons were elected at the assembly at City Hall, but they cannot be called representatives. We said then—or rather, Gyorgy Konrad said—that everyone who signed the Charter was actually a spokesperson, because we are talking about nothing else than the proclamation or the upholding of fundamental democratic rights by the society of civilians. Because good laws are in vain if the people themselves do not consider it their duty to follow them with attention, to study them. From the fact that some people from time to time call a meeting, formulate something, or publish a declaration in the press, it seems that there is an organization. There is no organization. There are civilians who have their own private opinion, and they are not coordinated, because there is no need for that.

Action by the Popular Front?

[Lantos] Miklos Tamas Gaspar's statement that the Charter fell into the MSZP's [Hungarian Socialist Party] hands was met with disapproval. Some spokespersons of the Democratic Charter distanced themselves from it. There was, after all, a state of war.

[Nemenyi] We got over that very quickly. No one considered it a state of war. I suppose the differences of opinion will continue to exist. We did not even meet in the course of the summer; we learned about the statements of our fellow-spokespersons from the press. When we sat down together for the first time—this occurred after the Csurka essay, after several of us have been asked by private persons, friends, acquaintances, and representatives of various organizations, why the Charter was not stirring when something ought to be done—we concentrated only on this and not on the discussions and crossings of swords which occurred in the course of the summer.

[Lantos] The list of the organizations which support your initiative was published recently in NEPSZABADSAG. It is a very long list containing numerous well-known organizations. It seems that this is an initiative or action by a popular front in the face of impending serious danger.

[Nemenyi] I would like to point out that we are not talking about the Csurka essay alone. There are many phenomena on account of which we felt at the end of the summer that we must speak up. For instance, the revival of racism was not only revealed in the Csurka essay. The cases of Ketegyhaza and Tura have since provided very sad examples. However, events like those did occur before now, as well. The revival of intolerance, racism, anti-Semitism.... Then, also, that certain vocal minority feels that the street is theirs, and when they go to the

streets, on the one hand, they intimidate many people, and on the other hand, they somehow manage to make the majority believe that the truth and the power is theirs. I on my part think that the minority has a right to express its will, and I don't think that possessing the truth is a question of numbers. But something ought to be done to prevent people from being subjected to humiliating, unjust situations, and to keep the majority from very extreme minority opinions instead of its own, much more sober feelings. There are words that we are somehow afraid to utter. We think that because it happened once already—and the outcome was good or bad—we should now designate it with a different word. I don't think that we are in fatal danger, and I also don't think that we must now make a pact with the devil himself against fascism, as Churchill must have said when he entered a pact with Stalin. But at any rate, there are things, there are phenomena, in the face of which one must set party loyalties and ideologies aside and must speak up together, because they must be nipped in the bud before they can revive and gather strength.

To the Streets?

[Lantos] In recent times it has become a journalistic topic whether one should take to the streets, whether it is good if involvement in politics is transferred into the streets. At the time our conversation will be broadcast, there will be another demonstration in front of the radio. Is it proper if day after day masses march down the street on account of important or not-so-important issues?

[Nemenyi] I am definitely offended if our demonstration is mentioned on the same day with this one, if only because the one in progress now is a repeated demonstration. One of the organizers announced the demonstration on the newsreel of Hungarian Television, and he made their intention obvious, as well. I consider a demonstration that will hopefully be really monumental and dignified—and that makes a declaration not against something but for something, as we plan to do—a completely different matter.

Background Discussed

93CH0062B Budapest KOZTARSASAG in Hungarian
No 24, 25 Sep 92 pp 60-61

[Unattributed article: "Democratic Charter '91; Genre: Self-Organization of Citizens"]

[Text] After almost half a century of communist dictatorship, in the course of the free elections in the spring of 1990, the citizens revived parliamentary democracy and developed the basic institutions of democracy. However, after just a year and a half following the elections, in several people's opinion "democratic transformation is halting in Hungary," and "intolerant, authoritative power groups" are endangering the Constitution of the Republic. As a protest, a statement was issued by the Democratic Charter '91 in which it was summarized in 17 points when they think there will be real democracy in Hungary. By the past few days, more than 30,000 people

endorsed this document with their signatures. Let us look through the history of the Democratic Charter.

The historical antecedent of Charter '91 is the monumental civil rights movement of the Czechoslovak Charter '77 (for more details, see issue No. 19 of KOZTARSASAG). Of course, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the similarity. After all, the distinguished members of the Czechoslovak Charter, persecuted and imprisoned, raised their voices against a brutal dictatorship. The issuers of the Hungarian Charter acted among utterly different social conditions in order to improve an already existing democracy and to restrain authoritarian, antidemocratic endeavors.

The Charter is not a party, not a movement, but rather a joint venture, an intellectual association of people who think in a democratic way. The Charter is not a kind of institution, but a civilian exchange of ideas, the genre of the self-organization of society—as the writer Gyorgy Konrad, president of the International Pen Club, one of the drafters of the document, characterized the undertaking.

Let us examine what prompted more than 100 renowned Hungarian intellectuals—writers, scientists, artists, politicians—to issue the Charter in September 1991, which calls for a forceful stand for democracy. It cannot be denied that in the year and a half following the historic free election, tension and dissatisfaction mounted in the most diverse strata of society.

According to the drafters of Charter '91, beyond the shock necessarily accompanying great historic turning points, this is due not only to the serious deterioration of living conditions, but also to the fact that many desired an altogether different kind of democracy.

The "party document" by Imre Konya, leader of the MDF faction, details of which were first leaked by the alert press and which was later published in its entirety (MAGYAR HIRLAP, 9 September 1991), acted as a spark on this accumulated social irritation. The study urged the MDF to utilize the possibilities that its victory at the elections afforded; it charged that they, "the victors of the bloodless revolution, the members of the MDF, do not belong to the beneficiaries of the changes"; urged a concentration of power, the thorough transformation of the "mentality" of radio and television, and a speedy change of officials in the state apparatus, the courts, and the prosecutors' offices.

Although since then even much more radical documents have seen daylight, in the fall of last year all this elicited a response from the democratic public not yet used to such studies, which led to the conception of the fundamental idea of a protest by a democratic charta. It is not a secret—nor has it ever been one—who set about drawing up demands, point by point, which can be regarded as "a minimum of democracy," from the apolitical economy to the protection of minority rights and freedom of the press, from basic social services to the impartiality of judicial power. The humorist Tivadar

Farkashazy, the movie director Karoly Makk, chemistry professor Gyorgy Horanyi, Ivan Peto, the SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats] politician, and Gabor Fodor, the FIDESZ [Association of Young Democrats] politician worked on the text alongside the former MDF member Zoltan Krasznai, editor in chief of MAGYAR NEMZET, and the protestant minister Ferenc Donath. The document was published on 27 September 1991. On a TV program, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall shrugged and called it a school essay in constitutional studies.

It was all the more astonishing when a few weeks later the prime minister discharged Gyorgy Suranyi, president of the National Bank, under the pretext of having been among the 100 or so people who signed the Charter, which by then had been reclassified as a dangerous oppositional document. The Charter, which was on the verge of passing away peacefully, was suddenly revived: Within a few weeks, more than 5,000 people signed the declaration to join. On 7 December 1991, in the crowded auditorium of City Hall, the "Chartists" held their first public assembly. They declared that "there will only be democracy if the citizens do not have to be apprehensive of the prevailing power because law will protect the individuality of the private sphere from the excessive power of the state." At the assembly, the Charter elected a body of 12 spokespersons from well-known public figures. The next station was 13 February 1992, when the spokespersons issued the document entitled "Report on the Situation of Democracy," which harshly criticized the government and at the same time informed "that there is already a town full of us; the number of signatures has reached 20,000."

In the meantime, attacks on the press, and especially on the radio and television (directors), were launched both on the government level and by groups calling themselves "'56-ers." (Numerous former prisoners of 1956 sharply distanced themselves from these declarations.) The Charter announced its general assembly on 15 March at the Petofi monument in defense of the freedom of the press. The slogan of the celebrating crowd of about 5,000 was the following: "Freedom cannot be protected by the best law by itself; our personal involvement is also necessary."

This day was disturbed by an ugly episode: "Counter-demonstrators" insulted Gyorgy Konrad, Ferenc Koszeg, representative for the Free Democrats, and an editor of the Hungarian Radio. After 1 May 1992, disputes started among the Charter's spokespersons which are still continuing: Several of them objected that their "enterprise" left its original course and is beginning to assume a "socialist" character.

However, the disputes within the Charter were swept aside by a new political event: The president, referring to his constitutional rights, denied the prime minister's request, who was also referring to his rights, and did not sign the discharge of the Radio and Television directors. The media-war broke out.

The Charter sided with Arpad Goncz and organized a signature rally: By 14 September 1992, the number of those who signed the document in support of the president reached 35,500. On 22 and 24 August, the POFOSZ [National Association of Political Prisoners] and other "'56-er" organizations organized demonstrations in support of the discharge of the radio and television directors. Parliamentary representatives of the governing parties also participated in these events. Abuse and threats were showered on the president at these demonstrations.

In response, the Democratic Charter announced a demonstration for 24 September to start at 1800 hours at the Petofi monument on 15 March Square. As we go to press, more than 30 organizations, including the Social Arbitration Council, which itself comprises 60 organizations, have announced their participation. In our next issue we will report on the demonstration.

MNB VP's Statement on Convertible Forint Disputed

93CH0084A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 22 Oct 92
p 5

[Commentary by KOPINT-DATORG Division Director Gabor Oblath: "Convertible Forint Beginning in January?"]

[Text] According to news reports Hungarian National Bank [MNB] Vice President Frigyes Harshegyi announced in Tokyo last week that the MNB would like to render the forint convertible beginning in January 1993. At our request, KOPINT-DATORG Division Director Gabor Oblath commented on this report.

It is not clear what prompted and what is behind the new statement of wanting to make the forint convertible beginning in January 1993. Are they just saying this, or do they want to do it? In the latter case, what steps should be taken during the next three months to make the forint convertible?

Undeniably, in recent times we have become unaccustomed to this kind of statement and to guessing suspected intentions behind such statements. But let us recall that a year or a year and a half ago it was customary for state leaders concerned with the economy to make dramatic statements whenever they returned from abroad (and mainly from Japan)—instant statements (at the airport, if possible): The forint will become convertible soon (within half a year, a year, a year and a half, and so forth). Everyone making such statements was careful to not even accidentally mention the same date for the introduction of convertibility as stated before by either the person making the statement or by some other person in authority. Persons making such statements were also careful in leaving behind a vague definition of convertibility that suited their purpose, or, to be exact, of whatever they were to introduce soon.

By the time such announcements began to become customary, moreover, began to turn into refreshing color spots, those in authority began to refrain from announcing convertibility. At that point in time it appeared that they had understood the situation: It was not worthwhile to join the game that had been invented elsewhere and pursued with great passion by East European governments, the game in which each player had to announce who was going to have convertibility sooner and/or to a greater degree. As the number of bluffs increased, it became increasingly clear that these announcements were not really interesting to the West.

An announcement of convertibility is well-founded if a country's foreign exchange rules correspond with the criteria contained in Article VIII of the IMF charter, i.e., when a currency becomes fully—internally as well as externally—convertible from the standpoint of current payments. Although it is possible that the forint's de facto convertibility has expanded in a relative sense, it does not comply with internationally recognized and required criteria in two respects. On the one hand, foreign exchange purchases for tourism are restricted. They intend to continue this restriction for a while—and appropriately so, in my view. On the other hand, the forint's de facto external convertibility is rather limited: Aliens subject to the foreign exchange law are not permitted to carry with them or transfer abroad the forints they acquired in the course of current transactions. It would be hard to tell the exact time it would take to remove the still-existing obstacles in the path of convertibility, but I suspect that doing so would take more than three months.

But then, what's this new announcement all about? What is going to happen in January 1993, and what are they going to announce? These questions should probably be answered by the person who made the statement. But as long as we managed thus far to avoid an unfounded declaration of convertibility in Hungary, moreover, a premature and forced introduction of convertibility in order to make good on an announcement, we should continue to tolerate for a while the fact that the forint is not called convertible, now that the East European wave of declaring convertibility has passed and has discredited itself.

FIDESZ's Economic Program Announced

93CH0084B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 29 Oct 92
pp 1, 14

[Unattributed article: "FIDESZ's Economic Program"]

[Text] *As reported in our previous issue, the theses of FIDESZ's [Federation of Young Democrats] economic policy program were prepared by a broadly based group and edited by Attila Chikan, the head of the Laszlo Rajk specialized college. The following are excerpts from the program.*

FIDESZ's economic policy program is liberal in terms of social philosophy, pragmatic in practice, and reflects

FIDESZ's political endeavor to become a centrist party. The program is based on four main principles. In the spirit of responsible political discourse, organic development is the goal.

FIDESZ builds its economic policy on long-term considerations; accordingly, consistent with the principle of "sustainable development," it heavily emphasizes human and environmental considerations. Depoliticizing the economy is a fundamental principle; direct political influence that still prevails despite the system change must be radically reduced. Finally, removing the state from the economy is a fundamental principle in order to discontinue paternalistic attitudes both in the entrepreneurial and the social fields, and to strengthen market effects and the civil society. Based on these principles FIDESZ has developed the following theses relative to the various fields of the economy.

The burden of the external debt service will remain within manageable parameters in the upcoming years unless this is prevented by unfavorable external events and by serious flaws in Hungarian economic policy. During these years, stabilization and recovery from the recession depends on the time when business investments begin. Reducing uncertainty, developing information provider institutions—such as security and foreign exchange market information providers—as well as an entrepreneurial infrastructure are preconditions for a favorable investment climate and for motivating entrepreneurs.

Hungarian economic diplomacy must manifest firmness, but not a forceful or pushy conduct toward the EC, conveying a sense that we are unable and unwilling to accept each and every condition. We must also continuously develop conditions for participation in other integrations, with special attention to relations with neighboring countries. We must establish a high-level government office to coordinate our approach to the European integration. Further liberalization must be the basic principle for formulating rules and regulations; in addition there also exists a need for modern market protection based on rules of competition, and consistent with GATT principles.

Reducing the size of the state household is a priority task; attention must be focused mainly on the expenditure side of the budget.

Within budgeted expenditures, support for low efficiency and oversized institutions budgeted for by the state must be reduced. The framework of the taxation system is modern, but changes must be made in the proportions of various types of taxes.

Privatization of the large distribution systems must be accomplished by taking gradual but firm steps; this must be linked to state household reform. Considering the fact that reform measures are presumed to resolve unpopular problems, and could, temporarily, be accompanied by additional expenditures, one cannot expect substantive progress in this regard during the term of office of the

present government. This could be the gravest legacy awaiting the new government.

From the standpoint of managing unemployment, a fundamentally tax-supported system that starts out from a lower assistance level (perhaps independent from wages) seems to be desirable, a system upon which one could build an unemployment compensation system based on income brackets and financed by contributions. Once eligibility for unemployment expires, aid would be provided on an as-needed basis. From among the active means of employment policy, part-time employment, an increased amount of time spent on learning, and infrastructural programs could be emphasized.

In the process of privatization one should strengthen the organic implementation of the process, one must avoid drastic interference, giveaways, and simulated privatization. Foreign capital must continue to play an important role. Theoretical and technical obstacles must be removed in the path of management buy-outs; in the overall, workers stock ownership must be implemented within modest parameters. A state super holding corporation is not a fortunate solution for managing property that remains under state ownership in the long term. The question is whether the already begun processes can be reversed, but the roles played by AVU [State Property Agency], the AVRt [State Property Management Corporation] and other institutions involved in privatization must, by all means, be reviewed.

FIDESZ is in the process of developing a detailed social policy; nevertheless, the fact that state welfare expenditures can be reduced only in the long term and only with a total revamping of the entire system of income redistribution is part and parcel of the economic concept.

The main contours of the institutional system for money and capital markets in Hungary, together with the legal regulatory infrastructure, have evolved; nevertheless, filling up this framework with substantive content is only in the beginning stages. Central bank autonomy is a fundamental consideration; this means the central bank's independence from the government and from politics on the one hand, and enables the MNB [Hungarian National Bank] to appear as a factor having an impact in directing the economy, on the other.

Stabilizing the banking sector is a prolonged task that requires state involvement. It hinges on two conditions: consolidation of credits and privatization. Regarding the latter, the task pertains not to revenues but to the strengthening of the capital base of the banking system and to the improvement of the efficiency of the banking system.

Stimulating entrepreneurship is one of the key issues in the course of transition. To accomplish this it is necessary to reduce the tax burden, to maintain and further develop preferential loan structures, and to support the development of an institutional system that supports small entrepreneurs.

Environmental protection plays a definitive role when it comes to economic decisions. While changing the tax system, environmental considerations in particular must be stressed. Special antistimulants must be used to discourage the flow of foreign capital into polluting branches of industry.

The weight of agriculture within the economy continues to remain significant, but it cannot be the driving force of the economy in the foreseeable future. One could expect to see three types of agricultural plants to evolve: U.S.-style giant farms, medium-sized peasant farms, and farms managed in the form of secondary occupation. Government support is needed primarily for the development of medium-sized peasant farms. The agricultural market institutional system and a peculiar financial network serving agriculture must be developed.

The condition and chief means by which energy management can be developed is the reduction of energy specific consumption. Once appropriate rules exist to govern natural monopolies, there will be no obstacle in the path of making progress to privatize both the production and distribution aspects of energy supplies.

The primary economic development tool by which regional inequities can be reduced is the development of the communications and transportation infrastructure on a priority basis; this could also contribute greatly to improvements in the employment situation. It would be inappropriate to allocate central resources for regional development in other fields of the economy.

1993 Property Policy Guidelines Discussed

93CH0084C Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 29 Oct 92
pp 1, 13

[Article by Gabor Karsai: "Property Policy Guidelines—And Politics Exist...."]

[Text] There is a cuckoo's egg among the property policy guidelines that were recommended by the Antall government for 1993, 1992 and 1991-92: It is the one recommended for 1992. This is the only property policy guideline adopted thus far by parliament, albeit only early last week, two months before its expiration date. We felt certain, at least, that this would take place as we went to press with this issue of our newspaper.

Dates When Property Policy Guidelines Were Prepared

Year(s) to which guidelines applied	Date of completion of documents	Date of adoption by parliament
1990	Jan 1990	Mar 1990
1991	Dec 1990	—
1991-92	Sep 1991	—
1992	Jun 1992	Oct 1992
1993	Sep 1992	—

Prior to last week, the National Assembly adopted only one set of property policy guidelines, the one that was

submitted by the Nemeth government. It was valid for six months and the parliament declared that it would be used only temporarily. The failure to adopt additional property policy guidelines conflicts with the law that requires the National Assembly to approve or reject such guidelines simultaneously with its decision concerning annual budgets. The Antall government was able to extend the force of the temporary guidelines twice only, but a year ago the parliament rejected a similar request for extension based on a virtually unprecedented agreement between the ruling parties and the opposition. Meanwhile property policy guidelines have been drafted and submitted to parliament continuously, but parliamentary approval did not follow presumably due to an inability to muster majority support. Only the 1992 guidelines had progressed to the point of being voted on by parliament, possibly because of an urgent need for parliamentary authorization to utilize privatization revenues consistent with the intentions of the government.

Policy guidelines for property under temporary or long-term state ownership are contained in laws that were adopted in June 1992. Prior to the enactment of these laws, the AVU [State Property Agency] law provided direction. According to the AVU law, these guidelines must establish the chief considerations applicable with respect to the utilization of state entrepreneurial property, thus, for example, the AVU's and the AVRt's [State Property Management Corporation] dividend policies, terms and conditions for the sale of assets, preferential terms to advance workers' opportunities to acquire property, the extent to which property may be transferred free of charge, the group of beneficiaries in such transactions, the projected amount of AVU revenues, and the way these revenues must be utilized.

Even though the various proposed guidelines were not approved as National Assembly resolutions, they rather well reflect the privatization concepts that prevailed in given periods. A comparison between the various guidelines convincingly supports the conclusion reached in No. 41, 1992 of this newspaper: The government privatization strategy now being prepared (FIGYELO No. 40, 1992)—whose spirit is obviously related to that of the 1993 guidelines—could produce a regrettable turnaround in privatization. This can be said because the new privatization strategy does not simply aim for developing new privatization techniques and financial solutions, but is also intended to depart from the entire process of market-based privatization, i.e., from the transfer property in exchange for value, from relying more or less on an active role to be played by enterprises, and from aiming for integration with the global economy.

What Is Modern?

The 1993 proposal spells out the three strategic goals of privatization, and first among these is "the development of an ownership structure characteristic of modern market economies." We could be pleased with this goal were it not for the fact that the specific content of this

goal remains unknown, such as the ratio of individual, characteristic ownership groups (which, incidentally, vary significantly in "modern" market economies), and the identity of these groups. The second purpose of the property guidelines reveals the intent behind it because it is the only detailed purpose: "to expand and strengthen the Hungarian propertied stratum," which must be stimulated on the one hand by actions that increase demand (leasing, time payments, credit certificates), and by adjusting the supply of property offered for privatization to this demand, on the other.

The way the property policy guidelines deal with the issue of attracting foreign capital is characteristic. In the 1991-92 draft property policy guidelines this issue appeared only as the second "fundamental" goal and had also been heavily stressed before, nevertheless the 1992 draft property policy guidelines included this issue only as a partial goal flowing from strategic goals, and as a partial goal it appeared in a rather toned down form. The 1993 draft no longer mentions the goal of attracting foreign capital in any form at all. This is hardly a coincidence, and thus a statement contained in the arguments supportive of the property policy guidelines, according to which the strengthening of the Hungarian propertied strata is not to be regarded as countering foreign interests, is not convincing.

The fact that the 1992 strategic goals do not include the idea of strengthening competition, the constraint to become efficient, the need to secure excess resources that are indispensable from the standpoint of modernizing the economy, the establishment of the still missing institutions of a market economy, the encouragement of integration with world markets, and the reduction of the budget deficit, should also teach us a lesson. These concepts have also been replaced by a vague requirement "to renew the organizational system of production and enterprises." Based on the context of various provisions one could say that this is perceived to be accomplished as a result of the state playing a significant role, because, according to the 1993 property policy guidelines, "optimizing the dimensions of plants" in the course of offering a supply of property for privatization constitutes a requirement. In other words, the fact that one of the goals of the property policy guidelines is to expand the Hungarian propertied stratum causes no problem; the problem is that this, in itself, has become a self-serving goal. (See "Turning Back the Pages" [box below] to see the dangers implicit in the typical means that serve this purpose: the citizen's right to receive credit certificates.)

[Boxed item: Turning Back the Pages]

Accordingly, credit certificates could, simultaneously, turn the state's privatization revenues into expenditures, and provide an incentive to new owners to bankrupt the firms they were entrusted to own. In the course of this some clever people—not the stable entrepreneurs—could become rich. (FIGYELO No. 41, 1992)]

Employees

An increasing trend of providing more and more benefits to employees characterizes each subsequent guideline; this represents a tangible appreciation of the goal of transferring property free of charge, an idea that appeared before only as a theoretical possibility.

The employee benefits described in the 1993 proposed guidelines are essentially the same as those listed in the 1992 guidelines, and the changes incorporated since 1990 represent primarily a continuous reduction in the required amount of the employees' own resources for purchasing stock. While in conjunction with employee stock ownership the 1991-92 guidelines enabled a discount greater than 50 percent only in exceptional cases, the 1992 and 1993 guidelines permit discounts of up to 90 percent off the nominal value of the stock. In calculating the benefits provided to employees—the maximum amount of which generally represented 10 percent of an enterprise's own capital or 12 months worth of gross wages per person thus far—includes a new preferential element: The 1993 guidelines do not permit the consideration of preferential interest rates or tax benefits; therefore this, too, constitutes additional support.

The 1993 proposal recognizes free of charge property transfers in the framework of privatization to three types of organizations: the Social Security, foundations (public foundations after the establishment of such organizations), and employees' special social welfare and employment-related foundations. The idea of transferring property to Social Security has already been part of the 1990 guidelines, but despite such projections virtually nothing has happened aside from the unexpected transfer of 300 billion forints' worth of state property in response to a proposal by a representative. The property to be transferred was not designated however, nor have the property management organizations supposed to receive the property been established: The long-term institutional conditions for managing property were not established within the Social Security system. This is also reflected in the guidelines by statements to the effect that except for portfolio exchanges designed to preserve and augment the assets, only the return on transferred property may be used to finance current expenditures.

The big question regarding the free transfer of property to foundations pertains to the principle that serves as the basis for governmental decisions. The arguments supportive of the 1993 guidelines state that such transfers must always replace or eliminate budgeted expenditures. It raises concern, however, that this will not be a large enough obstacle in the path of enforcing ideological-political or subjective-personal considerations, particularly at a time when no assurance is given for public control over the government's decisions.

Revenues

An agreement concerning the possible transfer of state enterprise social welfare assets to employee foundations was reached at the 5 June 1992 meeting of the Interest

Mediation Council. Quite naturally, this agreement was based on the 1992 guidelines that were the subjects of negotiations at the time, but since the government had, by then, submitted the disputed document to parliament in total disregard of its social partners (FIGYELO No. 24, 1992) the desire expressed by the Interest Mediation Council could be incorporated only as part of the 1993 guidelines.

Utilization of some of the privatization revenues has been restricted. This includes revenues derived as a result of applying privatization loan structures; these must be expended directly for purposes of reducing the state's indebtedness, so as not to create excess funds for which there is no backing. A law provides for the share of privatization revenues to which local governments are entitled, and privatization also costs money, of course. The way the remaining net privatization revenues could be utilized has been the subject of dispute from the outset: Everybody viewed it as some kind of "free resource" that could be used to finance anything. In reality and by logic, it would be appropriate to regard this net resource as an organic part of the state budget, because the utilization of this resource is inseparable both in theory and in practice from the three types of expenditures contained in the budget: current expenditures, payments to defray the state's indebtedness, and accumulation costs. The earlier guideline of 1990-91 upheld the principle that most of the net privatization revenues were expended to reduce the state's indebtedness.

"Earmarking" privatization revenues, as is done in the 1992 and 1993 guidelines, may be debatable from several standpoints, in part because resources allocated for various purposes are difficult to review as compared to a situation in which these expenditures were part and parcel of the budget as a whole, and in part because some of the expense purposes and methods of financing themselves are questionable.

Privatization revenues can be used for three main purposes: to cover expenditures related to privatization and to the continued state ownership of property, to finance current budgeted expenditures, and to pay for expenditures related to the stimulation of entrepreneurship.

The 1992 budget was first to advance the idea that part of the privatization revenues—20 billion forints—be used to finance the current expenditures of the budget. The proposed 1993 budget law would require the AVU to transfer only 5 billion forints to the central budget. In reality, however, the AVU would have to transfer an additional 20.5 billion forints to various funds, such as the employment policy fund, the regional development fund, and the agricultural support fund. The 1.5-billion-forint amount set aside to finance expenditures incurred in the process of establishing workplaces, which become necessary in conjunction with the sale of property, could also be regarded as financing the current expenditures of the budget. Of this amount 1.1 billion forints represent support to be provided to DIMAG

Corporation for its continued operations. In 1993 the AVRt must also contribute 14 billion forints in the form of dividends to the state budget, in addition to dividends paid to commercial banks.

Privatization expenditures are also on the increase. For example, guarantees related to environmental protection require large amounts of money. It is noteworthy that the property management of state-owned enterprises, the selection of enterprise managers by expert consulting firms, the establishment of the AVRt, i.e., expenditures related to "renationalization," also amount to several billions of forints. MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] Representative Attila Fejes—this name is the governments "maiden name" only, according to remarks by an opposition representative participating in the debate [as published]—has projected 7 billion forints, i.e., a stunning amount, instead of 2 billion forints for the establishment of the AVRt, and majority support for his proposal may be regarded as certain. Unfortunately, but perhaps not accidentally, the guidelines do not specify proposed figures suitable for comparison for 1992 and 1993.

The 1992 plan would allocate 4 billion forints of privatization revenues for purposes of the Credit Guarantee Corporation, and 10 billion forints for purposes of the Hungarian Investment and Development Corporation. (Attila Fejes's proposal would reduce the latter amount to 8 billion forints, but most of the difference would increase funding to be provided to DIMAG.) The fundamental problem of these organizations is that they are owned by the state; for this reason these organizations might not really feel constrained to represent business considerations, and opportunities could arise for the enforcement of state administrative and subjective considerations, such as with respect to the selection of enterprises "worthy" of reorganization, while "worthy" has been defined in totally vague terms, and while reorganization would certainly involve some money.

The picture we see based on the property policy guidelines is rather overcast, because "giveaway" privatization is not going to be able to create real owners. Employees—regardless of whether they acquire property as a result of privatizing their workplaces or as a matter of a citizen's right—are not good owners, just as financial institutions established with state funds, or institutions that received state funds, but which had no private ownership background, are not good owners. This is particularly true as long as the state that hovers over their heads is of a kind that acts on the basis of power considerations even in the economy. The truth is that no modern market economy is conceivable without private ownership interests.

[Box, p 13]

Economic Policy Anarchy

The inability to decide on property policy guidelines during the past two years is only a spectacular, tragic, as

well as comic indication of the lack of an economic policy supported by the coalition. The government has no economic policy or privatization program adopted by parliament, because parliament did not debate either the Kupa program announced in the spring of 1991 or the ownership and privatization program developed in the fall of 1991.

At the same time, the lack of consensus is accompanied by inflated program proposals that hinge on current political goals and personal ambitions, and relate to each other in ways that cannot be reviewed. Suffice it to make reference to the fate of last year's ownership and privatization strategy, or to this year's GAM [Economic Strategy Working Group] concept, but we could also mention budget concepts advanced for varying lengths of time that were developed last summer. Similarly, it is remarkable that the 1993 proposed property policy guidelines, based on an entirely different outlook than the outlook reflected by the 1992 proposal, was submitted to parliament before it had a chance to adopt the 1992 guidelines.

Agricultural Market Rules To Be Revised

93CH0040A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 1 Oct 92
pp 1, 23

[Report by P.B.: "A Six-Party Amendment to Bill Proposed on Rules for Influencing the Agricultural Commodities Market"]

[Text] Finally something on which both the ruling coalition and the opposition parties have been able to agree! The six parliamentary parties have introduced a joint amendment to the bill on rules for influencing the agricultural commodities market. In an interview he gave FIGYELO, one of the six members of parliament sponsoring the amendment, namely Pal Juhasz of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], said that the legislative bill to which they were objecting was actually nothing more than a set of procedural rules and a framework for cooperation among ministries, on how eventually to influence the agricultural commodities market.

The bill would entrust the operation of rules for influencing the agricultural commodities market merely to an interministerial coordinating committee. In contrast, the six-party amendment urges the establishment of a Standing Committee on Rules for Influencing the Agricultural Commodities Market. Each of the following organizations would delegate one member to the said standing committee: the NGKM [Ministry of International Economic Relations], PM [Ministry of Finance], FM [Ministry of Agriculture], the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture, and the national organizations representing the interests of agricultural cooperatives and consumers, respectively. The prime minister would appoint the committee's chairman from among its delegated members.

The committee's task would be to approve the annual and the medium-term [five-year] strategies for influencing the agricultural commodities market, and to set the export-subsidy levels and the guaranteed commodity prices. The committee would take action by majority vote. The minority would be able to appeal the decisions to the government.

But there would be one qualification regarding action by majority vote: No decision whatsoever would be possible against the unanimous opinion of the Chamber of Agriculture and the national organizations representing the interests of private farmers and agricultural cooperatives.

Moreover, the committee's work and the mechanism for influencing the market would be based on so-called agricultural commodity boards for the individual types of agricultural commodity. According to the introduced legislative bill, these boards for the reconciliation of interests would actually be tools of the Ministry of Agriculture. After all, they would be deriving their legitimacy from the ministry.

In contrast, the six-party amendment proposes statutory conditions. Thus, for an organization to qualify as an agricultural commodity board that represents the interests of the farmers, processors, and traders, its three groups would have to control severally at least 25 percent

of the market for the given type of agricultural commodity, and jointly at least 40 percent.

These agricultural commodity boards would elaborate and propose production quotas together with guaranteed prices, and would set the so-called target prices. The boards would be responsible for their work, because—according to the proposed amendment—the standing committee would be able to punish any serious negligence on their part by excluding them, temporarily or even permanently, from participation in influencing the agricultural commodities market.

In itself, however, prudent and conscientious work is not enough! Without proper funding, rules for influencing the agricultural commodities market would be nothing more than stacks of paper. According to the amendment, therefore, the law enacting the annual state budget would provide funding for influencing the agricultural commodities market; the level of the annual appropriations would have to be maintained for three years; and 10 percent of each annual appropriation would be available as credit. The funding for influencing the agricultural commodities market would be enhanced by the proceeds from profit equalization, by the interest earned on monies deposited as security, and also by the so-called Market Influencing Fund to which the members of the boards would contribute one percent of their annual proceeds from sales.

'Nationale Offensive' Bureau Opened in Silesia*93EP0069B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 44, 31 Oct 92 p 6*

[Article by Mirosław Peczak: "At the 'Unity' Tavern: The Platform of Nationale Offensive Is Modeled on the Program of the National Socialist German Workers' Party"]

[Text] On 8 July 1992, the German satellite television "Akut" newscast showed a report on the village of Dziewkowice, located not far from Strzelcy Opolskie, at which a group of activists of the neo-Nazi party Nationale Offensive, who arrived there from western Germany, is operating.

"But, sir, I am fed up with all these reporters, newspaper hounds, journalists," said the local village head, Helmut Wieschollek. He complained that his comments to "Akut" were distorted. When asked about Nationale Offensive, he answered that there were no incidents, except perhaps one, when they hung out a banner, a red one showing an odd-looking eagle, he quickly ordered them to take it down. One of these young men, Peter Goetz, is studying German in the village and, for some time, had even been secretary of the Dziewkowice Circle of the German Minority. The village head said of him, "He is a well-behaved boy, and he has a Polish girlfriend here." Still, the village head feels he was deceived by Peter and his friends. When they first began to come here, slightly more than a year ago, they had said nothing about Nationale Offensive. But anyway, Peter is soon going to be drafted, and this whole game will come to an end. Now that village head Wieschollek knows what kind of game it is, he is definitely in favor of having the neo-Nazis leave the village. "These rotters must go. Our motto is 'Einigkeit, Recht und Freiheit [Unity, Right, and Freedom].' 'Einigkeit,' you know, means unity; that is how my tavern used to be called."

The Jednosc [Polish for "unity"] Bar, which until 1945 was called "Einigkeit," stands not far off. In the time of Hitler, it was the site of conspiratorial meetings by German KPD [Communist Party of Germany] members, who were soon caught by the Gestapo, and also of Nazi meetings. Now it is the site of social encounters between local middle-aged males, who, quaffing Zywiec beer, discuss money and mutual acquaintances in the Silesian dialect. No one here knows anything about Nationale Offensive, not even the barmaid.

Likewise, the teachers at the local elementary school know nothing about Nationale Offensive. They advised that members of the German minority be asked about it. Maria Lukasiewicz, a Russian-language teacher, happens to know that some young Germans are living on Polna Street. When she was passing through it with her husband, they greeted her with a polite "Guten Tag [Good Day!]," and she was unaware that some organization, a fascist one to boot, is involved.

According to these teachers, the large number of young people in Dziewkowice are not causing any problems. There is no drunkenness or brawling. Now and then they go to discotheques in Strzelcy or Jemielnica. Maria Lukasiewicz doubts that they are skinheads. "There is certainly no such thing here, but perhaps there are some in Strzelcy."

And, indeed, the entire village gives the impression of an exceptionally tranquil and, above all, well-kept community. The inhabitants have the habit of sweeping the street in front of their houses with a broom every Saturday afternoon. The buildings are well cared for and good-looking, and the glittering disks of satellite antennas are mounted on nearly all of them. Did the inhabitants watch the "Akut" newscast in question? Even those who did not watch it are aware that the village has for some time been under observation by reporters. It all began one and half years ago, when bilingual signposts—"Dziewkowice—Frauenfeld"—appeared on the outskirts of the village. The police demanded their removal. Only one signpost remained standing—in the center of the village—bearing the inscription "Frauenfeld gruesst alle Gaste [Frauenfeld welcomes all visitors]." Some excitement was caused by the fact that the village used to be called Frauenfeld in the years 1936-45; previously, the name was Schewkowitz.

When, together with three other reporters, I entered the house at 10 Polna Street, I, like my colleagues, felt uncertain whether its residents would want to talk. We expected to meet with considerable mistrust. We were received by three rather sloppily dressed young people: Gunter Boschoetz, Stefan Jahnel, and Olaf Koerber. After a while, the house's permanent resident, "Hausmeister" Peter Goetz, joined us. Contrary to our apprehensions, they turned out to be very talkative. Boschoetz, the head of Nationale Offensive for Westphalia, told us about the platform, the basic objectives, and the membership size of his party. Nationale Offensive was founded two years before the unification of Germany, in Augsburg. It defines itself as a national-radical party. It wants to struggle for the social rights of German workers and the national interests of all Germans, and it desires to propagate and foster German patriotism.

These young men selected the Strzelcy Opolskie area in the hope that they could establish here an enclave of German patriotism in Silesia. To this end, they intend to publish a newspaper, teach the German language, and preach to young Silesians about their ideology. Recruiting young people is important to them, and that is why they not so long ago organized a discotheque. Music is to exercise an integrative and mobilizing role. They also want, as Boschoetz put it, "to assure better living conditions for the inhabitants of Dziewkowice," which sounds rather paradoxical, considering the evident prosperity of that village and the messy condition of the house in which we talked with them.

When asked about the situation in the eastern part of the FRG, they answered that the German authorities made many mistakes, causing many people from the former GDR to live below the poverty line. Nationale Offensive's platform, which is clearly patterned on the old NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers' Party] program, contains many social motifs. Above all, it reiterates phraseology addressed to indigent and frustrated individuals, who, as Germans, following the unification, do not feel themselves masters in their own country. It is readily guessed that the initiative of Nationale Offensive, like that of the other ultranationalist parties in Germany, is intended to win over the citizens of the former GDR, and it is there, too, that the party is becoming more popular. It is precisely owing to the influence it gained in eastern Germany that Nationale Offensive now has a membership of more than 500, according to the party's leader, Michal Swierczek, of Augsburg. One-half of them are skinheads.

This is in no way surprising because the slogans of Nationale Offensive express precisely the same sentiments as those proclaimed by skinheads (and not only German ones) during their demonstrations: a merciless struggle against Jews, the idea of racial purity, and combatting the homosexuals. Stefan Jahnelt, who has the appearance of a university student (and, incidentally, was the only one of the young Germans we talked with to have completed high school), did not completely agree with his colleagues, who strongly emphasized that the motto "No admission to foreigners" should be interpreted most literally. Jahnelt said, "They can come but not stay permanently, and provided they not get assimilated with Germans. After a foreigner works in Germany for 20 years, he should go back to his own country and help it grow economically. But there can be no mention of any multicultural society. What is happening nowadays in Frankfurt? It is almost like New York. And that is the last thing we want." Another German added, "Now, more than 60 percent of the aliens living in our country are blacks from Africa. Africans and Asians are the carriers of drug addiction and AIDS in our country."

We asked about the events in Rostock [attacks on foreigners by neo-Nazis] and were told that they reflected protests by the local population. It was simply that they could no longer tolerate asylum seekers sleeping outside the homes assigned to them. So, it turns out that it was not the skinheads and fascists but the local population, and it was not an assault but a protest.

Contrary to what village head Wieschollek said, the conversation at 10 Polna Street did not indicate that the newcomers from Germany intend to depart from that house. After all, they have their own plans, here and in nearby Kadlub. First, education and the growth of contacts, support for the idea of Silesian autonomy, and then, who knows? Perhaps annexation to Germany.

Olaf Koerber, previously a career noncommissioned officer in the Bundeswehr, which is not the kind of army he dreams of, recently returned from Kaliningrad, where

he spent three months. There, too, Nationale Offensive maintains an outpost; it is also attempting to become active in Novosibirsk. The house in Dziekwowice belonged to a Mr. Wrobel, who has been living in Germany for the past seven years. It was rented to Boschoetz and associates for 30,000 Deutsche mark. At first they had looked for a dwelling in the environs of Zabrze and Rybnik. They said they were told about the Dziekwowice house by an employee of the newspaper SCHLESIEŃ REPORT/REPORTER SLASKI, Torsten Paproth of Kadlub. At any rate, they are satisfied with the house on Polna Street. They also speak positively of the village's inhabitants. In general, since they came to Poland, only once were they told "Deutsche Raus [Germans, get out]!". It was at some discotheque.

When asked what they knew about the Polish skinheads, they said that, yes, they had heard about their anti-German stance. Nevertheless, they would like to establish some cooperation with Polish nationalists. "Polish nationalists also have their problems with Russians, and we understand that." Cooperation with Poles or Czechs, why not? What matters is to be resolutely against Jews, who, owing to their economic clout, rule the world and do not allow nations to pursue their own policies. Rudiments of such cooperation have already been established—specifically with the Grunwald Society. They pay visits to each other. Grunwald members have already been to Munich, and now these Germans were going to travel to Warsaw. They had promised Grunwald assistance in its efforts to join the Europe-wide movement of the radical right. Tejkowski's name, too, is not new to them. For the time being, however, contacts between Nationale Offensive and the Polish skinheads, as with the British ones, are sporadic.

And, indeed, closer contacts are difficult to conceive, considering that skinheads of the "Polish Community" burned a German flag in front of the FRG Embassy and Polish skinheads in Krakow killed a German driver, and considering also how the skinheads from the former GDR are treating Poles.

The police commander in Strzelcy Opolskie, Chief Inspector Tadeusz Koteluk, does not minimize the importance of the problem. Although, in Strzelcy itself, there are only eight sympathizers of the skinhead movement, he said, "This problem has been encountered." Recently, for example, on 20 September, the diocesan harvest festival on St. Anna's Mountain was attended by 70 skinheads from Wroclaw, Opole, and Katowice. "Certain articles that could serve as weapons in a brawl" were confiscated from the Opole group. "Three gas weapon units" were taken for safekeeping from the Katowice group but later returned because their owners had the proper permits. "On the basis of a conversation, we reached the agreement that it would be better for those weapons to be deposited for safekeeping during the festival." That was why there were no serious incidents, Chief Inspector Koteluk contended. "They arrived, sang

a song, shouted a couple of slogans, unfolded Polish flags, tore an inscription off the post office building, and that was all."

As for Dziewkowice, the police commander linked it solely to the signposts with German inscriptions. He does not like the name "Frauenfeld" because it dates from the Hitler era. He prefers not to comment on Nationale Offensive because that is outside his area of competence. Such matters are handled by the Office for State Protection. However, when he was told that the Nationale Offensive members sojourning in Dziewkowice openly admitted their historic sympathies for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party, he was surprised and said, "This is a shock to me." He also said that young people from among the German minority are not causing trouble or organizing themselves into groups of skinheads. On the contrary, the German minority may expose itself to attacks by skinheads at its festivals and public ceremonies. In that area of Silesia, any skinheads that appear are anti-German.

Before I left Dziewkowice, village head Wieschollek had the time to show me a recent copy of TRYBUNA OPOLSKA that reported that "Senator Dorota Simonides revealed that there exist reasons to believe that neo-Nazis from Dresden are establishing a branch of Nationale Offensive in Dziewkowice." Wieschollek was clearly irritated. Peter Goetz was passing by just then. It was his birthday, and he waved a friendly greeting. His colleagues left for Warsaw to meet with Grunwald.

Movement for Silesia's Autonomy Described

93EP0069A Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish
No 44, 31 Oct 92 pp 7-8

[Article by Stanislaw Bubin: "The Third Dimension: Silesian Autonomy for the 'Hanyeses.' Silesians Claim They Are an Occupied Nation and Do Not Want To Live in a Colony"]

[Text] "I said it many times and will say it again: Silesia is the cesspit of Europe, and it will soon become a lunar landscape. Its problems are becoming an embarrassing topic to the Polish central authorities, and any attempts by its population to come together in the struggle for its rights are being suppressed by a group of criminal collaborators," contended Rudolf Kolodziejczyk, chairman of the Board for the Movement for Silesian Autonomy, on inaugurating on 24 September the Second Open Congress of that organization. The viewing room of the Municipal Library on Ksiedz Szafranek Street in Rybnik was attended by 77 delegates representing about 7,000 members of the movement.

"We desire, and such is our goal, that every inhabitant of Silesia, everyone without exception, understand that our roads have now merged. We must emit a common cry that we are fed up with being treated like an occupied nation, that we do not consent to living in a colony. Human and material resources cannot be exploited with impunity! Does anyone among you know of any Polish

national party, association, or other grouping, or of their regional counterpart, that is effectively representing Silesian issues? And who has heard parliament members speak of Silesia? What are the Senate, the president, and the feckless deputies for, since they only talk without making any effective contributions?" Kolodziejczyk asked, and the delegates nodded approvingly.

The library's viewing room was filled mostly with elderly, gray-haired people, but there was no dearth of young people, either. At the door stood two gorillas, who checked the invitations: Provocations were feared.

"We are a beam in the eye because we pose issues clearly and honestly," said one of the movement's activists, Piotr Kukuczka. "We shall not abandon the road taken. The Silesian battery has been discharged, and so it has to be recharged. I gave up counting the slanders hurled at us, such as that we are building another *reich*, that we are separatists, that we are trying to separate Silesia from the Polish motherland. I am not denying that we want to be a radical organization, but our actions fit within the framework of the Republic of Poland, and we shall adhere to it. That is why I am a moderate optimist. We shall accomplish our goal."

One of the founders of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy, Tomasz Miler of Wodzislaw Slaski, recalled that the organization was registered only as recently as in February 1991. Before that could happen, its leaders had to surmount bureaucratic obstacles for 13 months and 13 days. The movement's board offices are at Plac Wolnosci in Rybnik, and, admittedly, it has reached its greatest influence so far precisely in the Rybnik Coal District.

"I live at the Dabrowski Housing Project in Wodzislaw. It is a typical housing project, nothing special. 'Hanyeses [native Silesians]' and 'Gorals [Tatra mountaineers]' inhabit it. Even so, its walls are white and not spray-painted with graffiti, there are curtains in the windows, an intercom system, clean windows, flowers. No one's car windshield wipers get swiped. Why? Because we started to work at the grassroots level. We are a close-knit community; we have meetings. And this promotes our movement, generally speaking. We have resolved that the existing structural forms of the state became outlived. Silesia and its population should be in the place they deserve, a place to which they are entitled by virtue of their economic strength and role played in the country's public life. We desire the right to determine our destiny ourselves. As the first stage, we are thinking of autonomy in the form that it used to exist before World War II in the Polish part of Silesia, together with a Silesian Diet. As the second stage, we are thinking of complete autonomy. The money generated in Silesia should be distributed here, with only taxes to be transferred to the Polish central government."

Tomasz Miler identifies supporters of the RAS [Movement for Silesian Autonomy] program: "Those who were to depart for Germany have already gone. We are concerned with authentic Silesians, those who endured

all repressions and stayed faithful to this land. If you ask a farmer in the environs of Janow Podlaski where his sons are, he will answer that one is in Warsaw, another in Szczecin, and a third in Zielona Gora. But, if you ask the same question of a Silesian, he will answer that one son is working at the Marcel Mine, another at the Knurowka Mine, and a third at the Pniowek Mine: They all remain close to the land of their forefathers. Such are the Silesians."

The Movement for Silesian Autonomy believes that the rights of the population inhabiting this land for generations are being violated. The smoke-polluted and economically pillaged region is on the brink of an ecological disaster. The foundations of its biological existence have been devastated.

"That is why our congress is held under the slogan 'Silesia's autonomy as the chance for survival,'" said another activist, Ryszard Klinger.

The chairperson of the DFK, meaning the Cultural Society of the German Minority, in Raciborz, Ruta Rossa brought to the congress a report written in German. Ultimately, she presented it orally in Polish to the audience and ended it with the slogan "Silesia is our goal! *Schlesien, Glück auf* [Silesia, good luck]."

The congress was honored by the presence of the mayor of Rybnik, Jozef Makosz, who warmly welcomed the delegates from the podium. "We are an open city and acknowledge the politics of facts accomplis. People will judge us not by what we say but by what we have done. Clear vistas, new sidewalks, lighted streets, full store shelves—such is our program. We will talk with anyone who helps us."

Edward Poloczek, chairman of the Alliance of Upper Silesian Societies and Associations—which, by now, seven organizations, including the Movement for Silesian Autonomy, have joined—delivered the declaration "Upper Silesia, which bears the burden of the historical consequences of the centuries-long expansionist policies of adjacent countries, has, as in the era of the PRL [Polish People's Republic], again become neglected by the governments of the present Polish Third Republic. The absence of a positive policy toward Upper Silesia and the postponement of difficult decisions on matters concerning mining, metal and other industries, and ecology, are undermining the faith of Upper Silesians in the justice and decency of the new authorities."

The Alliance desires to form a popular front in defense of the region's vital interests. The future Upper Silesian Region should govern itself through democratically elected authorities of three voivodships: Katowice, Opole, and Bielskie. In an open letter to the three voivodes, dispatched for the first time in June 1991 and sent again without revisions in October 1991, the Movement for Silesian Autonomy declared, "The behest of the moment is to pass legislation obligating the central authorities to pursue an honest policy on Silesia, a policy that should not discriminate against Silesia in any

domain of life, beginning with ecology and health protection, through education and culture, and ending with construction and transportation. The pillaging policy toward Silesia is being pursued continually by all of the governments so far, regardless of their declared ideologies or economic programs."

The supporters of autonomy thus demanded of the voivodes that they restrict payments to the central budget "in view of the notorious waste of every zloty transferred to the central authorities."

There was no response from the voivodes either then or now.

"Wojciech Czech, the Katowice voivode, has not met with us so far, although we asked many times for a meeting," explained Miler. "The Katowice authorities belong to the Upper Silesian Association, and they need no 'competition.' Hence, the Upper Silesian Association refused to join the nascent Alliance of Upper Silesian Societies and Associations."

"To us Silesians, the question of whether the future Silesia will be autonomous, regional, or German is downright insulting and humiliating. A weekly periodical recently mentioned 'the Silesian cauldron.' There is no Silesian cauldron. There is only the Polish cauldron, the Polish hell, at whose bottom the Silesian goulash is cooking. This is a serious difference in interpreting the political, economic, and social problems of Upper Silesia. To us, the most honest solution would be the application of the principle 'Let us love one another with the entire Polish public like brothers, but let us settle our accounts like Jews,'" said Edward Poloczek. He stressed again that Silesian autonomy can be mentioned only if based on the structure of the Polish State. "And the eastern boundary of the future region should lie on the Brynica River. That would then be the river of reconciliation between Silesians and Zaglegians."

Rudolf Kolodziejczyk recalled the definition of autonomy offered by Jozef Ciagwa in his study, "Autonomia Slaska 1922-1939 [Silesia's Autonomy, 1922-1939]": "Autonomy in public law means lawmaking powers vested in a community subordinated to a central government. It exemplifies a particularly high level of decentralization. Autonomy is something more than a local government, in which executive and administrative powers are exercised by elected officials but supremacy of federal laws is retained. In the case of autonomy, we are dealing with the exercise of lawmaking powers, as well, by the autonomous area, to the extent defined by the federal constitution."

Krystian Skupnik pointed out, "Recently, a leader of the German minority organization told me that his masters in Germany are upset, 'What are you in Silesia doing with that autonomy? This conflicts with Germany's interests.' In its turn, Polish propaganda claims that Silesia's autonomy conflicts with Poland's interests. We thus face two kinds of conflicts. In the history of Silesia, only the interests of Germany and Poland have counted."

There were no Silesian interests. Our movement is an attempt to introduce a third concept, a third dimension. This new concept evokes apprehension and hostility from both sides. But, as for us, we believe that autonomy—that is, regionalization of this country and not just Silesia—is Poland's chance. That is why we established broad contacts with the Union of the Wielkopoles in Poznan and the Association of Upper Silesians in Opole. European and world models already exist, and all that is needed is to utilize them: Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, the United States. Silesians do not want to give everything to the central government. They are opposed to transferring to it all of their income and earnings. Would it not be better to enrich the central government's coffers from a vigorous, pulsating economy rather than feed it with scraps from an economic wasteland?"

Krystian Skupnik does not beat about the bush: "We are witnessing preelection maneuvers of the Polish national parties. Thus, we emphasize strongly that there is not in Poland any credible party that could represent the interests of Upper Silesians. We have already had to deal with betrayals of our interests. For example, the Western Association was a creature of the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], established to exploit the Silesian voter in order to take away his voice. And, afterward, we observed attempts to boycott Silesian deputies to the Sejm, to torpedo their initiatives and not allow their integration. Silesia's representatives have been unsuccessful at creating any Silesian clout in the government or the parliament; it was a fiasco. So we now say that alliances with the Polish national parties are plain fraud to us Upper Silesians. No one will help us if we do not help ourselves. That is the brutal truth."

From the electoral list of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy, two deputies were elected to the Sejm: Pawel Andrzej Musiol and Kazimierz Switon. The former withdrew entirely from work for the movement six months ago, and the latter now speaks on behalf of the Christian-democrats.

"There is one more issue that pains us greatly. The press of every political hue is frightening its readers with us. It blames us for the odium of Germanness. We cannot let this pass in silence. The fact that Silesia is inhabited by representatives of the German minority and other ethnic groups is to us a natural consequence of the past. If Poland is welcoming businessmen from Germany, if it opens the door wide to them and encourages them to invest, why should it adopt a different attitude to the descendants of the Germans who had come here for the same purpose several generations ago? We are not going to practice double morality. In Silesia, substantial contributions made by Germans over several centuries can be seen. It cannot be denied that they were here and left their imprint over many generations. We respect those who worked here, and we shall oppose discrimination against several hundred thousand Silesians of German

origin—Silesians and not Germans living in Silesia. One should know how to make this distinction," Skupnik emphasized.

The congress ended Saturday afternoon. The newly elected chairman of the RAS Supervising Council is 39-year-old Zenon Wieczorek, a Rybnik industrialist who manufactures heated screens for the mining industry. The Movement for Silesian Autonomy now pays special attention to youth. It cannot sustain itself from membership dues, and so it counts on contribution from the business community.

Rudolf Kolodziejczyk explained, "We are receiving generous contributions from various businessmen, who do not wish to be named, however. So they will remain anonymous. At any rate, they, too, believe that, to Silesia and Silesians, our movement is the last chance in the struggle for identity and dignity. We cannot misplace the confidence of the 40,000-strong electorate that revealed itself during the recent election. Now it shall grow still more numerous."

Justice Minister on Legal Climate, New Laws

93EP0043A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 43, 25 Oct 92
pp 13-14

[Interview with Zbigniew Dyka, minister of justice, by Piotr Andrzejewski; place and date not given: "A Minister Taken for All He Has"]

[Text] [Andrzejewski] Is it true that you learned about the arrest of Aleksander Gawronik after the fact?

[Dyka] Naturally, the minister learns about matters of this kind after the fact. The decision is made by the prosecutor who interrogates the suspect and, as a result, may order him held temporarily.

[Andrzejewski] Did you not know ahead of time about his being apprehended, to begin with?

[Dyka] I did.

[Andrzejewski] Therefore, why did Deputy Prime Minister Goryszewski, who had previously arranged for a conversation with Gawronik in Poznan, not know it?

[Dyka] There is no way for the Ministry of Justice to warn all members of the government about eventual actions taken in conjunction with criminal cases.

[Andrzejewski] However, was the prestige of the government not damaged in a way?

[Dyka] I do not think so.

[Andrzejewski] The charges on which Aleksander Gawronik was arrested do not sound quite serious. It is hard to believe that a trillionaire from among the 10 richest people in Poland was tempted by several billion zlotys and Mr. Bagsik's paintings....

[Dyka] The collection of paintings was not private property but, rather, a part of the assets of Art-B. Besides, everything else notwithstanding, a combined total of more than \$1 million is at issue. Throughout the world, this sum is considered very respectable.

[Andrzejewski] At what level was the decision to apprehend him made?

[Dyka] In essence, the prosecutor handling the case made the decision.

[Andrzejewski] Is this to say that he will be the one to be dismissed from his job when they have to let Aleksander Gawronik go?

[Dyka] No. A prosecutor who is in possession of evidence makes a decision, assuming that, allowing the suspect to remain at large, could affect the investigation adversely, at least for a while. Of course, a mistake is always possible. Among other things, judicial oversight serves to minimize the risk. If it turns out that Gawronik was suspected incorrectly, perhaps anyone reasonable will be satisfied that an honest, innocent man was not sentenced....

[Andrzejewski] They say that this arrest, along with the promise of further such actions, is the result of pressure from Belweder. The president is again demanding that "swindlers be taken for all they have...."

[Dyka] You do not have good information. In September, I asked for a meeting with the president myself. This was an interesting and amicable conversation. Of course, the president is interested in various cases being disentangled, including those concerning "fraudulent deals." However, he is truly not applying any pressure. Several days ago, he called to express his support for me.

[Andrzejewski] However, the president has called publicly for "speeding up" accountability for fraudulent deals. As you see it, is it possible at all?

[Dyka] In a sense, it is, but this is associated with funding. There is no argument, the Art-B or FOZZ [Foreign Debt Service Fund] cases require costly trips to the United States, Germany, Israel, or the Netherlands.... In the initial four months of this year, these actions could not be undertaken simply because there was no money. The situation is considerably better now.

[Andrzejewski] They say that "sit-down strikes" at prosecutors' offices are continuing in response to political pressure from the top.

[Dyka] A "sit-down strike" is a spectacular definition that someone invented and that signifies nothing. However, if we consider the fact that, in the first half of the year, prosecutors' offices "processed" about a half-million criminal cases, let a reasonable person tell me: Are these "sit-down strikes" or hard work?

[Andrzejewski] For what percentage of such cases did fraudulent economic deals account?

[Dyka] From a few to a dozen or so percent. When we tried to calculate the value of what we were charging them over, it turned out that it was about 1.5 trillion zlotys.

[Andrzejewski] The volume of losses sustained as a result of the Art-B affair is estimated to come to several trillion.

[Dyka] Indeed. However, I would like you to note that, whenever someone discusses the string of fraudulent economic deals in Poland, the following, as a rule, are mentioned in the same breath: Art-B, FOZZ, Schnaps-gate, and then they inhale, yet...there is actually nothing to enumerate. In essence, such deals are not that numerous. Schnapsgate has actually now been completed, at least insofar as the prosecutors' office has influence on it.

[Andrzejewski] On the other hand, it has been more than a year since the former chairman of the National Bank of Poland was put under temporary arrest, but the case still has not been referred to court. The former chief of FOZZ has not yet been charged. It may soon turn out that Gawronik's arrest was premature or unjustified. In light of this, color is added to the accusation that the persecution of business people is being organized for political reasons....

[Dyka] There is no persecution. If business people interpret it in this manner, then tomorrow, after a railway worker is arrested, the railway community will begin to seethe, and, after the arrest of a physician, the medical community. A lot depended on the actions of financial services in the cases you mentioned. There were certain lacunae in the records of investigations that could not be quickly filled, through no fault of ours. For example, we have been asking for the FOZZ balance sheet for a year now, and even now we are not satisfied with what we have received. However, both cases will be wrapped up soon: The prosecutors' offices will either draw up the indictments or drop the cases.

[Andrzejewski] What is the potential of criminal law in the field of detecting and eliminating fraudulent economic deals?

[Dyka] To my mind, criminal law ranks last as an instrument for combating economic deviations. Not much can be achieved without eliminating fundamental causes of an economic nature. In the times of the People's Republic of Poland, for example, speculation was the "standard-bearing" deviation. Stiffer penalties were introduced, but, strictly speaking, the law was never in a position to cope with this. Speculation disappeared after the economic model changed. New dangers appeared instead. A draft law on the protection of economic intercourse is in the Sejm. It provides for penalties for crimes that criminal law has not addressed at all—for example, the laundering of dirty money, insurance crimes, or the issue of protecting securities or computer records.

[Andrzejewski] What about the proposed institutions of state's evidence and police sting operations? Are there not apprehensions about their abuse in the actual operation of the police?

[Dyka] The institution of state's evidence is present in many legal systems. Besides, appearances notwithstanding, it is not entirely new in our country, either. A similar principle is already in effect with regard to bribes. If the "giver" reveals the truth in the course of the first interrogation, he may benefit from the exceptional reduction of penalties. Frankly, however, this arrangement has not yet produced any particular results.

[Andrzejewski] Do you think that introducing it on a broader scale will result in a turnaround?

[Dyka] This will not be too broad a scale. We are considering the institution of state's evidence solely with regard to the gravest crimes—terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and, specifically, bribery. Experience in Western countries indicates that this may produce certain results.

[Andrzejewski] What about political provocation? You will admit that this has ambiguous implications....

[Dyka] The position of the government is unambiguous: This is a feasible arrangement, of course, given the fully "guaranteed" security of this institution.

[Andrzejewski] Is that to say you have doubts?

[Dyka] I would prefer not to make statements on this topic.

[Andrzejewski] Recently, there has been a lot of talk about your departure, with the names of your eventual successors mentioned—Deputy Lopuszanski or Deputy Markiewicz. Is this merely speculation?

[Dyka] Let us begin with who supposedly intends to remove me. The president? I have already told you that he called me, offering assurances that he views my work favorably. The prime minister also conveyed to me that she is outraged by rumors that have no foundation in fact. Likewise, Deputy Lopuszanski expressed his surprise and outrage with the role ascribed to him...

[Andrzejewski] Therefore, who wants to knock you out of the saddle?

[Dyka] I do not know. Some suggest that this is political provocation. The greatest number of reports on my alleged departure appeared in *GAZETA WYBORCZA*, which, in a way, is associated with the Democratic Union. However, the Union belongs to the coalition. I cannot imagine that provocation may be used in relations within the coalition. Therefore, I assume that this was a job botched by journalists.

Labor Solidarity in Conflict With Union of Labor *93EP0045A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish* 22 Oct 92 p 15

[Article by Jaroslaw Kurski: "A Union, but With Whom?"]

[Text] During the General Meeting of Labor Solidarity, some of the functionaries did not agree to communists' joining the Union of Labor that was being formed. As a result, the majority needed to dissolve the associations was not secured, and Chairman Ryszard Bugaj resigned.

Twelve years after August 1980, notions such as the Solidarity camp, Solidarity ethics, Solidarity traditions, and Solidarity roots no longer are criteria for political identification. The formation of the Union of Labor by the functionaries of the former anticommunist opposition and people coming from the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] overcame one of the most fundamental divisions in the political arena.

In a declaration, the founders of this group wrote that its formation is based on the conviction that "a modern country cannot function normally without a strong and effective party representing the interests of the working people."

In the opinion of Ryszard Bugaj, it will not be possible to accomplish anything sensible in politics if the Polish scene is dominated by the right.

Wieslawa Ziolkowska, chairwoman of WUS [Union of Labor of Great Poland], explains joining the union pragmatically: "Being a regional group, WUS does not have an opportunity to influence politics and is condemned to either a slow death or an alliance with a force of national significance."

The Social-Democratic Union of Great Poland differs from its sister organization, the SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left], in that the functionaries of this party did not want to take the money left after the PZPR dissolved, and, in creating a completely new organization, renounced the inglorious past. Zbigniew Bujak believes that WUS activists have nothing to reproach themselves for, despite the fact that they came from the PZPR.

In the opinion of the Union of Labor, PZPR membership cannot be regarded as a blemish because an honest change of values by individuals always was, and is, possible. People rather than organizations became members of the Union. There was no meeting of the authorities of the four leftist organizations.

Many Paths to a Democratic Poland

Bugaj wondered: "I do not know whether raising the issue of admitting former PZPR members so openly will benefit the noncommunist left wing politically. I say 'openly' because it is known that, after all, there are very many former members of the party in all clubs of

deputies. It is paradoxical that only in the Labor Solidarity Club has there been not a single member of the former PZPR!"

Zofia Kuratowska, chairwoman of the Social-Liberal Faction of the Democratic Union, believes "this opening occurred perhaps too soon and certainly constitutes a liability," though, as she stresses, she is also against creating artificial divisions. Kuratowska said: "I know that our colleagues from Labor Solidarity pondered for quite a while about whether they should create a joint group with these people."

In Bugaj's opinion, "Poland is embarking on a new historic stage." Bugaj said: "There are political forces that believe that the further away from the toppling of communism we are, the more important the division into communists and anticommunists becomes. Of course, this is the Stalinist thesis, that counterrevolution is increasingly dangerous the further away we get from toppling the old system. We believe we should resolutely abandon the division into 'old' and 'new' people."

In turn, to Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the Center Accord, "The Union of Labor is a strange creation that unites people coming from completely different backgrounds. On one hand, Zbigniew Bujak, the legend of the underground, and, on the other, Mrs. Ziolkowska, a PZPR member." Kaczynski believes that "their intentions are certainly the best. The object is for a strong noncommunist group to appear on the left. However, this objective is being achieved in a way we find hard to accept."

Bugaj, who believes that many paths led to a democratic Poland and that there are many people in whose biographies there is "something," maintains: "Only substantive divisions and individual 'balance sheets of people' count as far as we are concerned. These people cannot be automatically written off and treated as though they were plague-stricken; instead, we should look at what they specifically did."

There Will Not Be Biography Laundering

The statute of the Labor Solidarity Association says that those who have actively combated democratic opposition cannot join the association. The Provisional By-Laws of the Union of Labor are silent about it, although a similar provision can be expected to be inserted in the statute of the Union. Bugaj said: "We are working on a statute that will take the biographies of candidates into account and provide safeguards against the potential technique of laundering 'dirty' biographies. I do not rule out some kind of mishap, but nothing worse than that."

No Reciprocity

The postcommunist Alliance of the Democratic Left, which has been isolated for more than three years, sees cooperation with the new group as an opportunity.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, chief of the SLD, said: "I find very many common or altogether identical points in what deputies of the Union say concerning socioeconomic and social policy, privatization, and unemployment. That is why it is in the interest of the contemporary Polish left for cooperation to become more specific. Perhaps fundamental transformations of the left wing will also be possible in the future."

The SLD leader expressed regret: "However, I regret that the Union of Labor is still clinging to historical divisions and does not take into account social realities and the fact that the SLD, a group that matters and enjoys public support, exists. Pinning the label of postcommunist on PZPR men appears to us to be unfair and shortsighted. A Solidarity background is no longer strictly an advantage."

The biographies of people from the SLD and the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] are important, although perhaps not the most significant obstacle to establishing cooperation between the Union of Labor and the SLD. The lack of ideological credibility of the postcommunist Social Democrats is the problem.

The Union of Labor does not see an opportunity to cooperate with the SdRP. Bugaj stated: "While we do not negate certain reassessments this community has made, we nonetheless regard this party as the successor of the PZPR and a pillar for a considerable segment of the communist apparatus and the propertied *nomenklatura*."

The leader of Labor Solidarity wants some socially credible act of coming to terms with the past to occur in the postcommunist left wing, which is represented in the Sejm by the SLD club.

"To a degree, the SdRP and the SLD subscribe to social-democratic slogans under historical duress. I think the SLD does not stand for a common program but, rather, for common biographies; it is a union of veterans from the former ruling camp. They have people who never belonged to the PZPR but were in the orbit of power—in trade unions and administration. The credibility of declarations by former communists is very dubious because Polish communism in its last stage increasingly shifted to the right ('Red Thatcherism'), and many politicians from this camp have learned about the appeal of property acquisition."

Kwasniewski maintained: "There are but a few people from the former ruling camp. The SLD is a group that was not supported by all PZPR members because, I suspect, many of them had already voted in favor of Labor Solidarity."

We Do Not Want the Commies

Haste and nervousness accompanied the establishment of the Union of Labor. The founding meeting, which was scheduled for May, in part out of the apprehension that someone would come along and reserve the name for himself, was held in June. Nonetheless, some local chapters of Labor Solidarity were unable to agree on whether it

was worthwhile to set up a new group. The first congress of the party was supposed to be held in November but has been rescheduled for January of next year. Until then, the activists of the Union intend to build up their party locally so as not to become an intellectual center that is interesting but has no influence.

Optimistic data refer to 3,000 members of the Union of Labor throughout Poland. The Parliamentary Circle of the Union of Labor numbers six deputies at present.

Therefore, the influence of the party is not impressive. For now, there are few signs of this influence growing substantially until January. In addition, some Labor Solidarity activists called into question the open formula for building the new group that has been used to date.

The General Meeting of Labor Solidarity, which, as intended by Bugaj and Malachowski, was to bury the party and fuse it with the new entity, was transformed into heated criticism of the leaders. The opponents, representatives of Gdansk and Poznan, did not agree to the presence of former PZPR members in the Union. They maintained that the establishment of this group makes prospects for the unification of the noncommunist left wing more remote instead of bringing them closer. Therefore, the majority required to disband Labor Solidarity was not secured, and Ryszard Bugaj, its chairman to date, resigned.

[Box, p 15]

The Solidarity side of the Union of Labor is represented by Zbigniew Bujak of the RDS [Democratic Social Movement], Ryszard Bugaj, Karol Modzelewski, Aleksander Malachowski of Labor Solidarity, and a segment of the Polish Socialist Party. The postcommunist side is represented by Wieslawa Ziolkowska of the Social-Democratic Union of Great Poland; functionaries of the now defunct Polish Social-Democratic Union; Deputy Janusz Szymanski, who ran for the Sejm on the SLD ticket; and Tomasz Nalecz, who left the SdRP (the 8 July Movement) after the so-called Miller affair.

[Box, p 15]

"The hopes of an overwhelming majority of our society have been dashed. (...) A system resembling 19th-century capitalism dominates in Poland, under which the dignity of the employee is humiliated and his material existence under a considerable threat. (...) The advocates of extreme neoliberal concepts, regardless of whether they come from the circles of the old *nomenklatura* or the new right wing, are responsible for this in particular. (...)

"It is time to turn away the specter of disaster. An end should be put to the madness of irresponsible actions and irresponsible people, who are politicking in the ruins of the economy! We call on all like-minded people: Join us!"

Resolution of the Founding Meeting of the Union of Labor "Poland May and Should Be Saved."

Distribution of Parliamentary Commissions Criticized

93P20050A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
13 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Irina Dimiu and Corina Dragotescu: "The Legislative Cake Has Been Distributed; The Black Bread of the Government Comes Next"]

[Text] Negotiations for dividing the commissions among parliamentary parties, which began three weeks ago and took place "behind closed doors," concluded, for the Chamber of Deputies, on Tuesday, with the naming of the chairman. The distribution of the commissions lasted longer and was a more difficult process than the assignment of places in the permanent bureaus. Why?

Work on the commissions represents the principal component of parliamentary life, the unseen and hard to observe part of the legislative iceberg. The commission is the place where a law can be promoted, stopped, or amended. In accordance with its own rules, each chamber of parliament can establish, for itself, the number of commissions it shall have, their names, their competencies, and the number of members. The only common features are their functions. Thus, in the law-making process, every draft decree of a normative nature, initiated by the government, by members of parliament, or by citizens, is thoroughly dissected in the specialized commissions. Passing through this internal processor, some drafts have had their content changed substantially and only the initial idea has remained.

Apparently, deciding appointments for the positions listed in the rules does not justify such a bitter struggle or the intensity of the disputes for the chairmanship of the commissions—the chairman of the commission keeps in contact with the permanent bureau, conducts the sessions of the commission, and can participate in the proceedings of another commission that is addressing issues of concern to the commission he heads. Parliamentary practice has proven that the imprint of the chairman of the commission is often strong, even if some members prefer other pursuits to their work on the commission. Then, there are reasons connected with authority and the fact that the position has some "practical" benefits: the use of a car, privileges, and an office with a secretary.

The most important commission is the Judicial Commission, which has to give its approval on each and every draft law, no matter how unimportant it might be. Next comes the Economic Commission, whose activity, at present, is closely linked with the progress of the reform, affecting the pace of the transition. Next to this commission we can put the Budget and Finance Commission. Just as important is the Commission for Defense, Public Order, and National Security, which is in constant contact with the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Romanian Intelligence Service.

Tempted by the prospect of travel and the opportunity to establish contacts with various personalities in international life, the largest number of members of Parliament have opted, this time, for the Foreign Relations Commission. In contrast to the preceding legislature when there was a single foreign policy commission for both chambers, the current Parliament will have two—one for each chamber, even if foreign policy at the parliamentary level must be unitary.... Nevertheless, the double leadership has not lessened the fighting but, on the contrary, has aggravated it—especially in the Chamber of Deputies, where the National Salvation Front [FSN] and the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN] clashed, even in plenary session. When the FDSN awarded itself the chairmanship, the FSN wanted to transfer its candidate—Petre Roman—to the Defense Commission, a move that the FDSN never approved of (not even subconsciously, according to an FDSN deputy).

While the Foreign Policy Commission was the apple of discord in the Chamber of Deputies, this commission was handled relatively easily in the Senate. But things bogged down with the Commission for Abuses and Petitions and the Defense Commission, both of which were sought by the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-CD]. After long delays and discussions, the PNT-CD was given the Commission on Abuses and Petitions, as a compromise, and the FDSN took the Defense Commission.

Statistically speaking, the distribution of the respective commissions is in accordance with the percentage obtained in the elections by each party individually. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the "weight" of the commissions, we note disproportions in favor of the FDSN, which is in charge of the essential ones. This means the nonacceptance of the pact proposed, in the beginning, by the Romanian Democratic Convention and the FSN, calling for a balanced distribution, in the sense that one party would not monopolize the chairmanship of similar commissions in the two chambers. But, the FDSN controls the Economic, Education, and Foreign Policy Commissions. The turf fight has resulted in the fact that, because of the semifailure of the negotiations on dividing up the commissions, we will arrive at situations we consider to be abnormal: the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] (a party with a weak economic program) controls the Privatization Commission in the Senate and the Budget and Finance Commission in the Chamber of Deputies; while the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] (the self-defined party of intellectuals) is in charge of the Agriculture, Food Industry, and Forestry Commission in the Senate and the Labor and Social Protection Commission in the Chamber of Deputies. The FDSN, advertized as social-democratic, does not have the chairmanship of either of the commissions concerned with social protection. In the Senate, this commission is under the control of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] and in the Chamber of Deputies, the situation is as we stated above.

All this leads us to the conclusion that the distribution of the commissions does not have any connection with the strong points of the respective parties' program or with their slogans during the election campaign. But perhaps there is a connection in the Chamber of Deputies where the distribution of the Economic, Budget, Agriculture, and Industry Commissions indicates a slackening of the reform process.

Finnish Reporter on Romanian Gypsies in Poland

93BA0096A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 14 Oct 92 pp C1-3

[Article by Pilvikki Kause: "Thousands of Romanians Trying To Get to the West Remain as Beggars in Poland; Nobody Accepts Responsibility for the Gypsies Living in Primitive Camps"]

[Text] In Warsaw two men armed with axes guard a camp of gypsies who have come from Romania to Poland. "Skinheads and Nazis come here and kick," explains a fairly young and cleanly dressed guard.

A group of more than 100 gypsies are living near the eastern railway station, in huts assembled from blankets and pieces of cardboard. The guard says that the gypsies started their journey from various parts of Romania. Some arrived in Poland five months ago, others a few months.

The Migration Began Two Years Ago

According to the guard, no one is planning to stay permanently in Poland. Everyone is trying to get to Germany, France, or somewhere else. They have not found work in Poland, and had not found any in Romania either. "The journey cost an enormous sum of money. Many of them sold their houses and cars," says the guard.

Zbigniew Okrajny, chief police inspector of the Praga precinct in Warsaw, said that the migration from Romania began two and a half years ago. There are perhaps tens of thousands of Romanian citizens, most of them gypsies, staying illegally in Poland.

Poland charges the Romanians \$20 for each day they stay, but this does not seem to reduce the number of people coming.

The problem is worst in the towns on the western border. The occupants of the tent camps, located near railway stations, try at night to cross the rivers Neisse and Oder to the West. Entrepreneurs specialized in people smuggling aid the migrants.

Chief inspector Okrajny has nothing good to say about the migrants. Miserable women, who force their children to beg, have appeared on the streets of Warsaw. Sometimes the beggars attack passers-by. At the railway station children snatch bags or money from people buying tickets, and in the jail there are always some offenders.

According to the chief inspector, begging at the street corners is quite profitable. Money exchange offices may daily change a beggar's 1 million zlotys (340 markkaa) for western currency.

He wonders who has the final decision on the fate of the wanderers. Germany does not want them, and Poland cannot afford to return the unwanted guests back home by plane. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Ukraine will not allow their trains to pass through fearing that the hordes of people would move to their regions. Romania has not taken responsibility for the migration avalanche either.

Some of the gypsies who reached Germany asked for asylum. They have proof that they were persecuted in their native places in Romania.

Krzysztof Lewandowski from the Refugee Office of Poland says that hardly anybody seeks asylum in Poland. "This is an intermediate station. They are going to either Germany or Scandinavia."

In Poland there are 130 people who have been granted asylum. Most of them are from the Middle East or Africa.

The number of refugees from the former Yugoslavia living in Poland is estimated at slightly over 1,000. They are living with Polish friends and relatives and waiting to return home, or trying to arrange visas to other countries through the embassies in Warsaw.

The docks of Gdansk are still visited by Albanians of Kosovo who believe that some day they will get to the Nordic countries.

There may be as many as 200,000 illegal aliens from the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) living in Poland. They are a cheap, black-market labor force. On the eastern border of Poland busy bazaar trading, profitable to both sides, is carried on.

"Poles do not have a negative attitude toward Russians. We know quite well from our own experience what kind of difficulties they face," Lewandowski says.

However, the gypsies have become a politically sensitive issue. Germany is putting pressure on Poland to make visas obligatory for Romanians, but Romania strongly opposes the plan.

Also in Poland there are some prominent politicians who oppose the idea for moral reasons. They point out that Poland, not long ago, was promoting opening borders and wanted to eliminate visa requirements for Poles.

Papal Nunciature Reopened in Bucharest

93P20047A Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
6-7 Nov 92 pp 1, 5

[Unattributed article: "For a Day, Bucharest Was Catholic!"]

[Text] Thursday afternoon, in St. Joseph's Cathedral in Bucharest, there was a religious service celebrated by Monsignor Jean Louis Tauran, Vatican secretary of state for foreign relations, who is visiting Romania. The service was dedicated to His Holiness Pope John Paul II, on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of his elevation to the Holy See and the reopening of the office of the apostolic nuncio in Bucharest.

High-ranking church personalities, representatives of the different religious groups in Romania, members of parliament, leaders of political groups, members of the diplomatic corps, and a large number of Catholics from various parts of the country participated in the event.

Monsignor Tauran addressed Catholics and all Christians in Romania, urging them on behalf of Pope John Paul II and on his own behalf, to work for spiritual union, fraternal coexistence for the triumph of goodness, and understanding among peoples.

New progress in the development of relations between Romania and the Holy See was made on Thursday when President Ion Iliescu received Monsignor Tauran at Cotroceni Palace. In addition to the religious nature of the visit of the high-ranking prelate to our country, it also expresses, according to statements that Monsignor Tauran made during the discussions, "the confidence that associates of His Holiness Pope John Paul II have in the constant progress of Romanian society."

The discussions at Cotroceni Palace served as an occasion for an exchange of views on the situation of Romania during this transitional period.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the guest said that he offered the Romanian head of state "assurances of the support Catholics are prepared to give him in surmounting Romania's current domestic difficulties."

Monsignor Tauran was received by departing Prime Minister Stolojan who stated that every visit from important foreign figures is greeted with great joy, because this provides an opportunity for the guests to gain direct knowledge of the situation in Romania.

Monsignor Tauran stressed that, throughout their history, the Romanian people have been able to surmount all the difficulties confronting them. The restoration of relations with the Holy See is evidence of the confidence the Holy See has in a Romania, where such profound changes are currently taking place in Romanian society.

The delegation of high-ranking emissaries from the Holy See also had a meeting with Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase. After his meeting with Monsignor Tauran, Nastase indicated that the visit provided a very good opportunity for examining ways to restore the structure of ties between Romania and the Vatican, and said that the visit was a good occasion for profitable contacts with the patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Romanian foreign minister expressed his hopes that the visit of Pope John Paul II to Romania will be able to take place next year.

Matters related to the CSCE were discussed during the meeting, especially regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the hope was expressed that the bloody fighting in the three ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be stopped as soon as possible.

Babic 'Quietly' Takes Over Knin Radio-TV*93BA0188F Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
29 Oct 92 p 7*

[Article by M. Cetnik: "Struggle for Power in Krajina: Babic Takes Over Knin Radio-Television"]

[Text] *The RTV [radio-television] team accepted the new chief without resistance; the arbitration by some Krajina politicians on political events in Serbia continues.*

Quietly and almost without a sound, Milan Babic has assumed control over Knin radio and television. Several days ago, he activated his administrative committee for Knin RTV (which includes other such media enterprises), which decided unanimously to appoint Babic's man as the new manager—Draga Konacevic. The decision was read over the microphone of Knin radio, and Branko Marjanovic (the manager appointed by the Krajina government) disappeared without a word.

On the other side, judging from their statements at the International Press Center in Belgrade, the president of the Republic, Goran Hadzic, and the head of state, Zecevic, have no intention of setting the electoral mechanism in motion, even though they are obligated to do so by the assembly decision from Vukovar. Goran Hadzic says, "There will be elections, but there is much to be done before then," while Zecevic adds even more candidly, "The separatist part of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] will be outwitted and outplayed" (meaning Babic's party).

Babic's takeover of the media, however, reveals other essential and above all interesting characteristics of the political scene. First, it is interesting that the editorial team of Radio-Television (which was appointed by the government, or rather by government officials) accepted

Babic's man Konacevic without any resistance and with open arms, a man who was otherwise the former head of the Knin branch of the Socialist Party of Croatia and a former active opponent of Babic.

Naturally, there was no lack of ironic commentary among the public. This led many to question their conviction that Babic (when he expands the scope of his authorities) will take vengeance on those officials who were loyal to the government.

Two years ago, when he became the mayor of Knin, Babic did not replace a single manager from the communist regime, and many are convinced that he is not willing, like his model, to acknowledge that his personnel policy is more or less atrocious.

In a similar situation last spring, when the Zecevic government was on the offensive, the Knin police arbitrated and simply did not allow Babic's manager of Knin radio, Laza Macura, to enter the editorial offices. Will Martic prevail again?

Nevertheless, few people believe that. Elections are clearly the most legitimate, best-known judge, but the Serb politicians would not be what they are if (through the endless game of mutual stipulations) they had not complicated the problem to the extreme.

The ruling team is insisting on creating corresponding conditions, while apparently the close opposition (the SDS of Krajina and the Serbian Radical Party of Krajina) is threatening to protest. The leader of the Radicals, Rade Leskovac, has been spending time in Knin Krajina lately, organizing opstina committees of the party, so that because of his excess work load he does not even have time for a standard statement to the press. It appears that the Radicals are more inclined toward conspiracy, although arrogance is not a measure of one's own assessment of political or any other strength.

Left Coalition Holds Preelection Convention

93BA0174F Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 6 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Marko Jakopec: "Preelection Convention of the Left Coalition"]

[Text] *At the convention, the four parties specified the lists of candidates in the electoral districts.*

Ljubljana, 5 Nov—"The 88 best people are on our combined list of candidates for the elections to the State Assembly, and that is arousing apprehension among our political rivals, and filling us with the conviction that we will win the elections." This is one of the ideas stated at today's state preelection convention of the left democratic parties at Cankar House in Ljubljana by SDP [Party of Democratic Reform] President Dr. Ciril Ribicic. At the convention, a combined list of candidates for the State Assembly was presented, lists of candidates in the electoral districts were specified, and the electoral program for the combined list was confirmed.

The convention of the Workers Party of Slovenia, the Democratic Party of Retirees, the Social Democratic Union [SDU], and the SDP of Slovenia was attended by 88 electors from each party, and several representatives from foreign left and social democratic parties, including Nijaz Durakovic and Ivica Racan, and guests from Italy and Hungary. First of all the electors determined by lot the sequence of the candidates on the national list, on which Dr. Rado Bohinc (SDU), Ivan Sisinger (Democratic Party of Retirees), Milos Pavlica (Workers Party), and two independent candidates, Franc Horvat and Dr. Mateja Kozuh-Novak, were listed in turn. Then all 88 candidates for the elections to the State Assembly were presented in person, and later, by secret ballot, the electors finally determined the lists of candidates for the individual electoral districts. In the meantime the representatives of individual parties on the combined list presented the principal goals of the electoral program, and emphasized in doing so that it represented points in common for all four parties, and at the same time allowed all of them to advocate their own specific goals.

Dr. Ciril Ribicic said among other things that the parties on the combined list would not gather the voters' allegiance by expensive entertainment, sumptuous advertising campaigns, and helicopter rides from one convention to another, but would instead go out into the field for it, among people, to learn of their difficulties and desires. Dr. Lev Kreft said that times were bad, and that they would probably be even worse, and consequently it was high time for all of us together to do something for ourselves. He added that he was personally prepared to vote only for the kind of policy that is prepared to "vote" for him, and the combined list's policy is that kind of policy.

Transportation Agreement Talks Held With EC

93BA0174B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 2 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Stojan Zitko: "Free Transit Still Will Not Be Feasible Now"]

[Text] *The Slovene infrastructure, in fact, is too weak, as was also mentioned by Slovene Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek in his letter to the EC.*

Brussels, 1 Nov—Last Friday talks were held on a transportation agreement between Slovenia and the EC, which is to include all types of transportation, although during the first phase the emphasis is primarily on road and railroad transportation.

Deputy Slovene Minister of Transportation and Communications Dr. Slavko Hanzel said in connection with this that the EC was interested in so-called free transit through our territory, which our state cannot fully agree to with its existing infrastructure. Further negotiations will therefore be necessary so that free transit would only be gradually introduced, while also taking into account other transportation possibilities, such as various forms of combined transportation with the railroad, as the so-called piggyback system, etc. As for road transportation, a specific transitional period is to be agreed upon, while also striving for the kind of environmental protection that will be on the level of the standards that also apply to this field in the EC.

As we were told after the negotiations by Dr. Boris Cizelj, who also took part in them this time for the first time as the Slovene ambassador to the EC, the transportation agreement has already been agreed upon in considerable detail, and in addition to this it was decided that a special team of EC experts would be sent in the near future to look over our transportation infrastructure. The next round of negotiations on this subject will be in mid-November in Ljubljana.

As we know, the EC also wants to have three agreements signed between Slovenia and the EC at the same time (thus a financial protocol and the trade agreement itself, in addition to the transportation agreement), while Slovenia is proposing that the transportation agreement should be discussed and signed separately, because the negotiations in this area will also undoubtedly be protracted. In spite of this, it is already known that the agreement on trade and economic cooperation is supposed to be signed in Brussels on 5 November, and will probably be finally signed toward the end of this year.

At the end of last week two days were also spent on a discussion in Brussels in connection with succession to the SFRY, in which several Slovene representatives also participated. We cannot report on the content of the discussion, however, since the head of the Slovene negotiators, Dr. Miran Mejak, is reportedly not authorized to issue statements on it.

[Box, p 2]

In the letter that Slovene Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek addressed to the members of the European Council, the prime ministers of 11 EC member states, and French President Mitterrand, he explained the basic positions on the negotiations on the transportation agreement between Slovenia and the EC. Among other things, he pointed out in the letter that the provision on free transit is not very acceptable to our side in its present form.

Government, Unions Sign Collective Contract

93BA0174A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Jelena Gacesa: "Collective Contract Has Been Signed"]

[Text] *It was signed by representatives of the government and 11 trade unions, but not by ZSSS [Federation of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia] and Independence.*

Ljubljana, 29 Oct—Representatives of the government and 13 independent trade unions were supposed to sign a temporary 6-month collective contract on noneconomic activities today. At the last minute, however, ZSSS representative Gregor Miklic refused to sign it, with the justification that that would undermine the foundations of the positions agreed upon among the Slovene trade unions regarding collective contracts. Later he was joined by France Tomsic, with the idea that the presidency of their union thought that the trade union members had agreed too quickly to too low a base

wage, which would amount to only 22,660 tolar (gross) under the new contract, substantially less than the 31,000 initially proposed.

Gregor Miklic also said that the amounts of the base wages for individual rate categories according to general collective contracts were in principle the same for the economy and the noneconomic sector. The amount agreed upon for the first rate category, in the gross amount of 22,660 tolar, is completely unacceptable for the economy, because it would not only mean more than a 30 percent reduction in the base wages according to the general collective contract for the economy, but it is also substantially lower than the GZS [Slovene Chamber of Commerce] is offering the trade unions. Establishing the above-mentioned amount in the general collective contract for the economy would mean an actual reduction of wages in the economy, but it would be a raise in wages for the noneconomic sector. Miklic also said that the ZSSS council would state its final opinion on the matter on 3 November.

Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zakelj answered Miklic by saying that the ZSSS apparently did not understand the situation and the essence of the negotiations, which were to ensure stability in the area of noneconomic activities during the next six months. Labor Minister Jozica Puhar thought that the new contract would suit the interests of workers in most public services. France Tomsic noted that the contract would be invalid if it were not signed by all the most representative trade unions, and that the trade unions had made a mistake because they did not meet once again today and reach a final agreement, as had been agreed upon.

Political Options of Cosic, Panic, Milosevic

93BA0189B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Verica Rupar: "Will Cosic, Panic, and Milosevic Run?"]

[Text] They say that there was no longer even standing room in that auditorium in Cacak. Dr. Vojislav Kostunica's strident words encountered thunderous support from the audience. Even more than that, the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] was told that it is true that the "plums are ripe," but that in Serbia they are not picked, but knocked down with a stick. The only moment when confusion and silence prevailed in the auditorium was when Dobrica Cosic was criticized.

Why criticize him as well? Many people wondered that autumn day as they joined the chorus of voters who are perplexed by the flows and turns of the Yugoslav and Serbian political scene.

It is not, of course, a question of Kostunica alone. In this case, one might rather speak about consistency of attitude toward the federal state. We are dealing with a dramatic interlacing of political options which in recent days have concentrated around the question of the election: What are Cosic, Panic, and Milosevic going to do, will they run, on whose slate, and for what offices?

All the various possibilities are being entertained. Regardless of the outcome, the crisis will not be ended by the election, but the election could deal with it.

No Candidacy

Dobrica Cosic said in an interview with POLITIKA that he thinks that neither he, nor Slobodan Milosevic, nor Milan Panic should run in the election.

There are few who believe that that is how it will be. A few months ago it really seemed that a natural and stable political stratification could be guaranteed by December as a condition for democratic and fair elections. Today it is clear that that stratification has occurred precisely along the line personified by the three leaders.

The election of Milosevic as president of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] has left a broad range of choice. That Milosevic, in theory, is withdrawing, but "lending" his name to the SPS (at the top of the election slate), that he is running for deputy in the federal or republic election, or running again for president of Serbia. Milosevic's risk if he remains on the political scene is the fact that the international public has said that there is no removal of the sanctions while he remains.

Not running in the election would probably bring peace to Dobrica Cosic the writer. However, this would be a pure loss for the politician. It is not very likely that the party that wins the federal election would again nominate him for president of the FRY. The Socialists because even now they are critical of what he has done,

and the opposition parties because he did not give them support when it seemed to them they were having the hardest time. A triumph without Cosic would be all the greater for that. Milan Panic is in a different position. Return to California or continue his political career? It is not precluded, that is, that if one of the opposition parties won, he might be proposed for prime minister once again because of the international credibility he has gained....

The Demands of the Opposition

It is the unanimous opinion of the opposition parties that Cosic and Panic should make a political commitment and run in the election. The Democratic Movement of Serbia [DEPOS] is mainly counting on the Cosic-Panic tandem these days. However, the old division into monarchists and republicans becomes involved here. That is, it is well-known that Cosic is a republican through and through.

The Democratic Party and the parties which might be brought together in the "political center" are the closest to Cosic at this point. It is no secret that the leaders of the Democrats comprise the broad circle of not only Cosic's, but also Panic's collaborators. The most frequent assessments are that if Cosic committed himself to just one party, it might be the Democratic Party.

The Civil Alliance [GS], a small but influential grouping of parties, also favored the candidacy of the FRY president and prime minister, whom they see on a joint slate of the concerted opposition. Although attempts to bring together the opposition have failed so far, it is worth noting that in the last week the largest parties have held three joint meetings, and that they were not followed by the mutual accusations that previously were customary.

The formula seems to have been applied which DEPOS inaugurated this summer when it chose its Executive Committee, which does not include party leaders who might threaten the joint political effort because personally they cannot stand one another.

Another proposal has emerged in recent days: That Cosic and Panic head a separate slate of "independents" who would rally around a democratic and patriotic program, but who are outside the parties. They might then be joined by others.

Reasons of State

In any case, deciding to run is not an easy decision to make for any of the three leaders, but it is obvious that Milosevic must make the first move.

It is thought by some that they all have to run in the election. The arguments for the candidacy of Cosic and Panic concentrate around several arguments. The paramount political objective of the state is removal of the sanctions. It is obvious that although the FRY has not been internationally recognized, its leaders already have the credibility of negotiators, opposite numbers whose

advocacy of a policy of peace is believed. These, then, are leaders who could guarantee a settling of the seismic Balkan earth, because their contacts with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are arousing hope that the crisis might be solved at the conference table instead of on the battlefield.

On the domestic political plane, Cosic and Panic have done a worthy job of demonstrating dialogue to be the basis of any pluralistic scene, including ours. The conversations with the Kosovo Albanians and the opposition have demonstrated this most eloquently.

It is a matter, then, of affirming a very well-defined policy. Even though it would probably refuse to acknowledge it publicly, at this point it is probably the opposition that feels best, when in its two years of existence it has not managed to fully achieve programmatic, organizational, or practical stabilization. Acceptance of Cosic and Panic as candidates would on the one hand signify renunciation of some of the options they have offered up to now (monarchy, for example), but on the other hand they would finally get a leader who can triumph. And that is what the opposition has lacked up to now. It is the general assessment, that is, that in a contest for president of Serbia only Cosic has a real chance of beating Milosevic.

But there is also the "subvariant" in which there would not be a direct duel between Cosic and Milosevic. The former might run for the federal office and the latter for the Republic office.

Is this only a question of the ins and outs of an election? Not by any means. Very clear political options are personified by Cosic, Panic, and Milosevic in the upcoming political contest.

There is a risk in running in an election, but without that kind of risk there is neither politics nor democracy. The fact that we really live in a transitional period, with an elaborate political system and a government whose legitimacy is constantly being disputed, is not a reason to abstain from an election.

So that the people can really be aware of the consequences of their vote, the effects of what has been offered up to now, and which could make it possible to walk away from poverty, isolation, and altogether unjustifiable political stresses, need to be fully expounded to them.

Significance of Elections Examined

93BA0189A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Radivoje Petrovic: "The Election's Significance"]

[Text] Frightened by the civil war, by the possibility of power rolling chaotically through the streets, by all the ways in which the young new federal state is being eaten

away, and by many other forecasts of disaster, we have arrived at the best remedy against these and similar predictions—early elections at all levels.

Whether the elections scheduled in Serbia and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] will be authentic and democratic depends as much on the opposition as on the government. They will be authentic if what has been suggested in recent days comes to pass, and the opposition parties, which are rich in terms of the number and unconcealed vanity of their individual leaders, overcome these childhood diseases and go before the court of the will of the citizens. They will also be democratic if representatives of the government and governing institutions quick-freeze their ability to play games with details concerning the election rules, television, and the fair play that is so essential in the contest upon which they are entering.

In the times that are coming, all citizens of the FRY face an enormous responsibility for the consequences of giving their vote to someone on the party slate, which takes the form of the dilemma "For whom shall I vote?" That responsibility becomes all the greater because it is well-known that only about 20 percent of the citizens have chosen any of the parties, while the remainder, the majority, albeit groggy with press releases and statements, is compelled to think things through before it makes a choice.

Thus, in the best way, according to established rules, we are entering upon a time of rendering accounts for the last two years, evaluating what has come from the top levels of government or the political parties, along with the inevitable verbal loop-the-loops and party desertions inherent in the political mentality in these parts. In the proportional election system that has been adopted, the citizens will say what they think about each of the political parties and their leading figures, and there is no reason to doubt that this new picture will be different from the image they have taken pains to create of themselves between the two election campaigns.

At the same time, we dare not by any means forget that people in these parts will be committing themselves to individuals for a long time yet, and that brings us to the point where the 1992 election is thinnest. While there is an abundance of party leaders and past and present participants in political events, there are few that would satisfy the extremely strict criteria of the times we are in and yet are well-known to broad strata of citizens. The dearth of personnel, the rigged selection, the intricate diversity of party organizations, and many other things inherited from past times have brought about a situation in which there are very few figures to take part in an authentic election contest.

There is no doubt, and the surveys show it, that Dobrica Cosic, FRY president, Prime Minister Milan Panic, and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic are figures who almost certainly can guarantee the success of the candidates on the slates they might head. Most of the analysts

of domestic political events agree that the duel between the federal duo and Milosevic would be a real derby.

Many are ready to say that the recent events in the meeting of the Council of State and in connection with the taking of the building of the federal MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] are the first test and introduction to a tumultuous election campaign. To be sure, assurances are arriving from well-informed circles that Dobrica Cosic holds with the idea of none of these three running in the election. At the same time, it is said that Milosevic has decided to run, and his return to the leadership of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] is put in that context.

In the present balance of power on Serbia's political scene, the opposition is obviously lacking for figures who could challenge Milosevic's primacy. It is believed that the Socialists led by Milosevic would win the next election as well unless something unexpected happens, for instance, if Cosic and Panic run, either heading one of the opposition slates, which we can hardly expect, or as the leaders of a completely new bloc oriented precisely toward that majority of citizens who do not carry the membership card of any party.

Certain preliminary surveys of the potential success of those parties whose slates would be headed by the names of Cosic and Panic show that they would be favored by about 40 percent of the electorate. Under conditions which are not far from reality—with 10 percent not voting and 20 percent Yugoslav Albanians whose response is uncertain—that is a very high percentage and promises an important role in the future.

Regardless of this and all other combinations which will be showered upon the domestic public during the election campaign, it is obvious that with the calling of the elections and the channeling of political conflicts of various kinds, from those among the parties to those between the republics and the federation, Serbia and the FRY are entering a new period of stability. "Traitors" and "patriots," "Serbs by occupation," and "Serbs by nationality" become rivals in conflict only over an election, and their task is to prove themselves to the citizens and attempt to convince them not how verbally devoted they are to the nation, but how able they are to find the key to its salvation.

Under the conditions in which Serbia and Yugoslavia now find themselves, the election we have arrived at step by step, mainly through the briar patch of excessive domestic divisions—has a chance to be that watershed which leaves behind all the political sediment of past years and promises to round out the process of democratization. That kind of epilogue requires at least two things: that everyone takes part and that fair play is respected without any of the Balkan variations we are used to.

Prime Minister on Sanctions, Prevlaka

93BA0158B Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian
29 Oct 92 pp 1, 5

[Report on press conference by Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic held 28 October at the International Press Center in Belgrade, by Sh. Vukovic and S. Petrovski: "A Stormy Time"]

[Text] "On two occasions between 5 and 17 October, the northern part of Montenegro experienced very bad weather with the most serious consequences in Kolasin, Mojkovac, Bijelo Polje, Berane, Andrijevisa, Savnik, and Danilovgrad Opstinas. The worst fate is the one that cannot be corrected—torrents took three lives! But the property damage was also great: About 2,500 residential buildings were threatened, 6,000 people were left homeless, many economic facilities were damaged, along with numerous main highways, regional and local roads, the Belgrade-Bar railroad, the power distribution network, and the PTT [postal, telegraph, and telephone] network. However, in spite of everything we believe that through our own effort and the aid which we need, we will be able to overcome the difficulties, the greatest of which now is to furnish housing for people."

This statement was made today by Milo Djukanovic, Montenegrin prime minister, at a press conference in the International Press Center. Speaking about the efforts being made to overcome the extremely difficult situation, Djukanovic emphasized the understanding which had been shown by the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations, which has permitted Montenegro an ad hoc importation of goods and supplies necessary for aid to the threatened area. "The government is profoundly aware of the risk that has been taken and possible suspicions that the goods permitted in these times of the sanctions will be used for other purposes. That is why we have already formed an office for liaison with the United Nations and have undertaken this job, which has already been centralized, with a high degree of responsibility."

In addition to Prime Minister Djukanovic, the press conference was also attended by Bozidar Jaredic, minister of information in the Montenegrin Government, and Zorica Miric, deputy Republic minister for foreign affairs. Even though the conference was billed as "Consequences of the Floods in Montenegro," numerous journalists listened carefully to the prime minister's presentation, and then carried the talk to political topics.

"Are the Montenegrins a nationality or not?"

"You know, I would merely go back to our intention to form a civil state in Montenegro and our consistent position that ethnic determination is an individual matter. In Montenegro today, anyone can feel himself to be a Montenegrin, a Serb, a Muslim, an Albanian, a Serb, without any consequences whatsoever.... However much some people might try to question the existence of the

Montenegrin nation, it is utterly beyond dispute, as best indicated by the results of the population census conducted last year."

This statement was made today by Milo Djukanovic, Montenegrin prime minister, at a press conference in the International Press Center. The conference was organized concerning the disastrous floods which have hit Montenegro in recent days, but the newspapermen present—and there was an unusually large number of them—carried the discussion to political topics after the prime minister's initial remarks. Although Bozidar Jaredic, Republic information minister, cautioned that rules of behavior of the media in the election campaign were adopted this very day in Montenegro and that the prime minister should be put only those questions which rise above party politics, his remarks did not help much. The newsmen were interested in what the Montenegrin prime minister thinks about the most topical questions in the political and economic life of Montenegro and Yugoslavia.

The Importance of Prevlaka

"The question of Prevlaka has very great importance to Yugoslavia, but it is also a matter of extreme sensitivity to Montenegro. When I say this, I have in mind that that peninsula, in a relatively unimportant geographic space, is in exceptional disproportion to the strategic significance which it has to the country's security and sovereignty. We have been particularly emphasizing the factor of the sensitivity which that question has in Montenegro: Over 100 Montenegrin lads gave their lives in wartime operations which the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] conducted in that area. At one point, we made an assessment and gave full support to the negotiations which the federal government was conducting with the cochairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia," Djukanovic said.

"It is time to enter the peaceful phase concerning Prevlaka, which is why we have given full support to the efforts being made by Mr. Cosic and Mr. Panic in this regard. It would be hard for us at this point to say that that orientation is wrong. The results that will follow, we believe, will refute all the doubts, which are now very pronounced. Montenegro is following with due attention the development of this problem, we are not so naive as to believe anyone in advance at this point. We are absolutely ready to guarantee all the preconditions for the peacekeeping operation to proceed without hindrance, but also to respond promptly to possible improper action by the other side."

The journalists present were interested in how Prime Minister Djukanovic sees the conflict between the government of Serbia and the federal government. What is the attitude of the Montenegrin government toward the policy of Milan Panic? the newsmen asked.

Legislative Chaos

"In a system that has been effectively established," Djukanovic said, "there would not have to be a conflict between the federal and republic governments. There is a kind of inertia and legislative chaos in which we have lived in recent years."

Recalling the procedure whereby the president of the state and federal prime minister were elected and in which Montenegro was left without the post which belongs to it under the Constitution, Djukanovic pointed once again to the strength of the arguments which led the Montenegrin side to zealously support Milan Panic in the election to that post. "We have not departed from that principle even today, and we particularly support the foreign policy efforts of the federal prime minister toward removal of the sanctions which the world has imposed on us."

The interest of certain foreign correspondents in whether there are paramilitary formations in Montenegro received an answer in the negative. In response to the question of his assessment of certain public statements made by Metropolitan Amfilohije, Milo Djukanovic said that the bodies of government of Montenegro have good relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. "I see no reason for that collaboration not to improve in the future."

[Box, p 5]

Who Is the Boss in Montenegro

The newsmen's question was this: "On the first page of this nice brochure entitled 'Montenegro an Environmental State,' there is a Jugoskandik advertisement. What has happened to 'the wealthy Jezda,' how did the Montenegrin Government spend the money which it received, will it get more from the lease, what is the attitude toward Jezdimir Vasiljevic?... Who is actually the economic boss of Montenegro?"

"Thanks to the arrangement with Jugoskandik, US\$6.5 million have been invested in Montenegro, but the indirect effects are far greater. On our initiative, that contract was put in abeyance so long as the sanctions persist. I especially emphasize that it was our initiative, because we considered it proper to offer Mr. Vasiljevic's company abeyance of the contract which, it was completely clear to us, could not bring him anything good," the prime minister said. "At the same time, we have high respect for a well-conceived idea to form an offshore zone, and thus we are giving him a respite and good conditions to work without hindrance after the sanctions. Three days after they are removed, the contract states, Mr. Vasiljevic will pay the fourth installment."

"It is hard to talk about who is the economic boss. I myself do not claim to be the boss, nor do I see that such a person is needed in Montenegro. Everyone is boss in his own area. The most important bosses in the economy

are the bosses in the firms—the chairmen of the managing boards and management teams running those firms. In any case, I can say that the government which I head is working with maximum independence, authority, and competence, and Mr. Vasiljevic is one of our important partners, we pay him due respect, and we want to continue to carry out our program with him.”

Serbian Opposition Demands Free TV

93BA0190C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
7 Nov 92 p 5

[Article by Djordje Martic: “For Free Television and a Talk With Cosic”]

[Text] *At yesterday's consultative meeting, another meeting of the federal and Republic roundtables was demanded; DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] first informed the other opposition parties about its communique; what was stated after the meeting by Srbijanka Turajlic (DEPOS), Cedomir Mirkovic (SDP [Party of Democratic Changes]), and Dusan Knezevic (DS [Democratic Party]).*

The behavior of Serbian television is the key reason why all the parties in Serbia's democratic opposition are still refusing to participate in the upcoming early elections.

After yesterday's consultative meeting of the opposition front, a special communique was issued. It emphasizes that “the conditions for holding early elections have not yet been met, particularly the fully professional and unbiased activity of Serbian Radio-Television during the election campaign.”

The parties, alliances, and movements participating in the consultations propose immediately “resuming the joint work of the federal and Republic roundtables,” and in connection with this a separate letter was also sent to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] President Dobrica Cosic.

“Esteemed Mr. President,” the opposition representatives address Dobrica Cosic, and then continue: “We respectfully request that as soon as possible you receive representatives of our parties, alliances, and movements for talks on the conditions for holding early elections.”

Letter to Cosic

The letter was sent on behalf of all the party representatives present yesterday, who also decided that the four-member delegation for the talk with Cosic would be headed by Cedomir Mirkovic, president of the Social Democratic Party.

It is worth noting that this was decided at a meeting that was attended by representatives of the Republican Club and the People's Peasant Party from the Civil Alliance of Serbia, along with representatives of the Reform-Democratic Party of Vojvodina, the Democratic Party, New Democracy-Movement for Serbia, DEPOS, the

Democratic Party of Serbia, the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Serbian Democratic Party of Serbia, and the Social Democratic Party.

The joint communique from yesterday's meeting also calls the public's attention to the fact of the mutual “successful cooperation to date and united approach.” This eliminated at the start any questions about why DEPOS almost simultaneously published its own special communique, adopted at a meeting of this movement's council the night before last.

The DEPOS communique also concludes (with regret and anxiety) that “the conditions for the early and democratic elections scheduled for 20 December have not been met,” and then puts the impartiality of Serbian RTV at the head of the conditions for real elections actually to be held, and demands that the countdown of 45 preelection days start only from the time when all these conditions have been met.

DEPOS's Position

DEPOS is demanding that the general director and editorial staff of the Serbian RTV news programs submit their resignations, and then that two bodies be formed on a temporary basis, and according to strictly professional criteria. The appointments would have to be made by “a new Serbian RTV board of directors composed on a parity basis of representatives of the authorities and the democratic opposition (with six members each), along with five members elected by the Serbian RTV journalists.”

In response to a question about why there were separate communiques from yesterday's meeting and from DEPOS's meeting the night before last, when it was agreed that the public would be addressed only from the broadest consultative meetings of the opposition, Dr. Srbijanka Turajlic told us that there was no basis to conclude that there were any disagreements over this. DEPOS's communique was already ready the night before last, but it was only made public yesterday after the parties that are not in this movement were informed of its contents. “We did not want our colleagues in the other parties to learn about our positions from the newspapers.”

Dr. Srbijanka Turajlic explained the fact that DEPOS still had a separate communique by the great pressure from the public and journalists, who were seeking this movement's position. DEPOS achieved a compromise between nevertheless issuing a separate communique and the need to maintain good relations with the other parties by first of all informing representatives of the parties outside DEPOS about the contents of this address to the public. In connection with this, Cedomir Mirkovic told us that “the parties received the DEPOS council's conclusions with understanding.”

Race Against Time

After yesterday's meeting, some of its participants said that the opposition's delegation would talk with Dobrica Cosic about the problem of Serbian Television first of all. Different answers were given to the question about whether the planned preelection deadlines would be shifted, just because the FRY president left yesterday for Geneva, and only 46 days are left until the scheduled elections. In the opinion of Dusan Knezevic (DS), it is necessary to save time by immediately contacting Federal Information Minister Miodrag Petrisic and Minister Without Portfolio Ljubisa Rakic, since both of these figures are close colleagues of Cosic, and also people with influence in the sphere of information.

A different approach was stated by Cedomir Mirkovic (SDP). He thinks that those few days of Cosic's absence are not essential, and that the "opposition will forgive the authorities in Serbia those few days, as long as an agreement is reached on the media." The advantage gained by achieving the conditions for objective television would exceed the significance of a few lost preelection days.

In a statement for POLITIKA Cedomir Mirkovic also said that President Cosic was an extremely important interlocutor for the opposition, "since he is the only one who can influence changing things and really holding the elections." He added that with Serbian television as it is today, "there cannot and must not be any elections, since they would be illegitimate in the eyes of both the domestic and the international public." In his opinion, at this time the rules for the presentation of parties that were adopted by the Serbian Government and television have to be secondary in comparison with the means of managing this medium. Mirkovic said that "the election of an objective multiparty leadership for Serbian Radio-Television and professional editorial teams can be done relatively quickly."

The Authorities' Stubbornness

Mirkovic, however, thought that "the authorities will be stubborn about the issue of television, that many days and not just a few will be spent before there is a final agreement, and that therefore there will be a quite legitimate demand that the pre-election countdown of the necessary 45 days start from the time when an agreement has been reached." The SDP leader does not know how long this postponement could be, since "everything is in the hands of the authorities."

The most striking sign of unity among the parties yesterday was the appearance of a representative of the Serbian Democratic Party of Serbia at the opposition's joint meeting. Recently, in fact, it was announced in the press that this party would participate in the elections even under the current electoral conditions, but it was announced yesterday that this party's main committee had modified that position. Not even the Serbian Democratic Party of Serbia, therefore, is taking part in the elections under these conditions, and a separate communique is also to be issued in connection with this "I will-I won't" situation.

Name and headquarters of electoral district	Number of deputies
1. Belgrade	46
2. Zrenjanin	24
3. Kragujevac	29
4. Leskovac	25
5. Nis	24
6. Novi Sad	32
7. Pristina	24
8. Smederevo	22
9. Uzice	24

Serbian Radio-TV Director Interviewed

93BA0188E Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
29 Oct 92 p 9

[Article by Olivera Petrovic based on interview with Milorad Vucelic, general manager of Radio-Television Serbia, originally published in INTERVJU; place and date not given: "Vucelic: I Have Made a Stand"]

[Text] My status in the party is frozen, says the general manager of Radio-Television Serbia [RTS] and member of the Executive Committee of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] in an interview published in today's edition of INTERVJU.

Today's edition of INTERVJU features an interview with Milorad Vucelic, the general manager of Radio-Television Serbia. We are publishing parts of that interview.

A journalist who will discipline the politicians, or a politician who will prevail over journalism—the general manager of Radio-Television Serbia or the commander of "TV Bastille": Milorad Vucelic, the man who has managed Serbia's national TV network for half a year, is torn between accusations and praise, support and demands that he be replaced. For the first time since he assumed the top post at RTS, he has agreed to answer a journalist's questions as the general manager of the most powerful medium in Serbia.

[INTERVJU] Let us get this straight at the start: Are you talking to us as the general manager of Radio-Television Serbia or as a member of the Socialist Party of Serbia and of its main committee?

[Vucelic] I do not want this to sound like self-praise, but every institution that I have led has achieved success. Regardless of whether it was KNJIZEVNE NOVINE, KNJIZEVNA REC, the Student Cultural Center, or the Observatory Theater. These are professional predispositions. It would be worse if some locksmith were to return to the scene. And why not? We are a nation that likes

people who are unqualified for the job, that likes people who do not know the language spoken in this country, that likes people about which no one knows exactly who they are.

After all, it is possible that the government will adopt laws under which it will be impossible for me to hold both posts, and in that case I will decide. In any event, I will not react to the impudent political pressure coming from those who have their own frozen or hidden members among journalists, managers of publishing or newspaper houses....

[INTERVJU] Preelection activities are in full swing. How is television preparing for the elections?

[Vucelic] Keeping up with political parties is simplest when the preelection activities are beginning. There are rules that will be enacted, an operative plan that will be enacted by the Administrative Board and accepted by the parties. The appearance time will be determined by drawing lots—how much broadcast time, what kind of broadcasts, how much promotion—and at this time we have a clear situation. We will respect every single election rule. The strongest parties should receive corresponding air time, and here the opposition's objection is justified. If 50 parties, including the smallest ones, with this many or that many members, appear and demand the same treatment as, say, the Democratic Party, the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], the Radical Party, or the SPS, then this problem must be resolved. But that is not up to us, and we cannot pass judgment. We are already preparing for this big job, and we will try to see to it that there are no objections to our work. From anyone.

[INTERVJU] In other words, you will show the opposition that the fact that you are a member of the SPS does not diminish their chance of appearing on television in a corresponding manner?

[Vucelic] Of course. After all, these people asked that I be replaced even before they even knew whether or not I was a party member. At demonstrations they sent me invitations to appear at the rostrum and in interviews through the calls of "red gang." Accordingly, they asked this of me even before they learned of my membership and post in the SPS.

[INTERVJU] At that time you were not a member of the SPS?

[Vucelic] Whenever I told anyone at the time that I was not a member of the SPS, no one believed me. Several of my friends from the opposition always rolled with laughter whenever I said that.

[INTERVJU] How much power does the manager of RTS have?

[Vucelic] Lots. To a certain extent it is limited by the Administrative Committee, which names and dismisses the chief and responsible editors of the programs. As soon as the chief and responsible editor is appointed, he

has the rights and authorities accorded to him by law. The Law on Information applies to him. The manager can raise the question of responsibility and the possibility of dismissing an editor, but he himself cannot fire him. The manager's power is also considerable in terms of finances and the programming schedule.

[INTERVJU] Why does the opposition attach so much importance to Radio-Television Serbia?

[Vucelic] As far as criticism is concerned, when it is not expressed with much malice and bile, some of it can be accepted. The battle surrounding television is being waged because everyone is trying to make it their own means of propaganda. I think that this battle will always be waged, only that spitting at people who work here provokes the opposite effect.

[INTERVJU] A question was recently raised about your trip with President Cosic.

[Vucelic] I had some work that I had to do in keeping with an agreement with the president, but also work that I had to do for RTS. And I felt that it was quite logical to go on the trip, just as Prime Minister Panic invited me to accompany him on his next trip. If I have time and the opportunity, I will also travel then.

[INTERVJU] What sort of business does RTS have with Prime Minister Panic?

[Vucelic] A company, "RTS MP SAT," was set up with \$100,000 in startup capital, of which Milan Panic invested 49 percent while the remainder is majority RTS. That was done a year and a half ago, and its purpose was to deal with marketing. Talks are under way to define the future activities of that company, because we are not satisfied with what has been done thus far.

[INTERVJU] The general manager in the role of interviewer. After President Milosevic, who is your next discussion partner?

[Vucelic] I have spoken with Momir Bulatovic, but we postponed the interview until some future date. I will also ask to talk to Panic, Cosic, Bozovic, Djukanovic, Karadzic.

[INTERVJU] As an author, how did you feel about the public reaction to the comments sent to you by President Milosevic?

[Vucelic] Milosevic objected twice to the length of questions and to several questions contained in one. It appears that this is my manner, because I see that objection repeated. Otherwise, when I looked over the interview later I was satisfied with it.

[INTERVJU] The minister of information in the federal government recently complained that he cannot get any air time on RTS and that he would like to say what he says on local television on "big" television.

[Vucelic] The minister is a good friend of mine, an intelligent man who is doing an important job. However, it is better that the majority of the things that the minister says periodically not be said on big television. He is an enthusiast and a great professional, but I see the job of minister of information in completely different terms. It would be good to include all television managers, ministers of information, for us to see together which media attractions will be used against Yugoslavia, so that we can prepare for them.

[INTERVJU] How did you decide to join the Socialist Party, especially its leadership ranks?

[Vucelic] My motivation was primarily patriotic. I did not see any major patriotic enthusiasm even during the era of the League of Communists, when I was punished and excluded several times. I joined primarily on the basis of my patriotic feeling, because I have always belonged to the democratic left-of-center. During this time of general desertion, conversion, when certain momentous national causes are taking place, I felt that I had to make a stand. Neither this party allegiance, nor the former League of Communists, nor my absence from party life have prevented me from doing my duty in the way in which I think I must do it. According to my own conscience.

'Other Serbia' Book Condemns Ethnic Cleansing

93BA0201B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 30 Oct 92
pp 38-39

[Article by Ljuba Stojic: "Repent, Repent...!"]

[Text] The existence of the Other does not destroy us, nor does it challenge the right to our identity. It merely reminds us that we are not the only God-given possibility, but that we ourselves have chosen to be what we are. And then everyone else has the right to his choice to be something else.

Just because the Other does not destroy us, that does not mean that we can ignore him. On the contrary: Establishing dialogue with the Other, the otherwise, the different, is a condition of human survival. Especially because the Other is often within ourselves.

But the second law of thermodynamics also applies to people. When we sense the existence of the Other, the different, in ourselves or in others, a desire for one, for the same, arises spontaneously, as does a fear of otherness, which could destroy us, exclude us. Then we must appeal to the aid of reason in order to resist the entropy pulling us to death, self-annihilation, the one.

The Way Out of the Ghetto

The publication of the book *Druga Srbija* (*The Other Serbia*) very quickly evoked in the public reactions of fear of the Other. The reactions did not come from the powers that be, although it is their constant concern to eliminate the Other as "treason." The opposition

reacted, indeed the "moderate" opposition, having seen in this an "absurd and dangerous" division into two Serbias which "are supposed to collide, come what may." Rejecting the possibility of the Other's existence, the One is offered: "There is one Serbia. There is one Serbian people. A division into those 'true' and those 'false' Serbs is...arbitrary and dangerous. Dangerous because it offers as a resolution a 'head-on conflict,' and whoever prevails is the winner." To be sure, because exclusiveness is thus being attributed to the idea of the Other Serbia, advocacy of "diversity" follows, but "this still does not mean that conflict is the only solution."

The book *Druga Srbija* gathers together author-edited speeches delivered by 78 speakers in the forum of the same name in the Belgrade Circle (there were another eight speakers who did not get around to issuing permission for their speeches to be published). While members of the Association of Independent Intellectuals and their guests were expressing their thoughts about the Other Serbia on 10 successive Saturdays during this "hot spring," always at exactly noon, always in the building of the Student Culture Center (usually in the large big auditorium, but sometimes crammed into the stifling rooms of what once was the bookstore), there was almost no public response. They felt as though they were attending "spiritualist seances," left to themselves in their "ghetto," harmless and few in number.

The book is something else. A book is an event which can hardly be passed over in silence, it is an exit from the ghetto. But even a book can be satanized, one way being to reduce the multitude of diverse connotations offered the reader to just one that is incidental. Thus, the title can be interpreted as advocacy of a "binary picture of the world—division of everything into black and white, good and evil," mutually exclusive opposites. When one opens the book, however, most of the pieces demonstrate the "speech of the other" in its postmodern use with the meaning of "differences without antagonisms," "on the other side of political, religious, and ethnic exclusiveness," combined with a clearly expressed desire "to advance tolerance of the other to the basic principle of a civilized way of life."

"Serbophobes," "Traitors," "Renegades..."

Those who from the beginning saw in the Belgrade Circle "supraethnic nomads," "Serbophobes," and "traitors" will be particularly disturbed by the other part of the phrase that constitutes the title "Serbia." Who gave these "renegades" the right to speak about a country which belongs only to its pure-blooded patriots?

One of the compilers of the book *Druga Srbija*, Aljosa Mimica (the other is Ivan Colovic), explained in an interview with NIN that "warmongering and learned substantiation of the need for us to eradicate one another must not and cannot be a job for anyone who considers himself an 'intellectual,' or even earns his bread on the basis of that designation."

"We, by contrast, feel that it is our 'job' not to give the authorities peace to decide the destiny of all of us without hindrance, but rather we hold that it is our duty to constantly ask our fellows in the trade what they are doing and what they have been doing these last several years. The war of words has begun, and we can expect them to turn into bullets very easily and quickly."

Although he adds: "Far from us, of course, to render anyone to account..." Mimica nevertheless warns "that trials of war criminals will encompass not only the actual perpetrators, but also the inspirers of 'rounding out of territories,' 'ethnic cleansing,' 'restoring dignity,...'" With this emphasis on the responsibility of intellectuals for the troubles which have befallen all of us together or the still greater troubles yet to befall us, the Belgrade Circle has since its founding ("in that brief period of hope which began when the Croatian war died down and ended when the Bosnian tragedy blazed up") been antagonizing the so-called national intelligentsia of Serbia. Later, when the larger portion of that intelligentsia backed up the demands of the opposition for a change of the regime leading the country to disaster, the Belgrade Circle continued to recall that "those who are now amazed and horrified at the sea of blood that has been shed, at the destroyed towns and villages, at the rivers of unfortunate and uprooted refugees, must face up to their own responsibility—intellectual and moral."

At which point consistency escapes them, because they do not apply to themselves the standards of that same moral strictness. They respond to the objections of the well-intentioned who "in the history of the 'ancien regime' found traces of the stumbling of some of those who it turns out are today 'in the circle,'" that there is a misunderstanding here: "We did not want to create an association of former independent intellectuals, because in that case we really would have a slim membership, but our intention was to bring together those intellectuals who today are independent not only of the government, but also of the vices of nationalism in general." So, if today's nationalist has abandoned his yesterday's exclusiveness, we continue to hold to what was yesterday and we do not recognize that otherness of his today.

The Requirements of Tact and Discretion

It is no wonder at all, then, that many intellectuals who do not belong to the "circle" refuse to make any statement to the press about *Druga Srbija*. Some shrug it off with ill-humored observations ("The lamentations of ghettoized intellectuals," "They suppose that they are some alternative to an entire system—both the government and the opposition, but in actuality they represent a pure accident in this misfortune of ours"), while others look sympathetically on the activity of the Belgrade Circle, but have not found the time to put their opinion in a form for the public.

This makes the opinions of two philosophers who do not belong to any "circle," Mladen Kozomara and Aleksandar Kron, even more precious.

Although he feels that the introductory explanations of the book's editors were done "in a reasonable and convincing way," Kozomara says that we are today compelled "in all aspects of our life" to "experience the perverse effects of everything we do or do not do, say or do not say, attempt or do not attempt."

"We are all caught up in a movement in which attempts to clarify almost fatally increase the confusion," Kozomara continues. "Thus, the very initiative to establish the Association of Independent Intellectuals, for example, was burdened from the outset with those perverse effects, with its very inaugural gesture it opened up the possibility of compromising its declared intention. After all, do we need to be reminded, the affairs of the intellect require a certain tact and discretion. Intellectual independence, that is, is gained by painstaking reflection of one's own dependencies."

Nightmarish Times

However, those initial reservations do not prevent Mladen Kozomara from seeing the book *Druga Srbija* as a "valuable testimony as to one of the rare collective efforts to think, feel, and speak articulately against the stream," which is displayed primarily in the effort for the "responses to the challenges of our nightmarish times not to be simply reactive," "mechanical."

"Behind every one of us there, of course, remain even the dirty little traces of convulsive efforts to cleanse our consciences. But it seems to me that I also discern certain other traces in this book."

In conclusion, Kozomara feels the need as a philosopher to express a more resigned professional observation:

"In the multitude of voices that emerge in this book, those which are least audible are the voices of the philosophers and social theoreticians. It is thus possible, for example, for a philologist to offer the most pregnant political analysis, for a poet to display a superior refinement and keenness in critical analysis, for a film director to advocate more vigorously the elementary values of the critical mind than the supposed experts in such things manage to do, because here they mainly recite their untalented exercises in style."

Aleksandar Kron also finds in *Druga Srbija* "the shaping of a new public opinion," whose backbone is the "vision of a new and happier Serbia."

"Nevertheless, only a little of that can be found in this book," Kron says in an interview for NIN. "Most of the space is devoted to a description and analysis of the tragic state of affairs in the present Serbia. No political platform or program can be found in the book, although all the contributions have something in common: a profound and sincere suffering that the present Serbia is standing in front of the door which leads away from civilization and by all appearances it is going to open it and pass through it."

Kron adds that this book provides sufficient reasons for the "experience of moral catharsis"—in both the writers and in many readers.

"In a time when one can converse only with those of similar mind, when in response to arguments one has pulled out a person who thinks differently might pull out a revolver, the book *Druga Srbija* is an expression of the internal need of its authors to clear up things with themselves and communicate this to others."

In the sessions of the Belgrade Circle on *The Other Serbia*, the present author could not escape the impression that he was attending meetings of one of those human societies such as are well-known in various troubled times down through history, which bring together joint belief in the certainty of imminent disaster. Helpless and hopeless, they believe that by their inner cleansing and warning of others of the impending disaster that they can reduce the chances of that outcome, and in any case prepare for it. Those who have been around Belgrade for a long time recall an old man with long hair and a long beard who in the time of the last German occupation walked through the city in silence, carrying on his chest a cardboard sign which read: "Repent, repent! The day of judgment is at hand!"

Most of those to whom these disastrous warnings are addressed are paying no attention to them. Aleksandar Kron has noticed this, and he wonders for whom *Druga Srbija* is intended:

"For everyone, because it concerns the fate of all of us, and for no one, because no one is listening to the voice of reason any longer. Nevertheless, its importance will grow, even after the general sobering up in which most of the writers of this book believe to some extent. It will be read as valuable testimony of the power of prediction of a dark future. It would be good if this book were read even earlier."

Slavonia Orthodox Bishop Protest Letter to Cosic

93BA0163A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
30 Oct 92 p 9

[TANJUG report: "Letter From Bishop of Slavonia Lukijan to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Cosic: Do Not Open Roads and Communication"]

[Text] Belgrade—The bishop of Slavonia, Lukijan, warned Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic yesterday that until a final solution has been reached, one that is most favorable to Serbs in Slavonia, roads and communication should not be opened through the small but strategically important part of western Slavonia that now belongs to the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Bishop Lukijan believes that this should be the course of action despite pressure and sanctions.

"After last year's withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army and the infernal exodus of around 150,000 Serbs from western Slavonia, there still remains a small

number whom the Ustashi have not captured," he writes in the letter directed to Cosic. "This territory, with around 70 towns, is very strategically important to our enemies, because even though it is small, it includes the highway, the Belgrade-Zagreb line, the navigable course of the Sava River, and the oil pipeline. The Serbs here will not simply hand over these four important installations until a solution is found that suits us best."

Bishop Lukijan says in the letter: "We do not have unreserved confidence in our local authorities." And he appeals to President Cosic to "demonstrate the resolve and firmness of St. Lazar, the integrity of King Petar I, and the shrewdness of Pasic, because regardless of your demonstrated good will, the sanctions and pressure on Serbs have not decreased, but have even intensified."

In the letter, the bishop of Slavonia provided President Cosic with details about the background of Slavonian Serbs, who came to this region as early as 1484 ("before the discovery of America"), and to whom both the Austrian and the Turkish authorities granted a certain level of statehood.

Serbian Commodity Reserves Director on Dismissal

93BA0177B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
30 Oct 92 p 30

[Article by M. Jankovic summarizing news conference of Dusan Mitevic, dismissed Serbian commodity reserves director: "Bozovic Should Be Stopped!"]

[Text] Belgrade—"Between 1500 and 1600 hours on 28 October, without any previous announcement and without any presentiment whatsoever, I heard over the car radio, in the now hackneyed wording characteristic of certain times in the past, that I had been dismissed from the post of director of the Republic Commodity Reserves Directorate. I have received quite a few blows in my life, but this one really went beyond all limits."

With these words, Dusan Mitevic, dismissed Serbian commodity reserves director, began a press conference yesterday, remarking that this is not the first time that he has been at the center of attention through no fault or virtue of his own. In an excellent mood (in jest, he even asked the TV cameraman to take care of how he "looks" on the screen), Mitevic said that his dismissal was a settlement of accounts not clear to him, and that the dismissal had been carried out personally by Prime Minister Bozovic.

"By contrast with my last dismissal from the post of director of TV, when I did not want to get involved in commentary and explanations, this time I must do so," Mitevic said, "because Bozovic has so far made a significant contribution to the practice of dismissing one's closest associates. In these 14 months that I have headed the directorate, I did not receive a single word of criticism of my work, but now that all this has happened, I have begun to see the various steps that led up to this.

First of all, a typically bureaucratic trick was played, and my summons to the meeting of the government was delivered only after the meeting was over. What was it I did to the higher-ups for them to treat me that way?" Mitevic wondered.

"First of all, I opposed moving the headquarters of the directorate from Belgrade to Novi Sad, because there was not a single sound reason for something like that, but a group of important ministers from Vojvodina were insisting on it. Then about three weeks ago Bozovic called me in personally and asked that I urgently give him a report on the work of the directorate, which I did. That report was accepted in a meeting of the government last week without a single comment unless we count two of Bozovic's. The first that he had been in certain towns in Serbia and while there had heard certain criticism of the work of the directorate, and the other that excessive reserves had been given to private operators. I answered that I had also been in certain cities of Serbia and that I had heard certain criticism of the work of the government, and that excessive reserves had not been given to private operators. Even if they had been, I said, both the Constitution and the laws call for equal treatment of the private and socialized sectors. None of that had any effect, because Bozovic had rendered his verdict considerably earlier. He had ordered the Justice Ministry to prepare legislation that would abolish the directorate and in that way divide the total commodities, representing about 900 warehouses, the ministries. Last week, the government removed that proposal from the agenda, and that is why the prime minister did what he did not need anyone's consent for—he removed the director."

"I simply could not allow Bozovic," Mitevic said, "to place the commodity reserves under his own power, because then Serbia would be the only country in the world without commodity reserves. I therefore call attention of the public and all our political parties to Bozovic's secret plan, so that they might stop him."

Asked whether perhaps his friendship and business deals with Prime Minister Panic might have something to do with his removal, Mitevic replied that he doubted it, and he emphasized in this connection that he has carried through only one transaction with Panic—satellite television. "Incidentally," Mitevic said, "four days ago I was also removed as a member of the managing board of this television station, along with Bjeletic, Zugic, and Veljkovic, while Vucelic, Topalovic, and Popivoda were elected to our positions." Mitevic was also reluctant to believe that his appearance on the program "Impression of the Week" on Independent Television Studio B had any effect on his dismissal, as a story going from hand to hand in the corridors would have it, and he said that he would not accept any job if it was offered by Prime Minister Panic. "I will probably be involved in business, but I am going straight home from here," he said. In answer to the last question from the journalists as to what he thinks about the rumors that his dismissal is only a clever maneuver of the government to bring him back to the post of television director after Vucelic

leaves, Mitevic said: "Our politicians do not work out the sophisticated combinations of a Bobby Fischer. I am not going back to television, which does not mean, he added at the end through his laughter, that Vucelic will remain in that position."

[Box p 30]

Does Milosevic Know?

In answer to a newsman's question as to whether President Milosevic had been informed about Bozovic's move, Mitevic said that he did not know, but that he certainly knows now, "because I believe he reads the newspapers." "As far as I personally am concerned," Mitevic said, "I have not consulted with anyone about my moves, including this press conference. I only asked for someone from the leadership of the Socialist Party to inform them that I have been forced to name the name of one of their members and official and I will therefore speak out in public. I felt that to be an obligation, because I am a member of that party."

Reasons for Commodity Reserves Director Dismissal

93BA0189E Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
2 Nov 92 p 23

[Article by Z.V.: "Mitevic's Dismissal"]

[Text] First it was reported last Wednesday evening—with no reasons given—that Mr. Dusan Mitevic, director of the Directorate for Commodity Reserves of the Republic of Serbia, had been dismissed from that post by decision of the government of Serbia, whose official he was. Then the next day—on Thursday—Mr. Mitevic held a press conference and explained his view of the event which is on the way to becoming the event of the week: Dusan Mitevic, after all, is not dismissed every week; the last time was after the violent tumult on 9 March 1991; that was centuries ago.

After 9 March (that first and real one), when two lives were lost because of TV Belgrade and Dusan Mitevic, Milosevic's regime sheltered him in the position of director of the Serbian Directorate for Commodity Reserves, a post—as far as political power is concerned—far more important than his previous one.

Just last week Mr. Mitevic talked like a well-placed man on Studio B television; in answer to the question of whether Mr. Milosevic is his friend, he said (after a certain pause): "Well, I think he is." Two days later he was dismissed. At the press conference in Belgrade, he offered three reasons for his dismissal: he had allegedly defended "Serbia proper" against the appetites of Serbian Prime Minister Bozovic to move the directorate to Novi Sad; he had allegedly opposed ideas which give greater importance to Sandzak and Kosovo; and finally, he placed his dismissal in the context of the "overall

struggle for democratization of Serbia," with an obvious value judgment implied. He was offended and "loyal to principle," as usual.

Now that matters are being examined a bit more coolly, Mr. Mitevic would have to offer some stronger evidence to support the theory that Mr. Bozovic dismissed him because he opposed moving the directorate to Novi Sad. It would be hard to say which is less believable: the assertion that Mr. Mitevic is a protector of the economy of Serbia proper or the assertion that Mr. Bozovic is an advocate of Vojvodina autonomy. It is more likely to have been a conflict between two members of the same SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] over political power, that is, over control of commodity reserves, which afford manifold benefits to whoever controls them. Dusan Mitevic—we will recall—became the monopoly buyer of grain by decision of Mr. Bozovic's government; he thus acquired the right to withdraw credits from primary issue (printed money) to buy wheat and to do this through his own commercial bank. If such credits are used in compliance with the law, they are not attractive; but if the money does not reach the peasants quickly, they become very interesting to the directorate and its bank, which use it to turn a profit. This phenomenon has been the rule in our practice for years now. Only from that standpoint—unlawful and thieving—could Mr. Mitevic frighten the Serbs that they will "lose between \$1.5 billion and \$2 billion" if the directorate moves to Novi Sad. He forgot to mention that Mr. Bozovic's government had in its regulations afforded the Serbian police the right to go into any silo in Vojvodina and forcibly "requisition" at ridiculous prices that grain which still had not been sold to the directorate. That is, up to now the commodity reserves have purchased only 660,000 tons of grain out of the planned one and a half million; along with the reserves, that will last to the end of the year. The story going around among informed people in Belgrade is that Mitevic and Bozovic are passing the buck to one another after their president asked them the simple question of why there is no more grain in the hands of the Serbian state.

A regime which in one week has been left without Aleksandar Bakocevic and without Dusan Mitevic has to be worried.

Kosovo Albanian Political Scene Reviewed

93BA0168B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 30 Oct 92 pp 15-17

[Article by Momcilo Petrovic: "Rugova's Mandate With Limitations"]

[Text] *Even the representative of Kosovo Albanians does not enjoy unreserved support within his own ranks—the leader of the party that unites 600,000 Albanians is subject to criticism for "slowness and indecisiveness." To what extent can the "internal opposition" influence the outcome of his talks with Panic?*

Although only the time to come and the (tumultuous) events facing us will determine the true place of the Panic-Rugova meeting in the annals of history, there is absolutely no doubt that the outcome of attempts to resolve the "Kosovo question" will be influenced primarily by the level of support that the negotiators enjoy among "their own" people. If Panic's "case" is clear to outside observers to the extent that it is clear to them that the answer to the question "does he or does he not have support" will be very quickly and very loudly proclaimed *urbi et orbi* [to the city (Rome) and the world], Rugova's position is shrouded by many unknowns.

From the very first days of the disintegration of the SFRY, he has acted as the representative of Albanian interests, and to this day no attempts to challenge his primacy have been observed (at least outside Kosovo circles). Right now the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], of which Rugova is chairman, is unquestionably the largest political organization of Albanians on the soil of the former Yugoslavia, so that perhaps it should come as no surprise that in the delegation that held talks with Panic the first time (this article is going to press before the meeting scheduled for 29 October, which is supposed to be attended by Vance and Lord Owen, in addition to the aforementioned leaders), it was represented by a total of four members, while the Parliamentary, Peasant's, and Christian Democratic Parties had only one representative each. Nevertheless, the fact that the best-known "fighters for the national cause" of many years' standing, such as Redzep Cosja, Adem Demaci [Rexhep Qosja, Adem Demaqi], or the chairman of the Academy of Sciences of the "Republic of Kosovo," Mark Krasnici [Krasniqi], are not participating, as well as the fact that the entire leadership of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] has remained abroad even during the talks, and the fact that the delegation of Albanians negotiating with federal and republican education authorities is led by DSK vice chairman Fehmi Agani and not, say, Muhamed Bicaj, the minister in the "government" of Bujar Bukosi [Bukoshi], under whose orders the current strike is being carried out..., all of this gives rise to the notion that Ibrahim Rugova too is not entering into these "perhaps historic" negotiations without internal problems.

Charges of Betrayal

Although previously the acceptance of peaceful resistance as the universal and only way to struggle for the "Republic of Kosovo," regardless of at whose initiative or under whose orders, was a sign that a national consensus had been achieved, and that the leader of the DSK, Ibrahim Rugova, who was the strongest champion of this sort of struggle, had a mandate whose duration was never publicly proclaimed, the "battle of opinions" on the Albanian political scene has never ceased. Set off by the language barrier and the protagonist's perception that "in any event, everything should stay in the family" (an exception has been made in the case of isolated interviews for foreign publications, apparently intended

for emigrant circles), the polemics in Albanian-language publications has not caused major reverberations in Yugoslav public opinion, and today they do not reflect enough elements for a detailed analysis. However, two problems dominate all debate, and all other conflicts are refracted through the discussion of how to solve them, including the conflict surrounding the position of leader.

"Greater Albania" or the "Republic of Kosovo" is a dilemma that has been pushed to the fore by events on the soil of the former Yugoslavia over the past two years of European and U.S. resolve to preserve existing international borders. Shifting gears, Albanian politicians from Kosovo proclaimed the "self-governing, independent, and sovereign Republic of Kosovo" as their ultimate goal. At the same time, they left the door open for further "interstate" talks with Macedonia, repudiating "Ilirida," the state projected by Albanians from "our" former southernmost republic, leaving it up to the ruling team in the NSR [People's Socialist Republic of] Albania to dictate the pace of democratization at their own discretion (which in the case of unification with Kosovo, which piqued Europe, would be utterly impossible) and ensuring international support.

Redzep Cosja, however, has different ideas: "The only real and lasting solution to the status of Albanians is the unification with Albania of all territories of the former Yugoslavia in which Albanians make up a majority and which have geographic continuity with Albania.... It is unjust and contrary to the goal of peace to insist on preserving the existing borders."

Obviously addressing that part of the population for whom abandonment of the national dream known as "Greater Albania" is treason, Redzep Cosja, showing little concern for the fact that he is making Ibrahim Rugova's international position more difficult, has taken part in the congresses of Pan-Albanian National Reconciliation, which are held in Albania and Bulgaria. It was only when the third session was to be held in Kosovo in March of this year that he was forced to withdraw when confronted with the energetic disapproval of the head of the DSK and other parliamentary parties; that session has not yet taken place.

He used the outcome of the London Conference in August of this year for yet another series of attacks on Rugova: In an unusually harsh open letter published in ZERI, the publication whose chief and responsible editor is now Adem Demaci, Redzep Cosja accused the "president" of betraying the national interests, emphasizing that Europe's attitude toward Kosovo confirms the correctness of his positions. Rugova himself did not react to this letter, but Behlulj Beca [Belul Beca], the vice chairman of the SDP, did respond to Cosja, rejecting the charges leveled at the current leadership of the Kosovo Albanians as irresponsible.

Although it is clear that Ibrahim Rugova enjoys the support of the "young people," the Parliamentary Party of Veton Suroi [Veton Surroi] and the SDP of Skelzen Malici

[Shkelzen Maliqi], in his struggle with Redzep Cosja and the circle of independent intellectuals grouped around the Forum, it is impossible to predict the final outcome with certainty. Cosja's warning looms continuously over the leadership negotiating with Panic: "If the present-day political parties in any way accept the sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia, then new forces will appear on the Kosovo political scene that will carry forward the banner of self-determination and independence."

Lures on a Long Stick

However, Ibrahim Rugova is paying a different price for the support that he has among the political forces gathered around Suroi and Malici in the struggle with supporters of "Greater Albania." Once they had broken with Yugoslavia and definitively committed themselves to an independent Kosovo, these "young lions" became advocates of nonviolent pressure on Serbian policy and world public opinion, the intensity of which considerably exceeded the framework of peaceful resistance supported by the DSK leader. "To what degree can the situation in Kosovo be intensified without provoking conflict?" is a question to which the answer is far from unambiguous.

"We reproach the DSK for its strategy of waiting, during which the people are left up to the elements, unable to find their way, while the situation is very serious from the social, existential viewpoint and dissatisfaction is smoldering and could explode at any time with dangerous consequences," Skelzen Malici said. Ibrahim Rugova's relative lack of success on the international scene (most of all the treatment of Kosovo Albanians at the London Conference and their referral to talks with Yugoslav authorities) is the reason for harsh criticism of his present policy, calculated to promote himself on the internal scene. In the same way, the impossibility of convening Parliament after the elections held in May is being exploited: "We have a party that is dominant, that assumes the risk of deciding both on everyday policy and on strategic moves, while this consultative body (coordinating body—Ed.) serves only to give it a pluralistic form.... Strategic decisions are made in narrow, informal groups," says Malici, indicating a poorly concealed desire for a redistribution of power.

For now, the first "president of the Republic of Kosovo" has no choice but to apply the tactics that have worked thus far, picturesquely described as a lure on a long stick. For the nearly three years of his leadership, he has emphasized, one after another, goals whose realization he has proclaimed to be "significant accomplishments": The first was the "Kacanik Constitution" and the formation of the "government," then the referendum "for or against an independent state," and then the announcement and holding of elections.... The last goal, "Parliament," lost importance due to the change in circumstances and was replaced by negotiations with the Yugoslav prime minister. During all of this, he defended himself against internal attacks in this way: "... In

connection with this (a possible schism—Ed.), we stress that the Albanian opposition in Kosovo, neither now nor, I believe, in the future, is not creating and will not create any internal opposition based on someone's will. In better days, that could happen, but in the position in which Kosovo and Albanians find themselves, that will not come to pass. The Albanian opposition in Kosovo is united on the basis of a firm national program, which takes priority over all other programs.... When other times come, the Albanian opposition in Kosovo will be more heterogeneous, more pluralistic, and less national."

Unrealistic Goal

Thus far, this has "worked." Rugova's further political destiny will depend on his skill at presenting what he obtains in the negotiations with Panic (if anything is "obtained" and "lost," of course) to his public as the achievement of the national interest, a "self-governing, independent, and sovereign Kosovo," in the name of which he has in fact asked for "internal peace."

As consolation he has the fact that so far not a single other party leader among the Albanians has expressed a wish to replace him in the talks with Panic.

In any event, the DSK leader enjoys the support of the majority for now. A problem could emerge only because of the fact that this support is based on the vision of a "self-governing, sovereign, and independent Kosovo," and thus on what is, by all indications, an unrealistic goal.

A problem not only for Ibrahim Rugova.

Vojvodina Autonomy: Opposition, Hungarians Differ

93BA0067A Subotica NAPLO in Hungarian 7 Oct 92 p 9

[Interview with Janos Vekas, vice president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina, by Gabor Bodis; place and date not given: "Autonomy—as Viewed by Hungarians"]

[Text] [Bodis] Recently, Vojvodina opposition parties have begun to frequently criticize the VMDK [Democratic Union of Hungarians in the Vojvodina]; moreover, they have done so in regard to the autonomy issue. If I understand these things correctly, the essence of the problem is that these Vojvodina opposition parties—as, for instance, the Social Democratic League or the reform communists' party—support the idea of granting autonomy to the Vojvodina as a whole, and while the VMDK does not reject, and even supports this idea, it does not endorse overall autonomy at the price of surrendering autonomy for the minorities.

[Vekas] We say the same thing the Slovenes said in those days, what Kucan said regarding the fate of Yugoslavia. The Slovene president asserted that Yugoslavia is going to be whatever we agree upon. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia fell apart because they were unable to reach

agreements regarding very many things. At present we are saying the same to the opposition in Vojvodina: The Vojvodina is going to be whatever we agree upon. We are able to fully support the demand for a fully autonomous Vojvodina. Quite naturally, we, too, believe that it would be much better if all Hungarians in the Vojvodina enjoyed minority rights to preserve their identity, and not only those, let's say, in the Hungarian autonomous district of northern Vojvodina, whose number is barely larger than half the number of all Hungarians in the Vojvodina. Accordingly, we are able to accept demands for an autonomous Vojvodina, but at the same time we demand that the autonomist Vojvodina parties accept as part of their concept an institutional system for minority rights, the kind we demand. Well, this is the area where we have not been overly successful.

We must make clear that the minorities in the Vojvodina do not have enough votes for the passage of Vojvodina autonomy. Just as the Vojvodina could not exist without Hungarians, it could not exist without Serbs either, and the Serbs must state what they believe is more important to them at this moment: to live in a region of Europe under peculiar conditions, which would provide guarantees here, and would provide us, too, favorable conditions for enforcing our minority rights, or, alternatively, to live in a nation state. We have seen historical precedents in which certain nations were punished by being torn into two parts based on some global policy considerations. Suffice it to mention Germany, but the partitioned condition prevailed only as long as physical power was able to sustain it. The two Germanys became naturally united as soon as that situation ended. It is in this sense that we believe that we can expect lasting peace and lasting stability only if we find a solution that enjoys the citizens' support. In other words, if the status of the Vojvodina becomes one that is desired by the citizens of the Vojvodina. This cannot be determined without a referendum, and this is why we recommended in April that the autonomy of the Vojvodina be decided at a popular referendum. I can also perceive a situation in which the status of the Vojvodina becomes one that is not consistent with the desires of a majority of Vojvodina citizens. But just as we could say that the injustice implicit in the Trianon decision had, essentially, destabilized the region, we could say today that another unjust decision could also act as a destabilizing factor in the region. It seems to me that the European powers and the United States do not have instability as their goal, but the opposite: the establishment of stable conditions.

[Bodis] According to certain views, the Vojvodina, as an autonomous factor, has lost the status it once held at the end of World War II, when more than 100,000 Germans were deported, and Hungarians, too, were intimidated. So that what we call the Vojvodina does not even exist in reality, and many believe that a majority of the populace would not vote for autonomy in a referendum. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that they want to settle refugees mainly in the Vojvodina.

[Vekas] Just one supplemental thought: When they deported the Germans, they not only intimidated the Hungarians, but also murdered masses of Hungarians. The ethnic ratios have fundamentally changed. Very many Germans, very many Hungarians, and, one could say, many Jews have left the Vojvodina, and this process has continuously been going on for 70 years, ever since the Vojvodina had become part of Yugoslavia. Most recent action taken by the Serbian Government aims for the organized settling of 150,000 refugees in the Vojvodina, in addition to the 250,000 refugees, more or less, who have already settled here. This would entirely change the ethnic ratios on the one hand, while on the other, the ethnic tensions accompanying this action would be of such proportions that they would render the continued mutual tolerance manifested thus far by the various ethnic groups hardly conceivable. There is concern that refugees settling here would view the coexistence of various nations very differently. As a result of a number of existential problems, they could easily be persuaded by some right-wing political force to take a radical approach. I must say that thus far, in places where the VMDK has won the local elections based on Hungarian majorities, and where the VMDK has established autonomous local governments, the interethnic conditions have been at least as stable as they have been in places where this situation did not exist, but I cannot perceive a continuation of this stability after settling the additional refugees.

I am not persuaded by the Serbian Government's argument presented in support of settling refugees in areas with a Hungarian majority. We heard several arguments; one of these raised humanitarian considerations, for instance. We told them that we have helped the refugees so far, and that we are willing to help them now as well as in the future. We do not rule out help based on humanitarian considerations, even though our conduct has not contributed to their becoming refugees. We are aware of the reason why it would be more humanitarian to settle these refugees in Hungarian areas, and why they would not feel better in places where they could coexist with their fellow nationals. Equally characteristic is the fact that they want to settle these refugees in the Vojvodina among Hungarian people and not so much in Kosovo, among Albanians, even though conditions for settlement also exist there. This is an apparent abuse of the tolerance manifested by Hungarians in the Vojvodina, of their extremely high tolerance level. The other argument is based on economic considerations. Unfortunately, some of our people also envisioned a chance to become prosperous as a result of receiving refugees. They thought that building refugee settlements here in the north would be a good investment. We would much rather say that poor villages also exist in Serbia; their economies, too, could be helped, and we would be very willing to surrender this perceived economic advantage. In this instance, let them support those areas. National defense studies of long ago contained countless complaints about the population moving out of certain areas of Serbia, about not having enough residents, and of how

bad that was. Well, they do have an opportunity to remedy these shortcomings now.

PDP Secretary on Albanian Autonomy in Macedonia

93BA0138A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 25 Oct 92 p 2

[Unattributed interview with Mitkhat Emini, Party for Democratic Prosperity secretary; place and date not given: "Autonomy Does Not Mean Seceding From Macedonia"]

[Text] *Macedonia belongs to us as much as to the others, for we are not newcomers. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the war will end in a dialogue across a conference table, so why should we not sit down and talk? A war in Kosovo tomorrow would mean a war in Macedonia the day after. If there is a war waged by Albanians in Kosovo we shall assist them any way we can.*

PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] Secretary Mitkhat Emini is a leader whose thoughts are respected. He always represents his party whenever the most important issues related to the PDP, Albanians in Macedonia, or the state problems of the Republic are debated, and when discussions are needed with representatives of different international institutions and organizations. However, he is also a leader believed to be an extremist by a segment of the Macedonian public.

What are Emini's views on the political situation in Macedonia, on the more than two years of PDP activities on the pluralist stage, and on the future and the coexistence between Macedonians and Albanians?

[Emini] The PDP views Macedonia as a stable and independent state of equal citizens, regardless of faith, ethnicity, or gender.... In that sense the party supports institutional separation, and an argument in support of this is our participation in the government. There are those who believe that the PDP is not sincere and that all of our actions are concealing something different. Our insistence on acting through the institutions, with dialogue, and with mutual respect is the only possible way today. We are familiar with the examples of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] We know the way the present government has been labeled by some political parties—mainly, as they see it, for its "communist-Albanian structure."

[Emini] The PDP participates in the government but does not work for a coalition, which would imply a joint platform. Our party belongs neither to the left nor the right bloc but is in the center. We are ready to cooperate with anyone who accepts our program and with whom it is possible to talk. We were prepared for a coalition in the government of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party

for Macedonian National Unity], but they ignored our demands and did not want a coalition with Albanians.

We do not consider accurate claims that the Albanians are part of the system. The fact is that we have five ministers, but there also are ministries without a single Albanian. In order to be part of the system we should participate on all functional levels in all state institutions and agencies. You may rest assured that the Albanians would not work against Macedonia's interests. If we are acting together, then why are there no Albanians in charge of various functions?

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] How would you assess the present political situation in Macedonia?

[Emini] Above all, we are pleased that despite everything what prevails in Macedonia is reason, a policy of peace compared to political forces that look to the future through gunsights. In Macedonia everyone must realize that weapons are not the best way. The forces I mentioned, however, may be found in some parliamentary and nonparliamentary parties, forces that would like a situation similar to the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are trying to promote interfaith hatred. Rejecting everything that is not Macedonian, and especially whatever happens to be Albanian, and putting crosses on clock towers indicating conversion to Christianity are only some recent examples. We are not against religion, but this should be one of the freedoms of the citizens.

We are concerned by the worsened relations between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Islamic religious community. The PDP has no contacts with those religious institutions, for we are a political party. However, I can say that the MPC [Macedonian Orthodox Church] is acting in two directions. Some MPC leaders have coordinated their thoughts and views with the IVZ [Islamic religious community], while others are encouraging the spoiling of relations.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] At one point the PDP was strongly critical of the work of the MVR and, subsequently, of the Macedonian Army.

[Emini] Some state authorities and institutions—not all, but especially those who influence peace and stability—are not doing their job. The MVR is allowing some municipal authorities and officials to apply their own laws and to irritate the Albanian population. The PDP, which is within the government, will not allow a repetition of the example of Radolista and the intervention of the police. I am not saying that the police did not have to intervene, but not in that manner and with so many people. I believe that they wanted to gauge the pulse beat of some citizens. Most recently, when hooligans in Kumanovo and Gostivar attacked innocent Albanian students, the police did not react suitably. I asked myself how they would react if Macedonian students had been attacked.

We have no serious remarks concerning the Macedonian Army. The Albanians are participating in the Army with

a suitable number of command personnel. The evaluation of the Ministry of Defense and of President Gligorov is that this number is insufficient but that it could be reinforced by training the reserve cadres. The presence of Albanians in the Macedonian armed forces is necessary, for in terms of their number, the Albanians are a significant defense factor. The PDP insists on having a more extensive draft and on laying to rest suspicions concerning Albanians in the Macedonian armed forces, who came from the former Yugoslav People's Army. Unquestionably, such doubts will be laid to rest the moment the minister of defense appoints an Albanian as his deputy.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Could you tell us something more about the discussions taking place between the Macedonian Government and representatives of Albanians in Macedonia? This issue is of the greatest interest to the public, and you are one of the participants in the talks.

[Emini] Some such discussions have been described as talks but they are not talks, for this would mean also that some kind of agreement should be their purpose. With the EC acting as an intermediary, talks are being held between the government and the representatives of the Albanians. We are discussing the situation and how to improve it. We have agreed that some conditions are unacceptable, and ways are being sought to improve them, naturally, within the system. Nothing is being done behind the back of anyone else or against the interests of Macedonia. The talks are not secret, and how could they be if they are being held in Ohrid and Skopje? They are useful because they are not dominated by narrow party interests. We are not asking for any kind of privileges or anything that does not exist in Macedonia. We believe that Macedonia belongs to us as much as it belongs to the other groups. We do not accept the idea that some people own Macedonia while the others are tenants. There is a war currently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will end up in talks, therefore, again behind the conference table, and not with arms. Therefore, why should we not begin by sitting behind the conference table?

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] The PDP would like to revive the referendum on Albanian political and territorial autonomy in Macedonia, which was included in the party congress' documents.

[Emini] Autonomy is not a programmatic stipulation of the PDP. Autonomy is the result of the increased feeling of national affiliation. On the basis of the political will of various ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia, the Albanians in Macedonia as well believe that they must express their will and have spoken out in favor of autonomy, but autonomy within Macedonia and not outside of it. There should be no fear that this would eventually lead to secession. A number of countries throughout the world have autonomous areas where people are respected, live together, and do not think of resorting to weapons.

I believe that autonomy would improve the status of the Albanians and, as a party, the PDP cannot ignore the will of the Albanians. Again, our contribution to its implementation will be based on the institutions of the system—the parliament, and the government—as long as we can find mutual understanding.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] Within the range of informal talks at the European Conference, was there any mention of autonomy for Albanians in Macedonia?

[Emini] As Albanians, at the European Conference we asked for equal status. If a special status is granted, for example, to Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, why should Albanians in Macedonia not have a similar status? I personally believe that a special status in a country in which everyone is equal would only enhance the state rather than threaten it.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] The Albanians in Kosovo are unwilling to accept such a status.

[Emini] Our demands should not be confused with theirs. Kosovo, particularly on the basis of the 1974 statute, was a virtual republic with a territorial integrity and administrative boundaries. We asked for a higher level of government and self-government, which could be regulated through local self-governing laws. The purpose of Albanian autonomy is to ensure respect for and implementation of all the laws of the state on the basis of the laws passed by the parliament. At the same time, legal acts should be adopted for the implementation of these laws. This way autonomy would be a democratic gain: more freedom for some citizens that, unless other conditions are changed in the Republic, would not mean total equality, which is what we demand above all. I believe that it would be harder for Macedonia to accept equality than autonomy.

[NOVA MAKEDONIJA] If it comes to war in Kosovo, how would the PDP act?

[Emini] Obviously, we shall support the resistance of the Albanians in Kosovo. Why not be sincere? We are Albanian and it would be absurd to think that we shall remain idle. We shall organize the giving of aid in terms of food, clothing, medicine, and all kinds of help. There will probably be a large number of refugees from Kosovo, and we shall organize their resettling.

In any case, I believe that Macedonia will become involved if there is a war there. If it is Kosovo tomorrow, it will be Macedonia day after. If there is war in Kosovo the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia will look like Disneyland. It would be a danger for the entire Balkan area and Europe, for one could expect the involvement of Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and even Turkey.

We are pleased that the Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia have chosen the path of peace and have pursued it, although in many cases they could have lost their patience.

The Albanians in Macedonia are a stabilizing factor. We must develop conditions for coexistence. We offer our hand to anyone who respects us, who considers us equal, and who wishes to live with us in peace. No one should fear us.

Biography, Political Career of Borisav Jovic

93BA0168A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 30 Oct 92
p 14

[Article by Dragan Cicic: "Political Sketch: Borisav Jovic: The Third Man"]

[Text] The long standing ovations, cheering, and staging at last week's SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] congress will probably not escape the attention of local satirists. It is not hard to imagine a scene where Slobodan Milosevic, upon learning of 917 votes "for" and two "against," says furiously, "Find me the one who voted twice."

The inner circle of those suspected of abusing the democratic process would clearly include Borisav Jovic. If for no other reason because of the obvious enthusiasm with which he explained that when he was elected "no one was opposed, everyone was in favor" (indeed, he characterized this as an example of democratization). Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that he is to blame—he is clearly aware that Milosevic's departure would also mean his own political end.

Born in Niksic in 1928 (not Niksic, Montenegro, but rather the town in Batocina Opstina, in Sumadija), he joined the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] in 1951, and in no way did he stand out among the numerous (countless) party apparatchiks. He held various not very important posts, for example, as chairman of the Srez [old administrative unit] Committee of the People's Youth of Kragujevac, member of the Federal Metalworkers Board, and director for srez planning.... He used his knowledge as a doctor of economic sciences to produce works such as "Radno pravo umetnika" [Labor Law for Artists] and "Metodologija izrade statuta radnih organizacija i njena primena u ugostiteljstvu" [Methodology of Formulating Statutes of Labor Organizations and Their Application to Hotel and Restaurant Management]. After serving as director of "Crvena zastava" [Red Flag] in Kragujevac, he began to hold somewhat more important posts in the republican hierarchy.

In the personnel roulette game, destiny made him a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in June 1986. His duties were no better or worse than those that he had performed up to then, but the ferment taking place in the country was already portending an uproar. It was only a year until the Eighth Session, but his position, or at least his very membership, on the Serbian Central Committee allowed him to be very directly involved in the showdown between party factions. He was not only one of the many who—with the unerring instinct for survival in the

apparatus—were on the winning side; he was also one of the driving forces and leaders of the overthrow.

Besides Slobodan Milosevic and Bogdan Trifunovic, he was the third "man of truth" on the winning team, as they were dubbed in the propaganda slogans. At first the members of this group were depicted as more or less equal, and the image was generated that they complemented each other. In the division of functions, Jovic received the post of chairman of the Serbian Assembly. The semblance of equal status continued until he was forced to appease furious demonstrators by shouting, "Calm down, Comrade Sloba is about to arrive!"

As a member of the Presidency of the SFRY, it appears that at one point he demonstrated too much of an inclination for dialogue and compromise for Milosevic's taste, so that it was believed that the criticism that the Serbian president often directed at the Presidency and Drnovsek during that period was indirectly intended for Jovic as well.

There was plenty of conjecture about their struggle, so that the SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG even wrote that Jovic, among his friends, was "thinking out loud of dismissing Milosevic." MLADINA asserted that he was seeking protection from Milosevic's wrath in a report on the Serbian president's psychological state. He supposedly got his hands on the report thanks to his position as nominal head of state.

Such calculations were quickly forgotten thanks to the stubbornness with which he supported Milosevic. He made the position of president of the SFRY Presidency a function of his party and its then-leader most directly in a speech in Uzice during the 1990 preelection campaign. Standing in front of a large banner with Milosevic's picture, on which was written "Vote for the best person of the 20th century," he said that those who were concerned about whether the elections would be honest should "say openly that their goal is not democracy and honesty, but rather the overthrow of the Serbian leadership and the replacement of the socialist structure."

Three months later, in March 1991, he dramatically submitted and then withdrew his resignation, continuing his work on the Presidency. The maneuver caused general confusion and amazement, but from today's perspective it appears that by creating a new field of tension he succeeded in stabilizing Milosevic's position, which had been undermined by demonstrations, if the tanks sent out into the streets had not already done so.

Still, Milosevic's gratitude can hardly explain the fact that after his election as vice chairman of the SPS several days ago, Borisav Jovic is the only one of his old fellow soldiers to remain on the scene. Speaking before the congress, Milosevic cited the poor work performed by the SPS leadership, of which Jovic was chairman, declaring that he was surrounded by the wrong colleagues.... Jovic rejected the charges in unusually strong terms, and somehow survived politically. Even if

MLADINA's assertion must be taken with a grain of salt, there remains only one explanation—Jovic has managed to preserve his own base of power within the SPS, one that is not entirely dependent on Milosevic.

If this is true, then Bora Jovic is one of the few remaining bulwarks of arbitrary purges and autocracy. In other words, it is impossible to establish that Jovic voted twice, if for no other reason because he himself would have to be the chairman of a fact-finding commission.

'Forcible Occupation' of MUP Building Viewed

93BA0188B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
29 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by N. Trklja: "Minister Pavle Bulatovic on Forcible Occupation of SMUP, Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, Building: Republic Police Recruit Federal Police"]

[Text] The committees for defense and security of the Yugoslav Assembly concluded yesterday that the dispute between the republican and federal police concerning the building at Ulica Kneza Milosa 92 must be resolved as soon as possible, with respect for legal norms, in order to prevent similar incidents in the future, the consequences of which could be dangerous. Information on the forcible occupation of the Federal MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] building was presented by Minister of Internal Affairs Pavle Bulatovic. He provided a chronology of events and noted that the transfer of the federal building to republican ownership was carried out on the basis of legally irrelevant documents.

Aside from the formal-legal rationale, Bulatovic said that even if the documents were incontestable, the way in which the building was taken over was controversial. Noting that a meeting with the republican ministry had already been agreed to, Bulatovic said that the day before that meeting members of the Republican MUP occupied the building, so that the police assumed the role of the judiciary.

According to Bulatovic, the situation is further aggravated by the fact that members of the federal police are being asked to take sides. Those who fail to do so cannot enter the building. A differentiation is being carried out between those who are for the republican and those who are for the federal authorities, those who are heroes and those who are traitors. To members of the Federal MUP, this is a form of recruitment, Bulatovic said.

Air Force Changes, Activities Discussed

93BA0180A Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Nov 92 pp 20-21

[Article by S. Nedeljkovic based on interview with Colonel Branko Bilbija, pilot and assistant commander of the Air Force and Air Defense for flight personnel; place and date not given: "Master of Our Own Sky"]

[Text] The Air Force has made a considerable contribution to the warfare that has taken place on the soil of the former Yugoslav republics. At the same time, as is well-known, it has also had certain losses. We tried to learn what flight safety has been in the war that was imposed and whether and to what extent what had been practiced in peacetime was applied in wartime operations from Colonel Branko Bilbija, pilot and assistant commander of the RV i PVO [Air Force and Air Defense] for flight personnel.

He believed that flight safety under combat conditions cannot be looked at in the same way as in peacetime, because in war there is the enemy, there is flight over his territory, which is an essential factor of risk and a threat to flight safety. That element is more of a tactical nature and involves unknowns which cannot be completely worked out and foreseen whether the enemy is operating from the air or from the ground.

Intermixing of Forces

According to Col. Branko Bilbija, the enemy's activity can be predicted, but only in the case of stationary systems of territorial air defense. Then it is possible to establish quite reliably where the enemy is detecting us and where he is not, which makes it possible to take tactical measures and practice procedures for evading his air defense. However, in contemporary warfare, when a large number of infantry PVO weapons are used (SAM's, the short-range Strela 2M, the Stinger, and other weapons systems of the ground forces: antiaircraft artillery and artillery for defense of facilities), it is practically impossible to establish their precise deployment, which creates an additional risk and considerably diminishes flight safety. That state of air defense of facilities requires that pilots be trained and ready to fly at extremely low altitudes and high speeds, at great risk of collision with barriers, power lines, forests, birds.... And the pilot must be highly trained to find the objective under such conditions, to operate against it, and to return safely to the airfield.

As for the manner in which pilots have performed their missions in the war that has been imposed, the subject of our interview believed that combat operations of the Air Force have been highly complicated and difficult because enemy forces and our own have almost always been intermixed. Under such circumstances, the line of demarcation was usually not known, and there were very few true objectives for the operation of the Air Force within the zone of the front lines (armored mechanized units, artillery in position, enemy aircraft, etc.). Because of all that, the use of our RV i PVO units and also the behavior of units on the so-called front line necessitated operations in small groups. This put the enemy in a more favorable position because he was aiming his air defense against a small number of planes—airborne targets. In addition, the enemy did not have to identify aircraft, because he did not have an air force of his own, but directed fire from his guns on the ground against everything that appeared in the air above his forces.

Some Strange Missions

Col. Bilbija believed that on the whole flight safety in carrying out wartime missions was not at a satisfactory level, and one reason was that pilots were also given some strange missions. For example, they went out to reconnoiter and monitor the enemy's movements under an order to respond exclusively to ground fire. Combined with the fact that the entire Army was used differently than supposed in the rules of combat, this made flight safety still more problematical.

Speaking about the elements which had an adverse effect on flight safety in the conflicts that took place, the subject of our interview particularly emphasized the psychological aspect. That is, in peacetime the psychological preparations were based on mistaken values, so that it was very difficult to bring along the entire body of personnel from peacetime conditions to a situation in which we were dying on our own territory, in a country that had been peaceful until the day before. The atmosphere, that is, the environment from which the aviators carried out their combat missions, was also unfavorable. The airfields from which they took off to encounter the enemy were exposed to artillery fire and indeed even infantry fire. What is more, the difficult situation in the cities where members of their family were created an additional pressure, diminished the concentration, and distracted the attention of the pilots whose mission, under a great strain, was nevertheless to fly to the objective, operate against it, and return safely. Under such circumstances, when you add to all the rest the uninterrupted pressures of the European and world public against the VJ [Army of Yugoslavia] and RV i PVO, it is quite clear that it was very difficult to carry out combat missions and to maintain flight safety at the highest level.

Appropriate Flight Safety

The security of pilot training in the not so distant past was maintained by the wrong methods, and this was detrimental to the level of training even of individuals in the most distinguished positions in the RV i PVO. Instead of a high level of training, which in and of itself presupposes a high level of flight safety, it was assumed that flight safety should be increased by various (incorrectly assessed) restrictions, which had a negative impact both on people's capability and also on their morale. Thus, because of a false flight safety the altitude of hedgehopping flight was increased from offices and armchairs, contrary to the flight rules in effect, and this, like many other aviation rules and instructions, were written in blood. And then pilots were not allowed to carry out missions under all the conditions for which crews had been trained and the aircraft designed. Moreover, there were strange ways of training and bringing along young pilots, who were coddled just so no accident would happen to them. They were not allowed to fly and train under the most complicated conditions. Even expensive aviation exercises were conducted under fairly unrealistic assumptions. All this was done so that what

was referred to as flight safety would be at the highest possible level. Missions in RV i PVO are performed with a considerable, but acceptable, degree of risk. There is no complete safety in flight, not even in the situation where, as some see it, they were only watching the birds fly.

The new leadership team in the RV i PVO, headed by the new commander, has proceeded from a realistic examination of the situation in units so that on the basis of what has been established it could make an objective assessment of the level of training of individuals and units, of the condition of aircraft technicians on the ground, of the aircraft, of medical, rear, weather, and other support, and also of how well airfields and areas are equipped and arranged with the necessary ground radio-navigation devices for all flight conditions, which is something the Inspectorate for Flight Training in the RV i PVO command is already working on very rapidly. Using what we have learned from other wars and also the experiences from the war in our own space, we began to eliminate everything that was slowing down the training of combat pilots. This is certainly a broad activity leading toward complete professionalization of pilots' vocation and of members of the RV i PVO in general.

In the future, Air Force personnel will devote full attention to training pilots to fly at extremely low altitudes and high speeds. That kind of training is very important in overcoming hostile air defense and it requires a far more comprehensive approach—from theoretical to practical training, as well as performance of all future exercises with requirements and purposes that have been formulated realistically. We must likewise change the attitude of all participants in the conduct of flight training, beginning with the rear support, medical support, weather support, ornithological support, and all types of support that have a bearing on flight safety.

A particular innovation in the conduct of flight training to which Col. Branko Bilbija alluded is still closer cooperation with the Aviation Medicine Institute with a view toward specific monitoring of the psychophysical conditioning of pilots for performance of complicated flight missions. The Aviation Medicine Institute is also expected to be more committed and helpful in resolving possible accidents, emergencies, and critical points, the subject of our interview said.

Because flying is a risky occupation, which completely precludes any improvisation, it is logical that in the preparation and conduct of flight training nothing should be left to chance. Judging by the determination of the new command team in the RV i PVO to finally give flight safety the place which it deserves, we have to believe that in the future there will be far fewer reasons for the convening and proceedings of commissions which unfortunately deal with the tragic consequences caused by failure to abide by strict criteria in this very sensitive area.

Problems of Military Technical Institute

93BA0147A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
26 Oct 92 pp 26-27

[Report on and "text" of open letter to Prime Minister Milan Panic from a group of engineers at the Military Technical Institute of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, VTIVJ; text "abridged" by VREME editors: "Milosevic's Visit to VTIVJ: At Home With Potemkin"]

[Text] *Serious charges leveled at the technical institute of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia in a letter from a group of engineers.*

At the beginning of October of this year, the Aeronautical Technical Institute [VTI] was transformed and converted into the Military Technical Institute of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. Last Wednesday, the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, Gen. Zivota Panic, hosted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic at the newly formed institution.

Almost at the same time that Milosevic—according to a report by Radio Television Serbia, whose team was the only one to go along on this visit—was talking about his own "satisfaction with the achieved results" and showing the Military Technical Institute the way to "open cooperation with the economy," a group of engineers from that institution was sending an open letter to Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic, inviting him to visit the institute as well.

The letter differs significantly from the dull and usually demagogic reporting on Milosevic's visit, and VREME presents it to the broad public as well.

After a few introductory remarks on the capacities of and number of employees at the former Aeronautical Technical Institute and on the annual budget of close to one billion dollars that the state has earmarked for this and similar institutions, the engineers say the following:

"Specifically, the institutes were set up for the purpose of pursuing technical design activities and scientific research for the needs of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. This would inherently presuppose that they be obliged to have at their disposal an elite staff with a natural-technical focus, and that the dominant working atmosphere in them be one in which full expression of the creativity and independence of the subjects of the design and research process is possible."

Family Collectives

"However, our military institutes are organized as classic socialist military collectives, and thus on the principle of a typical military-party hierarchy, with a single chain of command and subordination. The institutional management personnel is educated at military schools, so that it is thorough only in its superficiality.

"Accordingly, 'internal advancement,' or rather moving toward the top of the institute's hierarchical ladder,

depends not on professional and scientific results, but rather on loyalty to the current ruling military clique.

"Although numerically in the majority, civilians here have been placed in a second-class position, and are perhaps even discriminated against. Civilian engineers who stayed in the JNA were forced to subordinate their careers to this officers' farce. For the sake of a housing solution, which was no match for the officers, but which on the average came faster than it would for civilians, and for the sake of monthly wages, which previously, as in March of this year, did not even reach the level of 20 marks, civilians with advanced specialist training in the JNA have inevitably accustomed themselves to the role assigned them, demonstrating endless obedience and blind submissiveness toward the higher-ranking officer cliques.

"Because of all this, civilian personnel has fluctuated; the most competent people have stayed in the JNA no more than a few months, while fraud, speculation, and corruption have become accepted and desirable forms of behavior in the workings of the Institute. The result of all this is that today the Institute is ostensibly an institution for design and scientific research which, as such, will no longer be able to survive under conditions of general poverty, but also under conditions of market economics.

"However, the Institute (and not only it, but also the other military institutes) is able to celebrate its 50th anniversary thanks only to the way in which it is financed. The secret of its survival is that its money has not been earned; rather, it has been received from the state budget unconditionally, so to speak. Monthly earnings have been continuously guaranteed and are based not on one's monthly labors, but rather on one's formal position....

"Over the past decade, the Aeronautical Technical Institute has been administered by active military personnel, led by Maj. Gen. Sava Pustinja. During that period, the ambitions of the VTI differed very much, to put it mildly, from its potential in terms of material, personnel, and organization.

"Since around 1980, the main preoccupation of the VTI has been work on the supersonic airplane, for which around \$20 million is necessary, and of which there is no trace today. With the funding earmarked by the JNA, the project managers have traveled all over the world several times, and entire families have found work in conjunction with the VTI project (there was a provision in sublegal documents that gave precedence to family members of active military personnel for employment in the JNA), and the number of employees has risen as high as 1,000.

"Regardless, even then no work was done at the Institute on anything, so to speak, except on sales contracts. Although it was possible to form 100 teams of 10 people each, the excuse for the VTI being unable to work on concrete matters (concerning the supersonic airplane) was that it did not have enough employees!"

Money in the Wind

"The second on the list of Institute priorities was work on the unmanned aircraft project, which began from square one every two or three years. The managers of this project were always the same, and they always traveled in that capacity and were monetarily reimbursed (even several times a year) 'for their contribution to the unmanned aircraft project.' Today, that aircraft is just as much a reality in our country as the supersonic airplane is, whereby it should be noted that in the rest of the world unmanned aircraft 'in an elementary form' began to be produced and used immediately after the World War I, while unmanned aircraft similar to those aspired to at the Institute were produced and deployed during the World War II.

"To round out the picture, work has been done at the Institute, parallel to these projects, on modernizing the 'Orao,' 'Galeb,' and 'Lasta,' aircraft that were already part of the 'armaments' of RV and PVO [Air Force and Air Defense] units. They operate now, so to speak, using 'sticks and strings,' i.e., they have missed out on all current world processes of automation.

"Now, all these old projects have been suspended and there are simply no new ones, nor is there any money, not even to buy onionskin paper. The material position of employees, especially civilians, is confounding. At the same time, not a small number of institute officers have moved into new three- and four-room apartments, and now 'refugee' officers are also congregating.

"Thus, the Institute has ended up in a 'bankruptcy' phase, while the man who was its director over the past seven years (and a high-level manager during the decade before that), Maj. Gen. Sava Pustinja, has in the meantime received orders on his appointment to a post on the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, while a similar fate awaits the current 'liquidator' of the Institute, Col. Jaroslav Safarik. In similar fashion, the other people in Gen. Pustinja's inner circle are now saving their skins by becoming part of the inner circle of Col. Lazarevic, the former director of the also newly formed Technical Institute of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia."

Call for Help

At the end of their letter to Milan Panic, the group of engineers from the Institute say:

"Research and design are free, reflective processes that can develop and lead to top-notch results only under conditions of free competition, while a hierarchical system among subjects can be established in them only on the basis of actual deeds, not on the basis of their formal knowledge and military rank.

"Thus, we see the Institute's prospects as follows: It is urgent that it be freed from military administration and that this Institute's officer establishment be directed toward units of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia; there must be a gradual transition from the budgetary form of

financing to one based on the market (over a period of one to three years); ownership relations must be established over the Institute's property; there must be close cooperation with international companies, which presupposes bringing in world experts for management, marketing, and individual specialized and scientific fields; the personnel and equipment that together can be competitive must be maintained, in the first phase because of the price of labor, but later because of both quality and the scope of services.

"Since we are convinced that our desire and ambitions are not in conflict with the desires and ambitions of the government of Prime Minister Milan Panic, we believe that the Institute would welcome the help of a corresponding government expert group, which would include world-recognized experts from technical fields."

Herceg-Novi Security Center Chief on Borders

*93BA0177D Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian
1 Nov 92 p 5*

[Interview with Radoje Radunovic, head of the Herceg-Novi Security Center, by Milenko Vico; place and date not given: "The People Are Guarding the Border"]

[Text] The Army has withdrawn from Prevlaka, members of a special police unit have taken possession of the border, and that led to the first question put to Radoje Radunovic, chief of the Herceg-Novi Security Center: "What is the situation in the border area of the opstina and the Republic?"

"The Army has withdrawn, the police have taken over control and guarding of the state border. For the moment, we are doing a fine job of this, and I think there will be no need for the citizens of Herceg-Novi Opstina to be afraid."

[Vico] The fear of the citizens, however, has been very pronounced.

[Radunovic] That is true, the fear has been pronounced, especially in citizens in the border area, which is natural. However, when the citizens become convinced of what we have been promising, that from the standpoint of the activity of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Montenegro and this security center, the border will be secured, that tension and fear will be diminished. The visits to those villages and their inhabitants which we are making almost daily have certainly contributed to that.

[Vico] How are the local people of the border villages collaborating with members of the border police unit?

[Radunovic] Well, we are engaged in the same task. Precisely so. I think that cooperation is on a high level. I believe, and I arrived at that conviction from direct contacts in the field, that the best border is one guarded by the people, of course, alongside the professional police forces.

[Vico] There have been no incidents so far?

[Radunovic] No, there have not, and I think that one reason for this is the Commission for Prevention of Border Incidents which was formed at the level of the ministries of the republics of Montenegro and Croatia. Thanks to the activities of those commissions, incidents have been prevented.

[Vico] Have there been contacts on the border between our police and the Croatian police?

[Radunovic] There have been direct contacts in several cases at the Debeli Brijeg border crossing. I believe that those contacts were pretty much fit and proper. There have also been handshakes, questions, and conversations between the police of Montenegro and Croatia, and I would like to say that I am very glad of that.

[Vico] Do any citizens cross the border at that checkpoint?

[Radunovic] Not at present, because the border crossing is not yet open, but we hope that in a short period, provided this normalization of relations continues, that border crossing will be opened. Then there probably will be crossings by individuals.

[Vico] How are you getting along with members of the UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force] deployed on the territory of Prevlaka?

[Radunovic] Collaboration is very good for the present. We have daily contacts. We talk at least once a day, several times if necessary, so it is a pleasure for me to say once again that cooperation with the UN observers who are on Prevlaka is very good.

[Vico] Nevertheless, deep down, do you feel that they are a bit more inclined toward the Croatian side?

[Radunovic] As for this group which is on Prevlaka, I personally think that they are portraying the situation rather objectively. However, it is a fact that they themselves cannot decide certain matters, that on essential questions they must consult their headquarters, which is located in Zagreb, and precisely because of the fact that Satish Nambiar himself approved the flying of the check-board flag in the "blue zone," in the hinterland of Prevlaka, I have gained the impression that the UNPROFOR is nevertheless inclined toward the Croatian side.

[Vico] Can you tell us something more about how members of this mission on Prevlaka are getting along in everyday life?

[Radunovic] They live normally. They have the right to come into town. They get their supplies normally and they have contacts with the local citizens. They are quartered on Prevlaka in facilities which the Army turned over to them, and they say that they have even a personal interest in Herceg-Novi getting water, because they do not have water either.

[Vico] You have said that you have daily contacts with the UNPROFOR, but do you have contacts, say, over some "hot line" with the security center in Dubrovnik as well?

[Radunovic] For the present, we do not have telephone connection with the police department in Dubrovnik, although a desire has been expressed on both sides for such a line to be set up as soon as possible, but we can contact them on a daily basis through representatives of the UNPROFOR, so that there are no problems at all for the present.

[Vico] It is well-known that in the demilitarized zone military units are not to be located on either side of the border. Is the Croatian side respecting that provision of the agreement?

[Radunovic] These findings of ours are ambiguous. The UNPROFOR informs us that they are respecting that "yellow zone," that the Croatian side is not bringing forces and armament which are not permitted up to that line, that is, to Gruda. But we also have other information which we get through the Army of Yugoslavia and from other sources, that they are violating those rules. I think that there is truth in this, but that those forces are concentrated toward the Hercegovina theater.

[Vico] Has anything changed in the behavior of the population of the three Kotor Bay opstinas since withdrawal of the army? Have there been outbursts, improper reactions?

[Radunovic] There has been unrest, the political tension and fear has increased, but I think that that tension is declining every day, that it is decreasing to a reasonable limit. There have been certain outbursts, but they were not of a disturbing nature, so that they should not be given any great importance.

[Vico] If any incident were to occur on the border, how would our border guards and you personally behave?

[Radunovic] Let us hope that does not happen, but if an incident does occur, both commissions for border incidents would be at the border crossing within an hour, and we would react in the sense of localizing that incident, that is, preventing any further escalation of the conflict.

[Box p 5]

Water

[Vico] What has happened, from what you have learned, to the water from Plata?

[Radunovic] Although the water supply is outside the jurisdiction of the Commission for Border Incidents, out of a desire to help the citizens of Herceg-Novi to get water as soon as possible, I have been involved in solving that problem. As far as I have been informed by UNPROFOR representatives, water was supposed to

arrive no later than Sunday or Monday evening. However, that has not happened. The Croatian side, for reasons so far unknown to us, has not allowed it to this day, and to tell you the truth, now even I am beginning to doubt that technical reasons are behind the delay. In saying this, I am referring to the fact that we have been asking for a joint commission to be formed which together with representatives of the UNPROFOR would go to the spot and see for itself what the reasons are for there being no water, and then it would inform the citizens of Herceg-Novi. However, as far as I have been informed by our representative for contacts with the UNPROFOR, the Croatian side has not allowed that.

Smuggling, Corruption, Illicit Trade in Macedonia
93BA0141A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 24 Oct 92 p 3

[Report by S. Kiridzievska: "The 'Gray Economy' Is Threatening Honest People"]

[Text] *The black market, corruption, illegal earnings, and avoidance of paying taxes are ruining the Macedonian economy.*

The black market, corruption, illegal earnings, and seeking loopholes in the law by a large number of juridical persons (regardless of the type of ownership) are ruining the Macedonian economy with their far-reaching current and long-term negative consequences. Such catastrophic consequences are reflected not only in the commercial activities in the public sector, but they also corrode the state (empty Republic treasury); on the other hand we notice a tremendous enrichment of individuals and juridical persons, not only as a result of better savings and enterprise efforts, but also the nonpayment of fees, taxes, and contributions or else by making partial payments on an unrealistically low basis.

These were some of the conclusions of yesterday's meeting of the industry and services council of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, which, in the past few months, has concentrated on the single issue of problems related to the gray economy.

In the first seven months of this year, real trade dropped by 53.1 percent and, according to August estimates, by 54.9 percent. Semiannual estimates of goods marketed in public trade, which is in its conversion stage to corporations and private trade by opening private enterprises and STD [expansion unknown], accounted for 19.6 percent of overall sales. According to the August figures, the participation of private companies in total sales increased by 36.7 percent, which was clearly reflected in the greater decline in public trade.

Reduced trade sales gave rise to further problems, the most current now being the closing down of unprofitable production capacities or franchising the same to enterprise personnel or to outsiders. According to data supplied by the larger commercial enterprises, in the first seven months of 1992 turnover in coffee sales dropped

by 70 percent; cigarettes by more than 85 percent; sausages by 70 percent, and nonalcoholic beverages by over 80 percent; the highest decline in turnover was in the sale of alcoholic beverages.

According to the merchants, the first to suffer from disloyal competition is the public sector, which had been supplying us for many years. According to the law, equal trade rules must apply to all. Unfortunately, this depends on the morality of those whose exclusive reason for becoming involved in trade is earning fast and easy profit. That is precisely why we must not be lulled into believing that the passing of the new laws in that area will resolve the problems overnight, for people interpret the laws in their own way and to their own advantage. We must change the atmosphere and the attitude and fight those who violate the laws. Only thus can we defeat the "gray economy," which is threatening the subsistence of those who would like to work honestly, the merchants emphasized.

Current Monetary Policy 'Less Restrictive'

93BA0177A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
30 Oct 92 p 30

[Unattributed article: "Credit and Money Flows: Fewer Restrictions"]

[Text] Belgrade—The projected credit and monetary policy for the last quarter of this year is less restrictive than the one in effect in the previous quarter, it was judged in the meeting of the Committee for Banking and Financial Affairs of the Economic Chamber of Serbia, which was chaired by Borislav Atanackovic, governor of the National Bank of Serbia.

Although precise limits were set on lendings of the National Bank of Yugoslavia derived from primary issue (262 billion dinars), the projection of monetary policy for the October-December period allows for flexibility and adaptation to the actual conditions for the conduct of economic activity.

Most bankers believe that the discount rate should not be raised so long as the sanctions are in effect, because this would tend to raise lending rates and the general price level, especially for agricultural products.

It was also emphasized in the meeting of the committee that there is sufficient cash in circulation, but not in the legal money channels. Interdicting the "gray" money market would have the influence of forming the exchange rate of the dinar at a more realistic level and at suppressing the "black" foreign exchange market.

Galenika-Energoproject Plan Drug Factories

93BA0168C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
30 Oct 92 p 11

[Article by S.L.: "Based on Agreement With 'Energoproject': Three New Drug Factories"]

[Text] *The total value of anticipated work is \$118 million; billions of U.S. drugs will be produced.*

ICN Galenika and Holding Corporation "Energoproject" concluded an agreement yesterday on the construction of three new drug factories and on the complete renovation of an old factory.

In fact, this is only part of the capital investment project based on material investment by the foreign partner, anticipating the construction of new factories to produce end-use penicillin, end-use cephalosporin, and steroids. A center for quality control and a scientific research institute will also be built as part of the factory, with a chemical and pharmaceutical section.

Drugs will be produced at the new factories on approximately 40,000 square meters of space. The beginning of production of end-use penicillin is anticipated for the end of 1993, with end-use cephalosporin and steroids coming at the end of 1994. The quality control center will begin operation in mid-1995, with the institute coming a year later. Thanks to the technological and ecological solutions of these two plants, ICN Galenika drugs will be found on all world markets.

Once construction and renovation is completed, ICN Galenika will be able to produce and market billions of U.S. drugs, in all pharmacological groups and pharmaceutical forms.

The total planned investment in buildings, infrastructure, and technological and scientific research equipment is \$118 million. Two-thirds of that, or \$78 million, was provided by the foreign partner, while the remaining \$39 million will be provided by the overall ICN corporation and ICN Galenika.

Representatives of ICN Galenika explained that the job was entrusted to Holding Corporation "Energoproject" because it was the most competitive in the international competition for this job.

A continuation of the existing level of good cooperation was affirmed through their signatures on the agreement by Dr. Velimir Brankovic, the vice president of ICN Galenika for Eastern Europe, Mr. Radomir Stojcevic, the president, Mr. Dejan Kovacevic, the general manager of "Energoproject," and Mr. Borosav Jankovic, the head of planning.

Data on Production, Sale of Private Weapons

93BA0189C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Nov 92 p 11

[Article by Dj. Vranjesevic: "Production Barely Able To Keep Up With Sales"]

[Text] Kragujevac, 4 Nov—On the last day of October, the factory of Zastava in Kragujevac which makes sports guns and hunting weapons opened this year's seventh subscription for pistols and revolvers. In the six subscriptions so far customers have been sold 70,000 pistols

and revolvers in all the models which that factory makes, but in this seventh and last for this year they will also be able to buy 9,700 weapons of this kind for personal protection. As has become its usual practice, Zastava guarantees the price as of the date the payment is made, and, we are told in this factory, the pistols and revolvers covered by this subscription will be shipped by 15 December.

This method of marketing through subscription has gone on for two years now, it is one which this factory was for all practical purposes compelled to adopt because of the immense interest of customers when the country was still intact, but the demand for pistols and revolvers has not diminished even now, when the country is made up of only two republics. However, in spite of the sanctions, at the Fair for Hunting and Sports Weapons, Athletics, Fishing, and Tourism held in mid-October in Novi Sad, Zastava's booth was besieged by foreign customers. The greatest number were from Hungary.

In any case, as far as domestic customers are concerned, they represent a phenomenon, because as soon as the subscription is announced, the payment lists are filled in 10 days or so. That is, it is very hard to explain why the sales do not diminish at all, when recently pistols and revolvers have become many times more expensive. For example, the least expensive 7.65-mm pistol has a factory price of 80,500 dinars; the 7.62-mm model costs 108,000 at the factory, the same as the 9-mm M70. The Magnum 357 revolver has a factory price of 173,000 dinars, but the most expensive pistols are the CZ99, which goes for 212,000 dinars, and its 40-mm namesake, the SV, whose factory price is 226,000 dinars.

A turnover tax of 44 percent has to be added to those prices.

Zastava's pistol and revolver factory regularly introduces a new model, at least one a year. And the other day the 10-mm AUTO pistols were displayed. This is actually a modernized model of the former TT. The derringer revolver, which has two barrels, with one round in each, certainly will soon be this factory's greatest innovation. These are revolvers with a hinged barrel. It will be possible to make the model called the Z-200 from small caliber to the largest pistol caliber.

Serbian Bonds Issued To Fight Inflation

93BA0190A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Nov 92 p 13

[Article by S. Vujosevic: "Bonds Against Inflation"]

[Text] *By selling securities, the state is collecting real money for the budget; disgraceful use of securities in the operation of enterprises; stock companies should list their shares on the stock exchange, in order to gather capital.*

This opinion of Branislav Cosic, director of the Belgrade Stock Exchange, which engages in the sale of securities, is also shared by many of our prominent economists.

"It is the best way to collect money, and it should have been started much earlier. We have had extremely good experiences with the Serbian Republic's bonds in 1991. They were sold quickly, and they excited the buyers. The first two issues of federal bonds were also sold very quickly—the first issue in a few days, and the second in a few minutes," Cosic said.

The third issue of federal bonds will start on 20 November, and two days earlier the Serbian Republic's bonds will be on sale.

"The bonds, as securities made out to the bearer, can also be used as a medium of payment—the federal ones for customs duties, and the republic ones for tax obligations—and rate reductions are being offered for this. The most essential thing, however, is that they can be used as money in financial relations between two legal persons. The Americans issue securities for a period of 30 years, but no one would ever buy them if they were not allowed to resell those securities under market conditions," Cosic explained.

Currently, however, the official exchange rate list of the Belgrade Stock Exchange only has one security—shares in Sintelon from Backa Palanka. Yesterday a request was received from Investbank to have its shares listed.

"After the creation of the Belgrade Stock Exchange, the price for these securities will be set on the basis of supply and demand. Currently, most work is being on the secondary sale of the 1991 Serbian Republic bonds, the federation's bonds from the first issue—because the second issue has just been completed and their sale has not yet started—and then treasury notes from banks and commercial notes from enterprises, but also certificates of deposit at banks," Cosic said.

The Belgrade Stock Exchange also performs a brokerage role, because it gathers information about those who are selling them and puts them in touch, and they thus conclude the transaction through it.

"It would be logical for all stock companies to acquire their value by being listed on the stock exchange, and to determine through it at what price they can be bought; that is the purpose of a stock exchange. The companies that are listed on the stock exchange always obtain cheaper capital for their operation. It is believed in the world that an enterprise cannot expand if it is not listed, because investors do not have confidence in it," Cosic explained.

The rules of the New York Stock Exchange prevail at the Belgrade Stock Exchange, and the members of the stock exchange have to adhere to them. Currently the members of the stock exchange are 15 banks in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which are also the founders, and only one enterprise, Dinara, has handled its monetary needs and transactions through the stock exchange.

Serbia, Montenegro Disagree on Budget

93BA0188C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
29 Oct 92 p 7

[Article by B. Matic: "How the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Will Be Financed: Transformation of Armed Forces From Budget"]

[Text] *Serbia supports the proposed Law on Financing the Federal State, while Montenegro proposes that it be debated as a draft version, and announces a blockade on its passage.*

In the Yugoslav Assembly, at a session of the Committee for the Federal Budget of the Chamber of Republics, an interesting about-face occurred yesterday: Serbia went over to the side of the Federal Government, while Montenegro, which in the past has demonstrated greater understanding, announced a blockade and a temporary "end of the love affair." The reason for this conclusion is quite concrete: Serbian deputies supported the proposed Law on Financing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], while in contrast their colleagues from Montenegro stuck to their position that it should potentially be debated, at sessions of the houses of the Assembly, only as a draft version.

Given the fact that the Serbian deputies and the proposers of the law were on the same side, the chairman of the committee in question, Srdja Bozovic, said that the proposal to go on the record during voting as well had lost preponderance. Deputy Radovan Radovic (SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]) commented on this when he said, "Now it turns out that Serbia supports the government of Milan Panic, while Montenegro will not. Now it is clear to me that nothing is clear to me."

What is the real issue here? Fifteen amendments have been submitted to the proposed Law on Financing the Federal State. On the Serbian side, Filip Vukovic (SPS) proposed that the current formula for distributing the excise tax on products and services not be tampered with (40 to 60 in favor of the republics), which the Federal Government accepted with regard to rebalancing the budget for the period from August to December of this year, even though it originally proposed the reverse ratio. With regard to the law on financing the federal state, however, the government proposed in its amendment that the top amount of revenues (excise tax, corporate gains tax, the tax on citizens income and on so-called stocks), which go to the federal budget, be determined each year when the budget is adopted.

Montenegro insisted in particular that disability and veterans protection (including in particular the last war) and solidarity in the event of natural disasters (floods in the north of that Republic) be obligatory as items that will be financed from the Federal Treasury. The Federal Government accepted these items and at least in this regard knocked one of the trump cards out of the Montenegrin deputies' hand.

Yesterday morning, and thus on the second day of harmonizing positions, when Serbian representatives deemed that the Federal Government "was demonstrating a great deal of flexibility" and that there was no reason that the proposed law should not be on the agenda that day, Bozovic had this to say by way of commentary: "Your problem, our responsibility." He added that voting for the Federal Government's proposal is the road to not adopting the law, because there would be a blockade.

The position of the Montenegrin Government, which Bozovic did not mention yesterday, played a decisive role in the announcement of the blockade. Specifically, the government of that Republic holds the view that the revenues of the federal budget should come only from tariffs, duty, and potentially up to 50 percent of the excise tax. All other sources on which the Federal Government is counting would be left to feed the Montenegrin budget. But as far as the announced blockade is concerned, we heard yesterday unofficially that Montenegro will demand that the law on financing the federal state be adopted by a two-thirds majority, which in fact has no constitutional basis, because provisions are made for a simple majority.

As far as the Committee for the Federal Budget of that Chamber is concerned, all three proposed laws—on financing the federal state, on rebalancing the budget to the end of this year, and on transforming the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia—passed yesterday. Compared to the first day of harmonizing positions, the novelty yesterday was the position of the Federal Government toward the amendments submitted to the proposed Law on Financing the FRY. As a "response" to the amendment by Filip Vukovic, according to which the total for five months' support of the federal state be reduced from 107.6 billion to 82.7 billion, the Federal Government proposed that instead of 107.6 billion, an amount of 181.5 billion dinars be earmarked for the financial needs of the FRY.

The reason for the new proposal on increasing the federal budget is the "injection" into the Federal Treasury of 73.7 billion dinars, intended as this year's installment for the transformation of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia.

Another novelty is the fact that with regard to the program for transforming the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, there is an appreciable reduction in funding for constructing official housing (from 151.9 billion to 53.9 billion), so that the number of housing units is reduced proportionally from 3,039 to 1,049.

[Box, p 7]

Who Gets How Much From Federal Budget

Of the 181.6 billion—which is supposed to be the five-month federal budget following rebalancing (if it is approved)—143 billion is projected for financing the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. For the work of FRY institutions, an amount of 22.7 billion is provided, with

300 million for building housing in Kosmet, 3.4 billion as supplemental funding for the Serbian borderlands, 2.1 billion for refugees, 7.2 billion for disability and veterans protection, and 1.7 billion for current reserves.

The Federal Government estimates that on the revenue side 119 billion will be "collected" from excise taxes, with 22.2 billion coming from tariffs, 1.1 billion from duty, 6.9 billion from other revenues, 10.7 billion from securities, and 19.9 billion from National Bank of Yugoslavia loans.

Serbian Firms Engage in Joint Ventures

93BA0190B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Nov 92 p 13

[Article by R. Lazarevic: "A Pair for Cyprus"]

[Text] *Putnik and Kon-Tiki, socially owned and private agencies, are jointly organizing tourist trips to Cyprus, sharing half of both the risk and the profit; Elektrotehna and the Karic Brothers also entered into a joint business on a similar basis.*

Nothing destroys barriers as successfully as interest. Not that long ago, equal participation of socially owned and private firms in the same deal would have been almost inconceivable. Today it is almost becoming a regular practice.

There are more than a few examples. Each one is unique in its own way, and so here are two recent ones that we will discuss somewhat more extensively:

The private tourist agency Kon-Tiki is trying to get back into certain traditionally attractive markets that have currently been abandoned because of the unfavorable circumstances. As early as 17 November, a group of 70 Yugoslav tourists is supposed to leave the Sofia airport for Cyprus. According to this agency's plans, every 10 days a group of domestic tourists would leave for the same trip.

The people at Kon-Tiki are realistic. Proceeding from an assessment that in the present conditions this deal is a rather large mouthful even for an agency with their eminence, they sought a partner to share both the deal, and the risk and the possible profit. They found one in Putnik, a socially owned firm.

"It is not easy to organize a group of 60-70 tourists every 10 days," said Branko Borisavljevic, Kon-Tiki's director. "Organizing the trip is not simple either. We estimated that the chances for success would be much greater if we entered into this deal along with Putnik, which has an exceptional motor pool, a well-developed network of offices, and experienced tourist personnel. We agreed to share everything equally, including the profit."

During the upcoming winter, according to Borisavljevic, Putnik and Kon-Tiki intend to handle one more deal jointly on a similar basis: organizing a tour in Tunisia.

The other example is also illustrative in its own way. Not that long ago, the prominent commercial firm Elektrotehna had been fighting for two years for bare survival. In the meantime, some of their employees split off and founded a new firm. The election of a new leadership turned into a real scandal, bringing to light heaps of "dirty laundry" from the previous period. Creditors stubbornly demanded money, eying Elektrotehna's attractive business premises (the department stores on Knez Mihajlova and Ulica Srpskih Vladara). The firm was left without working capital, and then without goods. The shelves of Elektrotehna's department stores have been literally empty for several months. Bankruptcy was at the door.

When everything seemed hopeless, a ray of salvation appeared in the form of an offer from a private holding company, Keric Brothers, or more precisely a commercial firm within this company. They offered goods, under the condition that the earnings would be shared. The calculation by the people at Keric Brothers was a simple one: Elektrotehna has a retail network located at the best places in the city, but it does not have any goods. The Keric Brothers wholesale operation has both goods and working capital, but not corresponding retail sales.

And a common language was quickly found. According to Velimir Smolic, Elektrotehna's director, this firm's department store is currently selling only goods from Keric Brothers' warehouse, the product line is jointly agreed upon by the department store's director and a representative of Keric Brothers, and the earnings, in this specific case also the margin, is divided in half.

Ownership barriers have apparently become part of the past.

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